08-0363 State Office of Risk Management v, Mary Lawton from Brazos County and the 10th District Court of Appeals, Waco For petitioner: Thomas M. Lipovski, Austin For respondent: Stuart F. Lewis, Bryan For amicus curiae Office of Injured Employee Counsel: Elaine Chaney, Austin The issue is whether the State Office of Risk Management waived its compensability contest arising from a purported work-related knee injury by failing to raise the challenge within the statutory 60-day deadline. In this case the state got a magnetic resonance image (MRI) of the injured knee within a month of the injury but contested compensability only after a medical review determined the knee was subject to a degenerative disease. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Justice Willett not sitting 07-1050 Zachry Construction Corp., et al. v. Texas A&M University from Brazos County and the 10th District Court of Appeals, Waco For petitioners: Ben Taylor, Dallas For respondent: James C. Ho, Austin In this case arising from the 1999 Texas A&M bonfire collapse principal issues involve third-party claims against the university: (1) whether, if sovereign immunity has been waived on liability, waiver also must be necessary for a derivative contribution claim against the university; (2) whether Texas A&M's immunity is waived by use of university property for the bonfire construction under the Tort Claims Act's tangible personal or real property provision; (3) whether Texas A&M had actual notice of a premises defect; and (4) whether, if immune, the university's proportionate responsibility can be determined if it is not joined in the lawsuit. The trial court denied Texas A&M's jurisdictional plea, but the court of appeals reversed and dismissed the claims against the university. Since the Court granted the petition, A&M has argued it should be dismissed after the university settled with all injured plaintiffs last fall. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issue in this contest over a tax exemption is whether a non-profit municipal corporation that owns student housing lost the basis for its exemption when it housed mostly high-school students for summer camps and programs. Specifically, did Texas Student Housing Authority satisfy exemptions provided by Texas Tax Code section 11.11(a) (used for public purposes), Texas Education Code section 53.46 (benefiting students in an accredited higher-education institution) or Tax Code 11.11(e) (not used for other than college students or state employees)? Texas Student Housing, created in 1995 by Westlake, a municipality near Denton, sued after the appraisal district revoked the tax exemption for a dorm it owns near Texas A&M University because the dorm housed students attending summer camps and programs on campus. The trial court rendered judgment for the appraisal district. The appeals court affirmed the revocation for two of three years, but reversed for the third, holding that programs for one summer were related definitely and intimately to Texas A&M's legislative mandate.

The principal issues are (1) whether a cardiovascular surgeon's firing, under a contract provision allowing termination without cause after a set employment period, requires the employer to prove it fired the surgeon on without-cause grounds to disprove a contract-breach claim; (2) whether the employment contract's stipulation for "annual practice losses" is ambiguous and, if not, whether the hospital the employer established the condition to terminate without cause; (3) whether a tortious interference-with-contract claim is precluded if the contract was not breached; and (4) whether the Second Torts Restatement's truthful-information defense (section 772) should be adopted in this case and, if so, whether it would cover a consultant's performance assessment to preclude the tortious-interference claim.

A principal issue is whether a plaintiff may recover attorney fees for a Texas Construction Trust Fund claim.

In this fraud suit against an attorney, the issues are (1) whether Youngkin proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hines's claims are subject to the Texas Citizens Participation Act; (2) whether Hines demonstrated by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case on all essential elements of his claims; and (3) whether Youngkin established by clear and specific evidence his litigation-privilege defense.

The issues in this fight against parental-rights termination by a father whose child was removed because the mother was addicted to cough syrup are (1) whether the state violated a father’s right to due process by terminating for his failure to follow a court-ordered service plan; (2) whether such compliance with a family-service plan should be measured objectively or subjectively; and (3) whether evidence of child endangerment was enough to support termination.

This case results from a single-vehicle accident after Texas A&M University changed the design of an intersection and presents the issues of (1) the scope of an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act for a governmental unit's exercise of discretionary powers, (2) when an off-road defect constitutes a special defect under the act, and (3) whether a plaintiff should be provided an opportunity to replead when the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction challenges only the failure to plead sufficient facts and not the existence of facts establishing jurisdiction.

At issue is whether claims under the Texas Constitution's "republican form of government" clause present a nonjusticiable political question.