The issue in this case is whether a title dispute permits a payor of oil-and-gas proceeds to withhold payments without interest under the safe-harbor provision of the Texas Natural Resources Code. The safe-harbor statute permits payors of oil-and-gas proceeds to withhold payments without interest if there is a payee title dispute that would affect distribution of payments or reasonable doubt as to the payee's clear title.

A main issue is whether a creditor's bona fide protections pass to a subsequent purchaser if the property is purchased through a receivership sale rather than through foreclosure.

The primary issue in these cases is whether an executive order barring local mask mandates falls within the scope of authority granted to the Governor under the Texas Disaster Act.

The principal issues in this personal-injury case are (1) whether AEP Texas Central, by contract, retained control over an independent subcontractor charged with filling in power-pole holes after their removal and, if a duty exists, (2) whether Arredondo's negligence allegation is actually a premises-liability claim founded on a land condition.

The principal issues in this interlocutory challenge to the trial court's order denying the district's jurisdictional plea, in a retaliation suit based on a same-sex sexual harassment claim, are (1) whether but-for causation is a jurisdictional element in Texas Commission on Human Rights Act allegation and (2) whether the same-sex hostile-work environment allegation constitutes gender discrimination under the statute.

09-0955 Allen Keller Co. v. Barbara Jean Foreman, et al. from Gillespie County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio granted on rehearing For petitioner: Wade Crosnoe, Austin For respondents: Randy Howry, Austin The issue is whether a contractor working for a county owes a duty to protect the public from a danger created pursuant to a contract requiring absolute compliance. In this case a car in which Foreman's daughter was a passenger drove through a gap between a guardrail and an embankment Keller widened according to the county's mandatory specifications. Foreman's daughter drowned when the car plunged into the river. The trial court granted summary judgment for Keller, but the court of appeals reversed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this effort to recover underinsured-motorist payments are (1) whether a declaratory-judgment action is appropriate for such a recovery and (2) whether a declaratory judgment for recovering underinsured-motorist benefits may be used also to recover attorney fees.

08-0110 American General Finance Inc. v. Kyle Allen from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Richard C. Danysh, San Antonio For respondent: Thomas H. Crofts Jr., San Antonio A principal issue is whether a borrower qualifies as a consumer under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act when the lender promised escrow services in addition to the loan. In this case Allen sued American General Finance on a counterclaim after foreclosure of a house he owned on which the company made a home-equity loan and promised to pay outstanding taxes. Before this suit, Allen won excess proceeds from the house sale, which American General Finance then tried to get by imposing a constructive trust. Allen counterclaimed in that the company violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. On that claim the trial court granted summary judgment against Allen. The court of appeals reversed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

At issue in this case is whether one oil-and-gas company's forced-pooling offer to another, which included a 10% risk penalty, was unreasonably low under the Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act.

In this dispute involving agreements between West, the chief executive for several of Quintanilla's businesses, the issues are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under expanded authority giving the Court broad power to determine questions important to the state's jurisprudence, enacted in 2017 after the dispute arose, and (2) whether the parol-evidence rule bars West's evidence of an alleged separate agreement to discharge West's debts to Quintanilla.

The principal issue in this case in which a real-estate scam is alleged is whether an amended petition without new material factual allegations amounts to a new "legal action" under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, triggering anew the 60-day deadline for a defendant to move to dismiss.

The issue is whether State Farm violated the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act by delaying payment on a claim until, after being sued by its policyholder, it invoked the policy's appraisal clause.

The primary issue in this case is whether the defendant is entitled to a settlement credit under the one-satisfaction rule.

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 09-0399 BP America Production Co., et al. v. Stanley G. Marshall, et al. from Zapata County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner BP America: Thomas R. Phillips, Austin For petitioner Wagner Oil: Pamela Stanton Baron, Austin For respondents Stanley G. Marshall Jr., et al.: Tim Patton, San Antonio For respondents Vaquillas Ranch Co., et al.: David M. Gunn, Houston In this case by mineral interest-holders alleging BP fraudulently continued a lease it had ceased working, the issues are (1) whether the discovery rule tolled limitations; (2) whether BP's communications with a mineral interest-holder amounted to legal opinion or created a false impression that required full disclosure; (3) whether BP, which leased its production interest, can be required to account for future net profits even though it no longer possesses producing wells; (4) whether a successor lessee to BP's interest, as co-tenant, can claim title to the mineral interests by adverse possession against the other tenant; and (5) whether BP's successor to its lease interest can be a bona fide purchaser, if it took title without knowledge of the alleged fraud. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this wrongful pooling case, the issues are (1) whether the owner impliedly ratified the pooling by depositing royalty checks and (2) whether estoppel prevents the owner from denying ratification.

In this dispute over a fee-simple conveyance to a trust beneficiary, later corrected to be a life estate, the issues are (1) whether the original deed is void; (2) whether Property Code section 5.029, allowing for non-judicial corrections for material mistakes, requires that Yates and its assignees, current owners of the property interest but not parties to the original instrument, sign the 2013 correction deed to validate the change; and (3) whether limitations bars the suit even if the Property Code section applies.

The issue is whether the City of San Antonio Water System is entitled to governmental immunity from Campbellton's breach-of-contract suit.

Canyon Regional Water Authority v. Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority from Guadalupe County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Gregory S. Coleman, Austin For respondent: David P. Blanke, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether 'paramount use' question in water authority's condemnation in public lake. The issue is whether the river authority, the owner of a lake, offered sufficient evidence challenging the water authority's condemnation of part of the lake to require the water authority to show its water need was paramount to the lake's prior public use. In this case, the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority sued after negotiations broke down on the water authority's plan to build a second water intake on Lake Dunlap near New Braunfels. The river authority argues that the intake interferes with the lake's recreational use. The trial court held that Canyon Regional Water Authority had rights to construct the intake under an existing easement, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the easement allowed only one intake and that water authority offered no evidence of a paramount public use.

In this gas-explosion case that injured a homeowner's father as he checked on an appliance the issues are (1) whether CenterPoint had a duty to inspect a residence's interior before gas service was begun; (2) whether liability limitations under CenterPoint's tariff were implicated if the plaintiffs were not customers, consumers or applicants under the tariff; (3) whether a tariff's liability limitations can apply to a non-customer as a legal matter; and (4) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the verdict under a negligence or negligent-undertaking theory.

In this case over a "cost-free" overriding royalty on gross minerals production, from wells on Hyder's property that produced from an adjoining leasehold, a principal issue is whether post-production costs may be deducted from Hyder's overriding royalties. Hyder sued Chesapeake for underpaying royalties from Chesapeake's slant-drilling production from wells on Hyder's land. The central dispute is whether Hyder's lease with Chesapeake for oil-and-gas production from her minerals estate, allowing for post-production costs, should inform a provision that provides a cost-free 5 percent royalty for directional production from adjacent estates. The trial court ruled that Hyder was entitled to an overriding royalty free of post-production costs. The court of appeals affirmed.

The issues are (1) whether a party who failed to admit negligence during discovery but admitted negligence during trial should be sanctioned for discovery abuse and (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supports the jury's gross-negligence finding.

The issue in this case challenging Laredo's plastic-bag-ban ordinance is whether state solid-waste law preempts the city's ban with "unmistakable clarity."

The issues, involving a motorcyclist injured when he tried to avoid traffic slowing as a patrol officer used his car's emergency lights, the issues are (1) whether enough evidence established a nexus between the patrol car's use and the motorcyclist's injuries; (2) whether bystanders' statements that the accident was the police officer's fault were speculative; (3) whether the police officer's use of his patrol car's lights was too attenuated from the accident; and (4) whether needs-risk balancing the correct standard for determining good faith in non-pursuit officer immunity cases.

The issues in this case, involving one vehicle under police pursuit colliding with a third car when the pursued car traveled the wrong way on a highway access road, are (1) whether a nexus exists between injuries and operation of the patrol car enough to waive the city' immunity; (2) whether the Masperos showed enough evidence of recklessness by the police officer to be an exception to the immunity waiver; and (3) whether negligent policy implementation constitutes an independent ground for immunity waiver.

10-0688 CMH Homes Inc., et al. v. Adam Perez from Duval County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Mr. Scott A. Brister, Austin For respondent: Mr. Brendan McBride, San Antonio The principal issue is whether a trial court order appointing an arbitrator in lieu of the parties' impasse is subject to interlocutory review under Civil Practices and Remedies Code . If not, counsel for CMH Homes argues that the interlocutory appeal should be considered a mandamus petition, inviting the Court to adopt the concurrence in In re D. Wilson Construction Co. (at 784, suggesting an improper appeal should be treated as a mandamus petition). This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this royalties dispute are (1) whether a grandmother's bequest of all "right, title and interest" in her ranch includes minerals after the surface estate was severed; (2) whether grandchildren who took remainder mineral interests from their father as life tenant can recover royalties Conoco paid on leases it executed without their signatures; (3) whether the appeals court erred by awarding prejudgment interest to the grandchildren, under the Natural Resources Code, for pressing a title dispute; and (4) whether the court erred by awarding the grandchildren $1.1 million in attorneys fees.

The primary issues in these cases are whether the Electric Reliability Council of Texas is a "governmental unit" entitled to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and whether ERCOT has governmental immunity from suit.

In this permissive appeal regarding insurance, the primary issues are: (1) whether an insurer's duty of "good faith and fair dealing" included the insured's accidental death that occurred during the investigation of covered accident, (2) whether the insurer created a new duty by "instructing" the insured after the accident, and (3) whether the court recognized a new direct-liability, extra-contractual cause of action against the insurer for the insured's death.

In this expunction case the issues are (1) whether a drunk-driving arrest record may be expunged when court-ordered supervision was served for a possession-of-marijuana charge arising from the same arrest and, if not, (2) whether a nondisclosure order for the possession charge otherwise has any effect on the DWI expunction.

07-1051 Galbraith Engineering Consultants Inc. v. Sam Pochucha and Jean Pochucha from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Stephen E. Walraven, San Antonio For respondents: Robert W. Loree, San Antonio The issue is whether a 10-year repose statute barring a lawsuit against an engineer prohibits joining an engineer as a responsible third party under another statute that allows joinder despite expiration of a statute of limitations. The Pochuchas sued the contractor who built the house, then joined him as a defendant after the contractor designated him as a responsible third party. The trial court granted Galbraith summary judgment because he had not been sued within10 years. The court of appeals reversed, holding that joinder was permitted even after limitations expired. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues are (1) whether for an attorney-malpractice claim Skelton was considered "exonerated" under Peller v. Hughes & Luce of a forgery conviction by winning a decision on habeas corpus for ineffective assistance and, if the holding in the plurality Peeler decision is reconsidered, (2) whether her malpractice claim was within time limits under Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins.

07-1065 Raoul Hagen v. Doris J. Hagen from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Ryan G. Anderson, San Antonio For respondent: Gary A. Beahm, San Antonio The issue is whether an action to determine if a 1976 divorce decree award of "Army Retirement Pay or Military Retirement Pay" includes disability benefits is a collateral attack barred by res judicata. When the Hagens divorced in 1976, Doris Hagen got rights to almost half of Raoul Hagen's military retirement pay. Then, after the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs determined in 2003 he was 40 percent disabled, Raoul Hagen elected to draw 40 percent of his retirement pay as disability benefits, which under federal law cannot be divided as property. As a result, Raoul began paying his ex-wife her percentage share of the 60 percent he got in military retirement. When Doris sued, the trial court determined the divorce decree did not require him to split his disability payments. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Raoul's retroactive advantage of the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act's exclusion of disability pay was barred because it was a matter a court already decided. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this case seeking the city's specific performance to develop park land, the issue are (1) whether the city had governmental immunity when it entered a memorandum allegedly pledging to develop a park in conjunction with a historic-bridge restoration and, if so, (2) whether the immunity is waived when the restoration group seeks specific performance.

The issues in the challenge to mandatory arbitration under loan agreements are (1) whether the borrowers' claims fall within the arbitration provision because the contest is over the lender's criminal complaints against them and (2) whether by pursuing criminal charges the lender waived arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process.

The principal issues in this title-slander and tortious-interference case involve legal-sufficiency questions going to support for the verdict and causation in both the slander and interference claims and whether legally sufficient evidence supports the malice finding on which exemplary damages were awarded. In this case HMC, a Host Hotels & Resorts subsidiary that leased property beneath its San Antonio hotel, sued Keystone, alleging Keystone breached a lease provision that HMC would be notified if Keystone decided to sell the property and would not sell it at a price more favorable than HMC offered if HMC wanted it. HMC had 90 days to negotiate such a sale. HMC notified Keystone that it wanted to buy but disputed the offer Keystone had from a third party. In negotiations that followed, Keystone asked HMC to waive the 90 days' negotiation period it had under the lease because the other buyer faced a federal tax-advantage deadline. HMC certified that the lease was not in default, then three days later told Keystone the lease was in default and demanded 90 more days for negotiating its purchase. When HMC and Keystone failed to close, HMC sued, arguing that the other proposed sale violated its right of negotiation in its lease with Keystone. Keystone countered, alleging HMC interfered with its contract to sell to the third party and, by HMC's letter claiming the lease in default, slandered its title and scuttled the transaction. A jury found for Keystone on both the tortious-interference and title-slander claims and awarded punitive damages, but the trial court granted HMC's motion to disregard the malice finding supporting the exemplary damages and awarded damages for slander. The appeals court reinstated the punitive-damage award.

In this premises-liability claim arising from a Brown Recluse-spider bite the issue is whether the wild-animal doctrine -- farae naturae -- protects the property owner from suit by an invitee claiming the owner had a duty to warn that dangerous spiders existed in the premises where he was bitten.

The issues in this case involving a trade-secrets sealing order after trial are (1) whether the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act conflicts with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a; (2) whether a stipulated protective order grants the trial court power to amend the original protective order sealing trial exhibits; and (3) whether the retroactive sealing of trial documents violates the First Amendment.

In this lawsuit following the 2017 Sutherland Springs church massacre, against the gun seller Academy Sports + Outdoors, the issues are (1) whether mandamus relief is proper from the trial court's summary-judgment denial against Academy based on the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act's immunity provision and (2) whether the federal law bars suits against the seller for, among other claims, negligence and negligent entrustment.

The issues in this attorney-fee dispute are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial based on findings that the fee agreement unambiguously provided for an ownership interest among attorney fees and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting the new trial based on insufficient factual and legal support for waiver and estoppel defenses.

The primary issues in these cases are whether the Electric Reliability Council of Texas is a "governmental unit" entitled to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and whether ERCOT has governmental immunity from suit.

The issues in this case, in which a policyholder agreed to pay $100,000 more to settle a claim than her insurer was willing to agree to, are (1) whether the appeals court abused its discretion by denying mandamus relief from the trial court's refusal to dismiss the insured's Stowers claim and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss the insured's breach-of-contract claim when the policy expressly allows the insurer to defend or settle the case as it "considers appropriate." Longoria, the insured, alleges in part Farmers mishandled her defense by not designating damages experts before trial.

(Chief Justice Jefferson not sitting) 07-0581 In re Harold R. Schmitz, et al. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For relators: Debra J. McComas, Dallas For real party in interest: Kevin K. Green, San Diego The Supreme Court will hear arguments of whether a lawyer's letter challenging a proposed merger was sufficient as a pre-suit demand before a derivative-shareholder lawsuit. Principal issues are (1) whether a letter objecting to a merger agreement constituted a proper demand letter required to file a shareholder-derivative suit under Texas law; (2) whether irreparable injury was established that justified waiver of the 90-day waiting period before suit; and (3) whether an adequate remedy by appeal existed. In this case a shareholder sued Lancer Corp. board members after the board accepted a merger offer valued at $1 a share less than another offer, citing what the board considered to be more favorable sales conditions. Two months after the proposed merger's announcement, an attorney faxed the company a letter attacking the merger. Three days later a shareholder sued to stop the merger and to declare board members breached their fiduciary duties by selling at an alleged inadequate and unfair price. Lancer shareholders later approved the merger. Board members then moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that Dillingham, the shareholder who challenged the merger, had not satisfied a statutory requirement under the Texas Business and Corporation Act article 5.14 to present her demands before filing her suit. The trial court denied the dismissal motion. On a petition for mandamus relief, to order the trial court to dismiss, the court of appeals rejected the petition.

In this case challenging a trial court's order establishing a mother's aunt and uncle permanent custodians of her children but allowing the mother visitation at their sole discretion, the issues are (1) whether "as-agreed" visitation orders violate Texas Family Code section 153.006(c) requiring specificity for visitation schedules and (2) whether Texas Family Code section 262.201(o), allowing a temporary custody proceeding before service can be shown by publication, violates a parent's due-process rights.

07-0322 In re James Allen Hall from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For relator: Tim Patton, San Antonio For real party in interest: Kevin Patrick Yeary, San Antonio The principal issue is whether an adult held over from juvenile-delinquency confinement on a 40-year determinate sentence has a right to an attorney for a habeas corpus action. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0309 In re Joseph Charles Rubiola, et al. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For relator: Ms. Elizabeth Conry Davidson, San Antonio For real parties in interest: Mr. Bryan A. Woods, San Antonio The issue is whether arbitration can be compelled for misrepresentation claims involving a home sale when (a) the home-sale agreement did not contain an arbitration provision but the mortgage contract did and (b) the principals selling the house and financing it were the same. The mortgage-agreement arbitration clause covered "each and all persons and entities signing this agreement or any other agreements between or among any of the parties as part of this transaction." The trial court refused to compel arbitration. The court of appeals denied the sellers mandamus relief. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues are (1) whether Family Code section 161.211(c) precludes challenging a voluntary parental-rights termination on insufficient-evidence grounds and (2) whether a voluntary relinquishment by itself supports termination as in the child's best interests.

07-0419 In re Labatt Food Service L.P. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For relator: Nissa Dunn, San Antonio For real party in interest: Leo D. Figueroa, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments on (1) whether a pre-death arbitration agreement binds a person's wrongful-death beneficiaries and (2) whether the prohibition of pre-injury waivers of personal-injury or death claims under Texas Labor Code section 406.033(e) defeats the decedent's arbitration agreement. Principal issues are (1) whether an agreement to arbitrate occupational injury or death claims binds a person's wrongful-death beneficiaries and (2) whether the arbitration agreement is barred by the statutory prohibition of personal-injury or death-claim waivers under Texas Labor Code section 406.033(e). In this case the trial court refused to compel arbitration of wrongful death and survivors' claims after a Labatt employee died in a work accident. The court of appeals denied the company's mandamus petition. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Both sides in this case attack by mandamus petitions an appeal bond set after the trial court's judgment against two of Longview Energy's company directors who allegedly used proprietary information to buy mineral leases that Longview was trying to purchase. The principal issues are (1) whether disgorged profits are compensatory damages for calculating a bond to supersede the judgment; (2) whether the appeals court erred by calculating the bond at $25 million, based on the judgment as a whole and not on individual defendants; and (3) whether the trial court by post-judgment discovery order properly compelled defendants to file monthly reports on assets and proceeds from the disputed leases. Longview sued the directors, Huff and D'Angelo, and their related companies, after recruiting them as investors in the planned lease purchase. In the trial court Longview got judgment for almost $100 million and a constructive trust on the disputed property and mineral rights. The trial court ordered supersedeas bonds against defendants up to $25 million, to be posted by each. The appeals court reversed the trial court's decision to impose an appeal bond against individual defendants but affirmed the ruling that disgorged profits are compensatory damages for calculating the appeal bond.

The issues in this case are (1) whether, and in what circumstances, a guardian may petition for divorce on behalf of a ward; and (2) the effect of one spouse's death on the appeal from a divorce decree.

08-0660 In re Satterfield & Pontikes Construction Inc. from Duval County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For relator: Nicholas A. Parma, San Antonio For real party in interest: Craig T. Enoch, Austin The principal issue is whether the trial court erred (a) when it severed all subcontractors from a school district's lawsuit against Satterfield, the prime contractor, even though the court previously permitted Satterfield to amend the suit to add the subcontractors, or (b) when the court refused to consolidate Satterfield's suits against the subcontractors, or (c) both. In this case Satterfield claimed its subcontractors did all construction on a high school and moved to add them to the suit alleging construction defects. The trial court granted the motion without notice to either party. Then Satterfield sued the subcontractors in a separate action and tried to consolidate those suits with the district's. The trial court denied the motion. When Satterfield learned the court granted its earlier motion to file a third-party petition against the subcontractors, Satterfield amended and served them. The trial court denied the district's motion to strike the subcontractors from the suit, but severed them on its own motion. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief. As in the Scoggins case, an important issue is whether Satterfield has an adequate remedy by appeal if the trial court clearly abused its discretion. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this interlocutory appeal, from denial of a dismissal motion in a guardianship dispute in which the petitioner alleges lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the proposed ward was not properly served under the Texas Estates Code, the issues are (1) whether the petition is moot and (2) whether James Fairley, the ward, was served in compliance with Texas Estates Code chapter 1051 and, if not, (3) whether the probate court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

07-0871 In re United Services Automobile Association from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For relator: Pamela Stanton Baron, Austin For real party in interest: Jeff Small, San Antonio In this age-discrimination suit, the principal issue after a question of proper mandamus jurisdiction is whether the plaintiff filed his action in district court too late. The mandamus proceeding questions whether the limitations period under Texas Labor Code chapter 21 remains mandatory and jurisdictional after Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000). Also at issue is whether the time periods in Chapter 21 are subject to tolling under Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code section 16.064. This suit was the second by the complainant. His first, filed in county court at law, was reversed on appeal because the county court did not have jurisdiction. Five years after the initial complaint, he filed in district court. The trial court in the second suit denied USAA's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals denied the company's mandamus petition, concluding USAA had an adequate remedy by appeal. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this case, in which the insurer agreed to be bound after a negligence verdict, the issues are (1) whether the trial court erred by concluding a second trial to determine underinsured-motorist coverage was necessary; (2) whether the policyholder is barred by collateral estoppel from litigating negligence and damages in a second trial; and (3) whether USAA is entitled to mandamus relief.

The primary issue in this case is whether substantial compliance is sufficient to avoid termination of parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) of the Family Code.

The principal issues in this juvenile-delinquency case are (1) whether the jury verdict was unanimous when the instruction was to find one or another act charged as deadly conduct but jurors did not specify which and (2) whether civil law or criminal law applies to determine if the ostensible jury-charge error was fundamental and requires reversal.

In this wrongful-death case resulting from truck-pedestrian accident, the issues are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding as prejudicial evidence that the pedestrian suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disease, had not taken her medication the day of the accident and had drugs and alcohol in her system when she was hit as she stepped into a street and (2) whether her family, as wrongful-death claimants, properly submitted a negligent-training claim against the truck driver's employer when the employer conceded its vicarious liability for the driver's negligence.

09-0269 Jefferson State Bank v. Christina C. Lenk from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Ellen B. Mitchell, San Antonio For respondent: S. Mark Murray, San Antonio Principal issues in this case involving estate funds paid to an imposter administrator are (1) whether a bank can rely under the Probate Code on fraudulent administration letters to give the imposter administrator access to the decedent's account without liability and (2) whether the bank's making bank statements available started time running to bar any action on an unauthorized transaction. In this case an administrator for two estates sued for money a onetime Bexar County probate clerk took from the estates using fraudulent letters of administration. The bank argues that the letters were "facially valid" and protected it from liability and bank statements were given by a receiver to the court-appointed administrator more than a year before she demanded payment from the bank. The bank contends that her payment demand was beyond the Uniform Commercial Code's one-year repose period. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank. The court of appeals reversed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this personal-injury case involving a car-truck accident are (1) whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence that a second car accident fewer than three months later may have caused Garza's injury and (2) whether the trial court's barring the evidence probably resulted in an improper judgment. Several days after the first accident Garza's doctor ordered X-rays and diagnosed tense muscles for her neck and back pain. Almost three months later, after her car was hit broadside in the second accident, she complained of head and neck pain but hospital X-rays showed no evident injuries. Three weeks later she returned to the orthopedic doctor who treated her after the first accident, this time for radiating pain in her arms and back. A magnetic resonating image - MRI - showed two herniated discs. Another MRI more than a year later revealed two additional herniated discs. In her negligence suit against the trucking company Garza alleged her back injury resulted from the first accident. The doctor who first treated her testified the herniated discs resulted from accident trauma in the first wreck, but he testified he had not reviewed her medical records from the second accident. JPL contends the MRI shows Garza's back injury was not the result of trauma at all. JLG sought to introduce evidence of the second accident, but the trial judge barred any reference to the second accident as not relevant because of JLG's theory that the back injury was degenerative or caused by her weight. The jury returned a $1.1 million verdict for Garza. The court of appeals affirmed.

Principal issues are (1) whether a declaratory-judgment action is proper to determine a deed without warranty or an easement's existence and (2) whether failure to attach evidence to a summary-judgment motion constitutes substantive error requiring reversal.

07-0131 John Christopher Franka, M.D., et al. v. Stacey Velasquez and Saragosa Alaniz from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Thomas H. Crofts Jr., San Antonio For respondents: Gene Hagood, Alvin The Supreme Court will hear arguments in this medical-malpractice case against two doctors at the University of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio, the issue is whether they should be dismissed from the suit because it "could have been brought" against the Health Sciences Center. The issue in this medical-malpractice case against two doctors at the University of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio is whether they should be dismissed from the suit because it "could have been brought" against the Health Sciences Center. Both doctors, one a professor and the other a resident, moved for summary judgment under Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code section 101.106(f). That section provides that a suit against a government employee over conduct within the scope of the employee's work shall be dismissed if not amended to name, in this case, the UT Health Sciences Center instead. The trial court denied the summary-judgment motion and the court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

John Leland, D.D.S. v. George C. Brandal and Ruth L. Brandal from Bandera County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Kathryn A. Stephens, San Antonio For respondents: Beth Squires, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether appeals court that held med-mal expert report deficient can remand for extension to cure defect. The principal issues are (1) whether an appeals court that holds a medical-expert report deficient can remand for consideration of a 30-day extension to file an adequate report or must render judgment for the defendant and, if the appellate court can remand, (2) whether the plaintiff waived the extension by filing supplemental expert reports within time limits upon the defendant's objection to the original reports. In this case Leland objected to the adequacy of two expert reports the Brandals served. The Brandals then filed supplemental reports before the 120-day deadline expired. The trial court denied Leland's objection to the supplemented expert reports. When the court of appeals reversed, it remanded the case to consider a 30-day extension to cure the defect. The case also presents a jurisdictional question - whether the interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court can be heard by the Court, based on whether a concurring opinion in the court of appeals creates a conflict in this case.

In this dispute over a warranty deed by a previous owner after that owner gave the property as a gift to his spouse, the principal issue is whether the estoppel-by-deed doctrine requires the previous owner's sons, who inherited from their mother, to surrender their interest to satisfy their father's warranty breach.

The principal issues are (1) whether deed restrictions providing homes to be "used solely for residential purposes" and not "business purposes" prevent a homeowner from leasing his home for short periods and (2) whether the deed restrictions prohibit use by multiple families and, if so, whether sufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding that the homeowner rented to multiple families.

The principal issues in this inverse-condemnation action are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supports damages from a flood-control structure on an easement that Kopplow claims would cause flooding on its remainder property during a 100-year flood; (2) whether Kopplow's inverse-condemnation claim is ripe; and (3) whether Kopplow's claim is barred by the rule that damages cannot be recovered by a property owner when the government takes adjoining land. Kopplow's suit alleged that the city's building a flood-control wall on a utility easement through its property for a nearby flood-diversion project raised the 100-year-flood plain and forced it to elevate its property to meet federal development requirements. The court of appeals reversed the damages award for the remainder property, holding that insufficient evidence supported the claim.

10-0096? Lancer Insurance Co. v. Garcia Holiday Tours ?from Jim Wells County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: E. Thomas Bishop, Dallas?For respondents Garcia Holiday Tours, et al.: Stephen J. Chapman, Corpus Christi For respondents passengers: David George, Houston A principal issue is whether a standard commercial-automobile policy covers charter-bus passengers for tuberculosis they allegedly contracted from the bus driver as an accident "resulting from ownership, maintenance or use" of the covered bus. Garcia Holiday Tours sued Lancer after Lancer refused to defend or indemnify Garcia in a suit by students and a chaperone who contracted latent TB on an Alice High School band trip. Garcia lost a $5.25 million judgment. In the declaratory-judgment action the trial court granted summary judgment against Lancer on the duty to defend and indemnify. The appeals court reversed, concluding fact questions existed on whether the TB resulted from the bus's use, precluding the passengers' summary judgment. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in this supersedeas-bond contest is whether the appeals court had jurisdiction to review the trial court's post-judgment bond.

The issues are (1) whether the Texas Arbitration Act preempts common-law grounds for vacating an arbitration award and (2) whether the arbitrator, in dismissing supplemental claims, denied the challenging party a right to a hearing on those claims. This case involves initial claims by a son against his mother, against his brother and against the family company. All parties settled with an agreement approved in bankruptcy court, but as part of that settlement the bankruptcy court enjoined them from continuing litigation without the court's approval. Despite that, Leonard Hoskins sued the company, his mother and the other brother, Clifton Hoskins, over the company's sale of a ranch to Clifton. Leonard's mother owned half the company under her late husband's will and was trustee and beneficiary of a marital trust that owned the other half of the company. The bankruptcy court ordered all parties to arbitration. Leonard Hoskins then challenged the sale anew in arbitration and also a loan Clifton got from the family company years earlier, complaining his brother was acting as de facto trustee and breaching fiduciary duties he owed to beneficiaries of his father's estate. After the arbitrator dismissed Leonard Hoskins's claims on the loan and conveyance, he then brought challenges to two different conveyances. Without a hearing, the arbitrator dismissed Leonard's additional claims against Clifton and the company and awarded attorney fees. A trial court confirmed the arbitration award and denied Leonard's motion to vacate the award, based on manifest disregard for the law. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the Texas Arbitration Act's grounds to vacate were exclusive and Leonard did not have a hearing right on his supplemental claims because he lacked standing to bring them.

The principal issues in this subsurface-trespass action are (1) whether a producer can drill through another mineral lease without the lessee's permission to produce from its leasehold and (2) whether the proper action in this case is tortious interference with the lease between the mineral-estate owner and its lessee.

In this appeal, involving allegations that directors breached fiduciary duties by usurping a corporate opportunity to invest in shale property the company was considering, principal issues are (1) whether Longview pleaded its claim that the directors competed with it without Longview's informed consent and, if not, whether the trial court properly submitted a liability question based on the competition claim; (2) whether the appeals court erred in applying Delaware corporate-opportunity law by recognizing a director's loyalty may be breached by competing against the company without authorization; and (3) whether sufficient evidence supported Longview had an interest or expectancy in shale property it was considering for investment.

The issues in this insurance-defense dispute are (1) whether an exception to the eight-corners rule should be created when undisputed evidence shows the policyholder committed fraud and colluded to get coverage and (2) whether the insurer should have pressed, by a declaratory action, that it had no duty to defend before terminating representation.

The issue is whether devise of a "double-fraction royalty" was a "fixed" fractional royalty or a "floating" fraction of royalty. In this case one line of descendants who took royalty interests bequeathed to three children in 1949 sued to declare the will split royalties equally among the three children (and, later, their descendants and successors) after other another in a line of descendants executed a lease with a royalty greater than 1/8th. The will provided an undivided one-third of an undivided 1/8th royalty to each child who got separate tracts but mineral rights in all. But did that mean sharing a one-third royalty equally or that those children - and their descendants - got a 1/24th royalty from production on the other tracts? Texas courts have been split on how such a bequest should be interpreted. In this case the trial court granted the Hysaw descendants summary judgment, ruling that the will devised to each of the three children a one-third royalty from all tracts. The court of appeals reversed, holding that descendants were entitled to a 1/24th share of production from the other two tracts.

(Justice Willett and Justice Guzman not sitting) 09-0073 Merck & Co. Inc. v. Felicia Garza, et al. from Starr County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Stephen G. Tipps, Houston For respondents: Kevin Dubose, Houston A principal issue is whether clinical-testing evidence showing a less-than-double risk in the general population, combined with other evidence, can legally prove toxic-injury causation under Havner's more-likely-than-not reliability standard. Garza sued Merck after her husband, who had a history of heart ailments, died of rare simultaneous arterial clots after taking Vioxx prescribed by his cardiologist. Merck challenged as legally insufficient Garza's expert testimony in a motion to disregard the jury verdict for Garza. The court of appeals initially reversed and rendered judgment for Merck, holding that Garza did not refute with reasonable certainty that her husband's pre-existing heart condition was a plausible cause of death. On rehearing, the appeals court held that Garza's expert testimony met Havner's requirements. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0316 Methodist Healthcare System of San Antonio Ltd., L.L.P. v. Emmalene Rankin from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Carl Robin Teague and Rosemarie Kanusky, San Antonio For respondent: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas The principal issue is whether the 10-year statute of repose on medical-malpractice claims violates the Texas Constitution's open-courts provision when Rankin discovered a sponge had been left i her abdomen almost 11 years after surgery. In the trial court the defendants got summary judgment, based on the statute of repose. But the court of appeals declared the repose unconstitutional, reasoning that the statute deprived Rankin of her right to compensation before she had a reasonable opportunity to discover the injury. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0544 Jeremy Molinet v. Patrick Kimbrell, M.D. and John Horan, M.D. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Eugene W. Brees, Austin For respondents: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas The issue is whether the two-year medical-malpractice limitations on suit ("notwithstanding any other law") is trumped by the proportionate-responsibility law's provision to join third parties ("even though such joinder would otherwise be barred by limitations"). Molinet sued a podiatrist for malpractice, then after the podiatrist designated Kimbrell and Horan as responsible third parties, Molinet amended his suit to include them. Kimbrell and Horan moved to dismiss, arguing that the joinder was beyond the limitations in a health-care liability action. The trial court denied their motion. The court of appeals reversed.This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issue is whether the operator must prove it complied with an offset-well clause by showing it protected against drainage.

The principal issues are (1) whether a common-law action exists for breach of an implied warranty to perform good and workmanlike repairs and (2) whether evidence existed to support a jury finding that the discovery rule or fraudulent-concealment doctrine tolled limitations for a warranty claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In this case Gonzales sued in part for breach of an implied warranty to repair foundation defects she hired Olshan to fix. The jury found Gonzales should not have discovered that Olshan failed to properly repair the foundation until after she hired her own engineer, more than two years after she complained about cracking appeared after Olshan's work on her house. Before then, Olshan had assured her the cracks she saw were not the result of a faulty foundation or of Olshan's work. The company sent an engineer who supported its contention. The engineer's firm was half-owned by Olshan's chief executive officer. Reviewing a judgment awarding Gonzales damages, the court of appeals reversed, holding in part that an implied common-law warranty for good and workmanlike repairs does not exist in Texas and overturned the jury's decision that the discovery rule delayed the effect of the two-year limitations that allowed her deceptive trade-practices claim.

18-1053

The issue is whether an appraisal award offered a policyholder bars the insured's contract-breach and bad-faith claims.

10-0997 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue is whether the trial court properly dismissed a lawsuit without prejudice - providing opportunity to refile it - when Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 150.002 mandated dismissal for failure to include a merit certificate assessing grounds for the suit. In ordering dismissal section 150.002 stipulates that "dismissal may be with prejudice."

The principal issue is whether a standard apartment lease's allocating risk to a tenant for any damages not caused by the landlord's negligence is void on public-policy grounds. Philadelphia Indemnity sued White over damage from a clothes-dryer fire that destroyed her apartment and others in her complex. The fire's cause was not determined, but Philadelphia pursued its claim based on the lease. A jury found White did not cause the fire but was liable under her lease. The trial court rendered judgment for White despite that verdict. A divided court of appeals affirmed, holding that the agreement's risk-allocation provision went beyond specific limits the state property code imposed on allocating damage a tenant's risk. By doing so, the court reasoned, the lease violated public policy.

10-1028 PNS Stores Inc. v. Anna E. Rivera from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: David A. Oliver Jr., Houston For respondent: Daniel J. T. Sciano, San Antonio, and Kimberly S. Keller, Boerne Three principal issues arise from this petition from a denied bill of review: (1) whether a default tort judgment in 2000 is void or voidable for defects in service of process; (2) whether the four-year bill-of-review limitations applies to an attack on a void default judgment (or whether alleged extrinsic fraud can toll the limitations); and (3) whether an amended summary judgment in a federal suit on the same facts - the amended judgment, with prejudice, barred the case from being refiled - renders the state default judgment void. In seeking to overturn the default judgment, PNS Stores claimed it did not have knowledge of the suit, which was served on the company's registered agent, and alleged defects in the method of service. PNS argues in part that the service-of-process defects render the default judgment void and subject to direct attack or voidable and subject to indirect or collateral attack. The company also contends that limitations should be delayed because of extrinsic fraud. It argues that notice of the $1.2-million default judgment in the underlying negligence case was served on the registered agent, not the company as party, and execution to collect the judgment - when the company claims it had first notice of the judgment - was delayed by design for almost 10 years. The trial court denied PNS Stores' effort to overturn the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this negligence, nuisance and trespass case alleging a toxic plume from a disposal well contaminated nearby leases, the principal issue is whether Regency established that limitations accrued at once for each of Swift's several leases.

Principal issues in this health-care-liability case are (1) whether the trial court erred by reducing the damages according to settlement credits before imposing the statutory-damages cap on non-economic damages and (2) whether the trial court erred by ordering periodic payment of fractional future medical damages arguably without a basis in the record.

07-0599 Retamco Operating Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: James L. Drought, San Antonio For respondent: Douglas W. Alexander, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether Texas has personal jurisdiction over Republic, a California company that acquired passive, non-operating mineral interests with a liability assumption for a pro rate share of operating and well-abandonment expenses. The issue arising from this fraud and contract action over royalties is whether Texas has personal jurisdiction over Republic, a California company that acquired passive, non-operating mineral interests with a liability assumption for a pro rate share of operating and well-abandonment expenses. Republic got the mineral interests from Paradigm Oil in transactions in California and Colorado while Retamco's fraud and breach-of-contrast suit was pending. Paradigm later declared bankruptcy. The trial court denied Republic's special appearance to challenge personal jurisdiction, but the appeals court reversed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues are (1) whether an equitable bill of review may set aside a 10-year-old probate judgment when extrinsic fraud on the estate can be shown; (2) whether the heirs sufficiently proved they are entitled to a bill of review to reopen the probate case; and (3) whether Fidelity, the original administrator's surety, is liable for its bond as well as $80,000 in prejudgment interest. This case arose after a Bexar County probate consultant pleaded guilty to stealing from estates, including this one. After that criminal case Hollenbeck, an heir in this case, sued to reopen the estate, discovered unreported bank accounts and sought to collect from Valdez, the original administrator, and Fidelity. The probate court denied Hollenbeck's statutory bill of review, but granted the heirs one in equity and awarded them almost $466,000. The court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issue over a disputed insurance policy covering 15 properties is whether the policy permits the insurer to calculate losses on a property-by-property basis either for actual damage or on a percentage of a property's scheduled value. The policy specified losses determined on actual loss or 115 percent of how much Lynd valued each property. In its suit Lynd contends that RSUI should have aggregated losses to all covered properties before deciding to pay by one basis or the other, a $4.1 million difference to cover its losses from Hurricane Rita from RSUI's calculation. Lynd seeks actual losses for two damaged properties, not the percentage of their scheduled values. RSUI paid actual losses on the other 13 properties, losses less than 115 percent of scheduled values for each property. The trial court granted RSUI summary judgment. The appeals court reversed.

The issues in this contract-breach case against the San Antonio River Authority over a contractor's claimed cost overruns are (1) whether Government Code section 2009.005 prohibits a government agency like the river authority from binding arbitration and, if not, (2) whether the authority waived its immunity for the breach claim.

A principal issue in this retaliation-discharge case is whether the San Antonio Water System properly raised a legal-sufficiency point to the appeals court by arguing that Nicholas failed to prove she engaged in "protected activity," an element that would have waived the agency's governmental immunity. Nicholas sued the water agency after her boss, a man whom she counseled and reprimanded three years earlier when she was the agency's staff chief, eliminated her position in a staffing reorganization. The reprimand involved the propriety of his asking women at work to lunch when he was married and among the agency's management. The reprimand was not in response to a formal harassment complaint. Nicholas was assigned to work under him when a new chief executive officer appointed his own staff chief. A jury found that Nicholas lost her job because she engaged in protected activity and the court of appeals affirmed. The water agency argues that it did not lose its governmental immunity because Nicholas failed to show she acted to stop sexual harassment as defined by the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.

The central issue in this worker-compensation death-benefits claim is whether an exception to the coming-and-going rule applied to a vehicle accident that killed a contract foreman working 440 miles from home, provided a company car and paid per-diem to live near his work site. When the accident occurred, Lopez was driving two subordinates to the work site, 40 miles from their temporary quarters. After his death, and after SeaBright denied his widow workers-comp benefits, she contested the denial before the Insurance Department's workers-comp division and won. SeaBright sued, but the trial court granted Mrs. Lopez summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Lopez's accident occurred in the course and scope of his employment.

The principal issue in this vehicle-hits-bull case is whether Texas Agriculture Code section 143.074 authorizes a higher care standard on livestock owners for animals wandering along highways in counties that have adopted restrictions on roaming livestock.

07-0697 Paul H. Smith, et al. v. Thomas O'Donnell from Harris County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Casey L. Dobson, Austin For cross-petitioner/respondent: Vincent L. Marable III, Wharton The Supreme Court will hear arguments on (1) whether privity must exist between an executor and the deceased's attorney for a suit over alleged failure to advise on property mischaracterization when the deceased was executor of his late wife's estate and (2) whether a no-evidence summary judgment favoring the attorney was proper on the executor's gross-negligence claim. Principal issues include (1) whether privity must exist between an executor and the deceased's attorney to support a legal malpractice suit based on the attorney's alleged failure to advise on property mischaracterization when the deceased was executor of his late wife's estate and (2) whether the no-evidence summary judgment favoring the attorney was proper on the executor's gross-negligence claim. This action followed a suit by the deceased's children against their father's estate, claiming stock owned by their mother was mischaracterized as their father's separate property and deprived them of what they should have inherited from their mother. The trial court granted the attorney summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, in part holding that no privity existed between the attorney and the executor and in part holding no evidence existed to prove gross negligence. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

06-0243 Solar Applications Engineering Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Douglas W. Alexander, Austin For respondent: Sharon E. Callaway, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether lien-release provision before final payment in construction contract is condition precedent to suit over the contract. The issue is whether a construction-contract provision that required the contractor and subcontractors to release liens before final payment constitutes a condition that must be satisfied before a suing over a contract breach. Solar sued T.A. for breach after T.A. terminated the contract under which Solar was building T.A.'s truck stop in San Antonio in its last stages before final payment. T.A. responded to Solar's suit by arguing that Solar could not sue it for breach before releasing liens. Solar contends that its contract with T.A. required lien releases before final payment, but that provision could not be a condition precedent to a breach-of-contract suit because, in essence, liens were assurance that Solar would be paid. Even if the lien release was a condition precedent, Solar argues, it was not triggered because T.A. terminated the contract. A jury found for Solar. The court of appeals initially affirmed, then reversed and rendered judgment against Solar on rehearing. Note: Justice Green not sitting.

07-0787 Spectrum Healthcare Resources Inc. and Michael Sims v. Janice and Patrick McDaniel from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Richard C. Harrist and Robert R. Biechlin, San Antonio For respondents: Jeffrey C. Anderson, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments in this health-care liability case involving an agreed docket-control order that established a time line for an expert report. The issue is whether that order extends the 120-day statutory deadline for an expert report. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to submit the report, but a divided court of appeals reversed en banc. In this health-care liability case involving an agreed docket-control order that established a time line for an expert report, the issue is whether that order extends the 120-day statutory deadline for an expert report. The McDaniels sued after Janice McDaniel fell during physical therapy. Less than two months after the suit was filed, the parties agreed to a schedule for designating expert witnesses and their reports outside the statutory limits and stipulating that the agreed order would take precedence over deadlines set by rule or statute. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to submit the report, but a divided court of appeals reversed en banc. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

This contest over a state child-protection case worker's compensation claim for an injury at home while she worked on case files raises an issue over definition of "issue" in the administrative proceeding: Whether on review the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the state's statutory basis for denying compensation, that the case worker violated restrictions for working from home, because the alleged violation was not raised as an issue.

The issues in this effort to circumvent a non-access ("spite") easement are (1) whether Champee Springs, as a property-owners' association, has standing to sue to enforce the easement for its members to bar a road from two contiguous tracts Teal owns; (2) whether the non-access easement is unenforceable for public-policy reasons; and (3) whether the easement is invalid in part because inconsistent conduct estops enforcement.

The issues are (1) whether the appeals court applied the correct standard to determine the executive mineral-rights-holder breached its executive duty and (2) whether, and under what circumstances, a non-executive may force the executive to lease the executive's own mineral rights.

08-0964 Edwards Aquifer Authority and State of Texas v. Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel from Atascosa County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner Edwards Aquifer Authority: Pamela Stanton Baron, Austin For petitioner State of Texas: Kristofer S. Monson, Austin For cross-petitioners/respondents: Tom Joseph, San Antonio Principal issue are (1) whether landowners within the Edwards Aquifer boundaries own the groundwater under their property and (2) whether water from an artesian well that flowed into a reservoir constituted water controlled by state regulations or by the Edwards Aquifer Authority. This appeal arises from Day and McDaniel's challenge to the aquifer authority's limited irrigation permit to pump water from a reservoir on their property. In an appeal from the aquifer authority's permit ruling, the trial court sided with Day and McDaniel, deciding that the reservoir water was aquifer water subject to the authority's control. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that the landowners had a vested right to aquifer water beneath their land but that groundwater flowing into the reservoir was "state water" subject to state regulation. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

A principal issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the Texas Medical Liability Act's arbitration-enforcement provision constitutes a law regulating insurance that would remove it from preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act. In this case patients or their heirs sued a San Antonio nursing home, alleging inadequate medical care, abuse and neglect. The nursing-home operator, Fredericksburg Care, moved to compel arbitration, based on signed arbitration agreements that failed to satisfy the medical liability act's requirement that arbitration clauses be in bold-faced type and signed by a patient's attorney. Fredericksburg Care contends that federal arbitration law preempts the state statutory-enforcement standards. Perez and others who sued the home argue the standards regulate insurance under the federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, making federal arbitration law inapplicable. The trial court denied Fredericksburg Care's motions. The court of appeals affirmed.

08-0419 University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio v. Kia Bailey and Larry Bailey from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Michael P. Murphy, Austin For respondents: Steven E. Aldous, Dallas The issue is whether an amended medical-malpractice petition naming a state medical-school hospital relates back to the original filed against a doctor, a hospital employee, who successfully moved for substitution or dismissal after limitations had run. In this case the Baileys sued the doctor for malpractice in his individual capacity. More than a year after they filed the suit, and several months after the two-year limitation on filing suit, the doctor moved for dismissal under a Texas Tort Claims Act provision. That provision - section 101.106(f) - considers a public employee sued for job-related conduct to be acting in his official capacity and allows him to be dismissed from the suit and the governmental entity substituted instead. Section 101.106(f) does not mention the common-law relation-back doctrine. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the court of appeals reversed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0091 Trammell Crow Central Texas Ltd. v. Maria Gutierrez, et al. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: W. Wendell Hall, San Antonio For respondents: Joe Stephens, Katy The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issues are (1) whether past crimes were similar enough to make a crime foreseeable, triggering a duty to protect an invitee and (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that breach of the duty proximately caused the invitee's injuries. In this case Gutierrez's husband was killed in an attack in shopping center parking lot outside a theater he and his wife had left. Trammel Crow's trial evidence suggested Gutierrez may have been targeted for a "hit" because, after his arrest for burglary, Gutierrez turned information on other suspects and told police he feared a drive-by shooting as retaliation. But Gutierrez's wife presented evidence that he was not afraid of an attack; that his wallet was stolen in the attack and his gold bracelet was broken (indicating a robbery by strangers); and that 10 robberies occurred on the premises among 220 crimes reported there in the previous two years. Her evidence indicated five of those robberies involved deadly weapons. Jurors awarded her a multi-million dollar verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, finding jurors could have determined the attack was a robbery by strangers, not a targeted killing, and was foreseeable.

The issue is whether a floating royalty interest or a fixed royalty was created by language that reserved an undivided one-half interest in the royalty and restating that as "being equal to one-sixteenth of the production."

This case raises questions of what counts as sufficient evidence of an unreasonably dangerous condition of a railroad crossing and what constitutes notice that such a condition exists.

The issue is whether governmental immunity protects the university in a wrongful-death claim involving a campus police officer who shot a student after a traffic stop.

In this wrongful-death case arising from a university police shooting, the issues are (1) whether a private university should be entitled to interlocutory appeal as a "governmental unit" insofar as its police department is concerned; if so, (2) whether the university is entitled to be dismissed based on immunity from claims against it; and (3) whether the claims against the officer should be dismissed against the officer.

The issues in this injury case by a public-transit bus passenger are (1) whether the Texas Tort Claims Act's motor-vehicle exception waives immunity for common-carrier negligence; (2) whether the transit system qualifies as a common carrier; and (3) whether enough evidence supports the verdict that the transit agency was negligent.

The issues in this case concern settlement credits, periodic payments, and admission of evidence in the context of a medical malpractice suit alleging negligence against a doctor and his employer.

The issue in this case is whether citizens have standing to sue the City of San Antonio for excluding Chick-fil-A from doing business at the San Antonio airport.

10-0435 Weeks Marine Inc. v. Maximino Garza from Starr County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Frank E. Perez, Brownsville For respondent: Edward John "Jack" O'Neill Jr., Houston For amicus King Fisher Marine Services: Steven J. Knight, Houston Principal issues in this Jones Act action are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that Weeks' failure to provide "maintenance and cure" aggravated Garza's original injury and (2) whether damages for negligence and for failure to provide maintenance and cure were duplicative. Garza filed suit after he was hit in the head by a swinging bar aboard a barge, claiming negligence under the federal Jones Act and aggravation of that injury by Weeks' failure to get adequate treatment for the injury. Weeks' preferred physician cleared Garza to return to work. but after Garza continued to complain of symptoms, his own doctor referred him for surgery. The trial court awarded damages for the injury and pain and suffering because of the failure to provide maintenance and cure. On review, the court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that damages did not amount to a double recovery. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in these cases is the applicability of the Texas Citizens Participation Act to a motion to compel discovery that includes a request for attorney's fees.

In addition to the proprietary-function issue in Wasson Interests v. Jacksonville, above, a principal issue is whether the Court can decide that proprietary function waives a municipality's immunity in a contract action when the trial court grants a jurisdictional plea to dismiss a claim for attorney fees. In this case Wheelabrator sued for contract breach or, alternatively, to recover money for services rendered when San Antonio's public electric utility refused to make final payment for work on a power plant. In a first appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's rejection of the city's jurisdictional plea on the quantum meruit claim, to recover for services rendered, holding in part that the proprietary-function rationale cannot support waiving the city's immunity. On remand, the trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea, dismissing Wheelabrator's attorney-fees claim. The appeals court affirmed that decision, holding the proprietary-function rationale does not apply to waive immunity on the attorney-fees claim.