The principal issue is whether the trial court properly dismissed a suit under procedural Rule 91a against the commission, on notice that the suit was filed, because the plaintiff failed to effect service within 90 days.

This case involves contract interpretation and repudiation, lost-profits damages, and the election-of-remedies doctrine.

10-0554 American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Daniel Samudio from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Robert D. Stokes, Austin For respondent: Byron C. Keeling, Houston The principal issues in this workers-compensation impairment-rating dispute are (1) whether a trial court has jurisdiction over an impairment-rating dispute when only one rating was before the workers-comp division and (2) whether the trial court or appeals court has jurisdiction to assign a new impairment rating if the one presented to the workers-comp division was invalid. In this case Zurich contested Samudio's 20-percent impairment rating a doctor calculated for his spinal injury that resulted from a fall at work, arguing that the impairment rating was not properly calculated according to mandated American Medical Association guidelines. The court of appeals determined that the rating methodology the doctor used to establish Samudio's impairment rating might not have been proper, but the rating was valid in the absence of any other presented in the administrative hearing. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this case involving oral and written severance agreements are (1) whether employees' contract-breach claims are preempted by federal law (ERISA) and, if not, (2) whether the agreements are valid unilateral contracts and (3) whether the company that bought the manufacturing plant at issue is a "successor" covered defined by the severance agreements.

Principal issues are (1) whether Houston's air-quality ordinance intended to regulate emissions more stringently than state law is preempted by state law and (2) whether the ordinance unconstitutionally delegates law-making authority by incorporating state regulations and allowing changes the Texas Department of Environmental Quality may make. BCCA, a group of industrial owners in the Houston area, sued Houston over its ordinance establishing the city's own comprehensive air-quality program. Before the city passed the ordinance in 2007, it contracted with state air-quality regulators to monitor pollution standards the city imposed on businesses not regulated by the state. But Houston's newer ordinance and regulatory scheme resulted from the city's perception that the state's pollution enforcement was too lax. The trial court granted summary judgment to BCCA and enjoined the Houston ordinance's enforcement. The appeals court reversed.

06-1084 Bison Building Materials Ltd. v. Lloyd K. Aldridge from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Tom Van Arsdel, Houston For respondent: Kurt Arbuckle, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the principal issue of whether an appeal can be taken from a trial court's order vacating in part an arbitration award without a rehearing. The principal issue is whether an appeal can be taken from a trial court's order vacating in part an arbitration award without ordering a rehearing. In this case Aldridge, a Bison employee, moved for arbitration of a damages claim for a work injury under an agreement stipulating all work-related injury claims would be arbitrated but providing that an objection to an arbitration decision could be reviewed by a court. Bison moved to dismiss his claim, arguing that he had waived his right to arbitrate his damages because, after his injury, Aldridge signed a subsequent workplace-injury benefits waiver and release forgoing "the right to file a legal action ... for any and all damages sustained by me because of my injury" for benefits he got from Bison's plan. Aldridge sued to set aside the arbitration decision. Noting "unanswered questions regarding fair notice and ambiguity of the post-injury waiver agreement, the trial court vacated that part of the award precluding arbitration of the damages claim. In a split decision, the court of appeals dismissed what it called an interlocutory appeal because it had no jurisdiction.

The issues are (1) whether a common-law affirmative defense of an offset based on a theory of breach of contract conflicts with the Uniform Commercial Code's provisions that allow a bank to chargeback provisional funds to a depositor whose check was dishonored and (2) whether Elizondo is entitled to an offset under these facts.

The issue is whether in a health-care liability case the required preliminary expert assessment must address both direct and vicarious liability theories. In this case the patient sued a temporary staffing agency over a male nurse's alleged inappropriate touching and questioning, claiming Certified EMS, the employer, was vicariously liable for the nurse's conduct and negligent itself in its employee's training and supervision. On an adequacy challenge to expert reports, the court of appeals rejected Certified EMS's objections, reasoning that at least one report was adequate for vicarious liability even though it was inadequate for direct liability.

In this dispute over an alleged contract breach to sell oil-and-gas working interests the issues are (1) whether a fact issue exists on the parties' intent to be bound by terms expressed in emails; (2) whether a fact issue exists that those emails showed the sellers waived a "definitive agreement"; and (3) whether the sellers established defenses under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.

Two principal issues are (1) whether a mineral-rights owner exercised reasonable diligence, to avoid limitations, by relying on a fraudulent plat the drilling operator filed with the Texas Railroad Commission instead of a third-party survey in the commission's records would have shown the operator's fraud and (2) whether the mineral-rights owner ratified an unauthorized pooling agreement by knowingly accepting royalties from the unit. Hooks sued for underpaid royalties from Samson, the operator, alleging the operator did not pay royalties on minerals it took in slant-drilling from a "bottom hole" that was within the scope of Hooks' lease. Hooks also claimed unpaid royalties from a pooled unit that Samson created by unilaterally terminating an existing producing unit without authority to do so. Samson contends Hooks sued too late on the fraud claim because Hooks could have discovered the misleading information locating the bottom hole before the limitations deadline. Samson also argues that Hooks accepted royalties from the unauthorized unit, negating the breach-of-contract claim. The trial court ruled for Hooks and awarded damages on the fraud and contract claims, but the court of appeals reversed on both.

A principal issue is whether dismissal by nonsuit of a health care-liability claim delays the statutory expert-report deadline. In this case the Lidjis, suing on their son's behalf, nonsuited their claim 116 days after its filing (four days before the expert-report deadline). When they refilled the suit more than two years later, the Lidjis served an expert report on the same day. The Lidjis argue that their nonsuit tolls the deadline for the expert report. The hospital moved to dismiss, contending the deadline for the report passed. The trial court denied the hospital's dismissal motion and the court of appeals affirmed.

A principal issue is whether a fraud claim, alleging misrepresentations to get a widow's consent for an autopsy, constitutes a health care-liability case requiring a threshold expert report. Carswell sued St. Catherine, the Katy hospital where her husband died in 2004 after his admission following emergency treatment for severe pain. The hospital treated him with narcotic pain-killers. In her complaint Carswell alleged medical malpractice, claiming in part that St. Catherine's staff did not monitor her husband after different narcotics were given to him the morning he died. He was scheduled for release later that day. A hospital worker found him crossways in his bed, unresponsive. A year and a half after filing her malpractice suit Carswell amended her case to add the fraud claim, alleging she consented to a complete and independent autopsy but the autopsy actually was done by a hospital affiliated with St. Catherine and by a pathologist who was not trained to determine a cause of death. Conflicting evidence addressed whether the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office, which has jurisdiction to conduct autopsies for unexplained or mysterious deaths, was contacted about an autopsy or what the medical examiner was told. In response to the suit, CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast, St. Catherine's owner at the time, moved to dismiss Carswell's case, arguing that autopsies fall under the state's medical-liability law's definitions of health care-liability claims that include "professional or administrative services directly related to health care." But Carswell never filed an expert report to substantiate her fraud allegations, which the law requires before a health care-liability case can go to trial. The trial court ruled the fraud claim was not one for health-care liability and rendered judgment in her favor. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the fraud claim.

The issues are (1) whether the evidence raises a material fact issue on each element of a regulatory taking claim and (2) whether the evidence raises a material fact issue under the Mayhew/Penn Central balancing test.

06-0948 City of Pasadena v. Richard Smith from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston On rehearing For petitioner: Kevin D. Jewell, Houston For respondent: Heidi L. Widell, San Antonio For amicus curiae, State of Texas: James C. Ho, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether a city has a right to appeal a hearing officer's decision dismissing a disciplinary proceeding when the basis for the examiner's decision was mistaken law. The principal issue is whether a city has a right to appeal a hearing officer's decision dismissing a disciplinary proceeding when the basis for the decision was mistaken law. In this case Smith, a Pasadena police officer, appealed an indefinite suspension to a hearing examiner. State law provides for an appeal from a civil service commission decision, but not from a hearing examiner's decision. The trial court dismissed the appeal on Smith's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals affirmed. In this Court, the city argues that the hearing examiner's decision can be appealed under a provision allowing for an appeal when the examiner has exceeded her jurisdiction - and that a mistake of law is exceeding jurisdiction. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this case brought against a tenant operating a coin-operated laundry in an apartment complex are (1) whether the tenant is entitled to limited possession until evicted and whether it's liable in tort for wrongful possession and, if so, (2) whether the continuing-tort doctrine tolls the statutory limitations for alleged torts. In this case Aspenwood bought an apartment complex in foreclosure and tried to evict Coinmach's laundry facilities, but Coinmach ultimately won on appeal. After several years during which Coinmach paid rent (Aspenwood never cashed the checks) Aspenwood sued in district court for tort damages for trespass and for interfering with a contract Aspenwood had with another laundry-machine company and claimed damages to when Coinmach's lease ended with the foreclosure sale under the continuing-tort doctrine. The trial court ruled Coinmach was a tenant at sufferance and had a right to possession until judicially evicted and granted summary judgment for the laundry operator. The court of appeals agreed that Coinmach was a tenant at sufferance, but held that Coinmach did not have a possessory interest in the leasehold and that Aspenwood could sue for trespass back to when the lease ended and for tortious interference with a contract.

In this challenge to a deputy sheriff's firing, a principal issue is whether the Texas Government Code's requirement that a misconduct complaint against a law-enforcement officer be in writing and signed by the complainant applies to an "internal" complaint - that is, in this case, when a county prosecutor brought evidentiary concerns to the sheriff in a case involving the deputy.

In this appeal challenging summary judgment for the bank's affirmative Uniform Commercial Code defenses, in a case in which an account was emptied by fraud, the issues are (1) which of two deposit agreements govern; (2) whether the bank customer was negligent as a legal matter for failing to monitor the account when the account was depleted; and (3) whether the bank sent or made "available" bank statements to the customer when it mailed them to an imposter.

The issues are (1) whether an employee is a "participant" under Farm Animals Activities Act; (2) whether Zuniga was such a participant under the act; and (3) whether the ranch owners are subject to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.

The principal issues in this case involving a Rule 11 agreement to designate experts are (1) whether the appeals court had interlocutory jurisdiction to review denial of a dismissal motion under Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 150.002(e) and the trial court's extension for plaintiff to file a merit certificate and (2) whether the defendant waived its right to dismissal based on its agreement to delay the date to designate experts. In this lawsuit Crosstex Energy Services sued the engineering firm that built its gas-compressor unit after an explosion and fire, alleging negligence and other claims. Within days of the limitations deadline for several claims, Crosstex and ProPlus agreed to delay the date to designate experts for the litigation. After the statute of limitations deadline passed, ProPlus moved to dismiss because Crosstex had not filed a certificate of merit with its complaint. Section 150.002(a) requires a certificate, based on an expert's affidavit, when a complaint is filed in a negligence case based on professional engineering services. Section 150.002(d) requires dismissal upon failure to file such an expert report and 150.002(e) specifies that a court order denying dismissal can be appealed before the case is tried. The trial court denied the dismissal motion and gave Crosstex an extension to file the certificate. On review, the court of appeals reversed, with one dissent, holding that it had interlocutory jurisdiction because the trial court denied ProPlus's dismissal motion. It held that ProPlus had not waived its right to seek dismissal when it entered the Rule 11 agreement and that Crosstex's failure to file the merit certificate required dismissal under the statute.

The issue is whether a claim for an implied-warranty breach for repair work is available exclusively under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and subject to its two-year limitations.

In this back-injury disability case, alleging negligence against an oil-rig operator, the issues are (1) whether post-injury surveillance video should have been admitted and (2) whether evidence that Diamond paid Williams as much as 85 percent of his salary for several years to temper the jury's award and not, as the trial court decided, to be taken into accounting as an offset against the awarded damages.

07-1026 Louis M. Ditta v. Susan C. Conte and Joseph P. Conte Jr. from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Michael J. Cenatiempo and Thomas C. Wright, Houston For respondents: Susan Conte: Karen L. Watkins, Austin Principal issues in this action to remove a trustee is whether a guardian's appointment ends the statutory delay on a lawsuit brought for a disabled trust beneficiary or whether limitations remain tolled under the discovery rule. In this case Ditta, the appointed guardian, sought to remove Susan Conte as trustee of a trust benefiting her mother, who was declared incapacitated in1997. Ditta filed his action after an accounting, ordered after his appointment, that showed Susan Conte and her brother had taken money from the trust for their personal expenses. After a final accounting in 2000, the probate court ordered Susan Conte to repay the trust but only if her mother needed the money. Then in 2004 the guardian sued to remove Susan Conte as trustee, claiming her discord with her brother jeopardized her trustee duties, her use of trust funds had been improper and her debt to the trust created a conflict of interest. The trial court removed her as trustee and modified trust terms to permit a bank to be trustee, finding that she and her brother had spent money from the trust they should not have. On review, the court of appeals reversed, holding that Ditta's lawsuit to remove Conte as trustee was barred by the statute of limitations. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this wrongful-death case, brought after a father and his two children drowned in a riptide, the issues are (1) whether the appeals court, in granting the city's jurisdictional plea under the Tort Claims Act and Recreational Use Statute, misapplied the review standard that every reasonable inference should favor jurisdiction and (2) whether the court erred by determining the deaths resulted from a naturally occurring condition. Suarez argues that her jurisdictional evidence showed the beach's artificial construction combined with natural conditions to create a particular danger and that the city failed to replace warning signs after Hurricane Ike destroyed them near where the drownings occurred.

10-0648 El Paso Field Services L.P. and Gulfterra South Texas L.P. v. MasTec North America Inc., et al. from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Murray Fogler and David M. Gunn, Houston For respondents: Kevin Dubose, Houston The issues in this dispute over alleged unforeseen costs in a pipeline-replacement project are (1) whether the court of appeals correctly ruled that El Paso's contract with MasTec allocated risk of "foreign crossings" to El Paso and (2) whether the appeals court correctly applied federal common law instead of Texas common law. In this case MasTec sued for additional costs it encountered to work around and through other pipelines and obstructions for the new pipeline it contracted with El Paso to build. In the contract El Paso stated it would use due diligence to disclose such foreign crossings to MasTec, but its alignment sheets identified 250 and MasTec claimed it encountered perhaps 750. The contract specified that MasTec would assume all risks "notwithstanding" El Paso's representations. A jury awarded additional costs to MasTec, but the trial court rendered judgment for El Paso notwithstanding the jury's verdict. The court of appeals reversed, holding that under a U.S. Supreme Court decision risks were the owner's responsibility from defective specifications that the owner was better able to determine. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues are (1) whether Texas law presumes in a suit filed in Texas involving personal injury or death in another state that the place of injury governs which state's law applies and, if so, (2) whether factors determining the most-significant relationship favor Mississippi's more stringent compensatory-damages caps instead of Texas'. In this interlocutory appeal the defendants argue that the trial court erred by applying Texas law to damages incurred or suffered by mostly Mississippi residents from a rural Mississippi pipeline explosion. The appeals court affirmed the choice of Texas law.

In this property-tax challenge to assessing stored natural gas, the issues are (1) whether the tax constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the dormant Commerce Clause; (2) whether argument that the ad valorem tax violated state law was waived (and, if not, whether the tax violates state law); and (3) whether the natural gas, stored in a reservoir, was in interstate commerce.

The issue in this case is whether Exxon Mobil is considered an "additional insured" under National Union's umbrella policy or Starr Indemnity & Liability Insurance's bumbershoot policy.

In this subrogation dispute between a contractor and subcontractor's insurance carrier, the issues are (1) whether the standard subrogation endorsement, referencing a written contract required to obtain it, permits a court to consider the contract requiring subrogation; (2) whether the subrogation endorsement directing a court to consider an extrinsic contract permits the court to consider another part of the contract; and (3) whether, when the contract requires the subcontractor's insurer to waive subrogation, the court may look further than the contract's indemnity provisions and, if so, whether the contract's requirement that the subcontractor obtain workers compensation constitutes a liability "assumed."

The issues in this arbitration-award challenge are (1) whether the Texas Railroad Commission has exclusive or primary jurisdiction over claims in this case; (2) whether the award should be vacated based on alleged evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator; (3) whether the award should be vacated because the arbitration panel refused to stay its proceeding to permit the Railroad Commission to complete an investigation; and (4) whether arbitrators exceeded their powers by awarding declaratory relief and punitive damages.

07-0010 Galveston Central Appraisal District v. TRQ Captain's Landing, L.P., and American Housing Foundation from Galveston County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Michael B. Hughes, Galveston For respondents: John Ben Blanchard, Amarillo The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether a community housing agency may claim an ad valorem tax exemption for property to which it holds equitable title but legal title is held by its development subsidiaries. The issue is whether a community housing agency may claim an ad valorem tax exemption for property to which it holds equitable title but legal title is held by a wholly owned development subsidiary. Together with TRQ Captain's Landing, its subsidiary, American Housing Foundation sued the appraisal district over the district's denial of a property-tax exemption for apartments to which TRQ held legal title. Under state tax law, such an exemption may be granted only to a qualified non-profit community housing-development organization that owns property for sale or lease to low- or moderate-income people. Galveston County Appraisal District argues that it holds equitable title in the apartments and that its intent in forming the subsidiary, to develop low-income housing, complies with the Legislature's intent for tax exemptions. The trial court granted summary judgment for the appraisal district. The court of appeals reversed.

08-0453 Geffrey Klein, M.D., and Baylor College of Medicine v. Cynthia Hernandez from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Cameron Pope, Houston For respondent: Robert J. Talaska and Theodore G. Skarbowski, Houston In this medical-malpractice suit the principal issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by dismissing Klein and Baylor's interlocutory appeals because Klein was not a state officer or employee and Baylor was not a governmental unit and (2) whether the trial court erred by denying Baylor and Klein's summary-judgment motions based on governmental immunity. Hernandez sued Klein and Baylor for injuries her baby suffered during a delivery at Houston's public Ben Taub Hospital by Klein, a Baylor resident acting under Baylor's contract with the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board for training at Ben Taub. The two Houston courts of appeals have split on the question whether Baylor residents should be considered public employees entitled to take preliminary appeals when a trial court denies dismissal based on an immunity claim. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Three principal issues in this contract-breach and business interference-tort case over a scuttled Bulgarian gas-field venture are (1) whether evidence supporting lost-market value was speculative and based on lost future profits; (2) whether Nevada law as the incorporation state determines whether a Phillips-owned company's two subsidiaries were its alter egos (and his); and, if Texas law governs, (3) whether legally sufficient evidence established that the two companies were Phillips' alter egos. Carlton sued Phillips, its onetime partner in the Bulgarian field development, after two Phillips-related companies allegedly plotted to supplant Carlton as the principal financing partner with a company holding exclusive exploration rights to the Bulgarian field.

The principal issues in this case involving a fire that burned through a pesticide plant are (1) whether expert causation testimony was reliable if each opinion was founded on other experts' assumptions; (2) whether all experts' opinions taken together constitute sufficient evidence by elimination that a certain chemical caused the fire; and (3) whether expert opinion about the chemical's ignition was adequately tested. In this case Control Solutions sued Gharda, alleging a chemical Gharda sold Control Solutions - chlorpyrifos - ignited because it was contaminated when manufactured. The trial court awarded judgment for Gharda despite the jury's verdict against it. The court of appeals reversed, with one dissent, holding that each expert's testimony was reliable.

The primary issue in this case is whether a trial court must have territorial jurisdiction over an alleged offender's conduct to issue a protective order under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

The issue in this case is whether an interlocutory order that grants partial summary judgment and orders a party to sell real property within thirty days is an appealable temporary injunction.

In this case, alleging Harris County in essence took the plaintiffs' property by failing to implement flood-control measures and by approving residential development without flood-mitigation efforts, the issues are whether (1) the county knew with substantial certainty that flooding damage would result; (2) its failure to implement flood controls caused damage to the plaintiffs' homes; and (3) the county's development approvals amounted to a public use. The Kerrs and other property owners contend the county's substantial certainty that the owners' homes would be damaged can be shown by allowing "unmitigated" development that aggravated runoff in heavy rains, as flood-control plans foretold; that flooding was substantially certain from the county's failure to complete a flood-control plan the county undertook; and that recurrent flooding bolstered that certainty. The county counters that the flood-control plan was abandoned because its financing did not work and faulty criteria undermined the plan's design. The trial court denied the county's jurisdictional plea. The appeals court affirmed.

The issues in this electrocution-injury case are (1) whether an injured contractor established a fact issue that the premises owner - the company that employed the electrician as a contractor - had actual knowledge of the danger or condition that led to the injury; (2) whether the injured contractor established a fact issue that the company exercised or retained control over how the electrician worked; and (3) whether the company owed the contracting electrician a duty.

The primary issues in this case are whether (1) Texas law grants eminent domain authority to a pipeline owner shipping polymer grade propylene; (2) a pipeline shipping a product from the pipeline owner’s sole manager to an unaffiliated customer constitutes a public use; and (3) the landowner may properly testify that the highest-and-best use of the taken land is as a pipeline corridor, and value the land through comparisons to past, private pipeline easement sales.

In this case, involving a district court's order to set a court administrator's salary, the issues are (1) whether the appeals court properly sanctioned the district court's order based on its inherent power, its appellate jurisdiction and its supervisory control over a commissioners court; (2) whether the district court's order properly commanded action by one commissioner that the commissioners court as a whole must take; and (3) whether the appeals court erred by upholding a temporary injunction and bond that arguably were not properly ordered or approved.

In re BP Products North America Inc. from Galveston County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For relator: Katherine Mackillop, Houston For real party in interest: David W. Holman, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether apex-deposition doctrine protects retired CEO. A principal issue in this case involving deposition of a retired chief executive officer is whether the apex-deposition doctrine that protects a company's highest officers from harassing depositions, absent actual and pertinent knowledge, applies to a retired CEO. BP sought mandamus relief when plaintiffs got an order allowing BP's then CEO, John Browne, to be deposed in a lawsuit over the Texas City refinery explosion. The court of appeals denied BP's mandamus petition. When Browne resigned in May after admitting perjury in a British court, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss as moot the company's mandamus petition. BP resists that motion. Justice Gaultney sitting by appointment pursuant to Section 22.005 of the Texas Government Code.07-0119

Aside from the utility commission's exclusive-jurisdiction question, two other issues in this case are (1) whether the plaintiffs, suing for a fatal electrocution of a man who stopped to assist after a car wreck downed a power pole, have standing to have their claims heard by the Public Utility Commission and (2) whether the probate court, where the suit began, has exclusive jurisdiction

08-0524 In re Department of Family & Protective Services from Harris County and the 1st District Court of Appeals, Houston For relator: Sandra Hachem, Houston For real party in interest: Douglas Ray York, Houston The issues in this parental-rights termination case are (1) whether the trial court's new-trial order after the statutory dismissal deadline vacated a termination order rendered before the deadline passed; (2) whether an objection based on the trial court's failure to dismiss was waived because it came after the new-trial order; (3) whether mandamus relief is appropriate when the state can pursue an accelerated appeal; and (4) whether Family Code section 263.401(b) restrictions are jurisdictional. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Justice O'Neill is not sitting. In re General Electric Co., et al. from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For relator: Kurt H. Kuhn, Austin For real parties in interest: Charles S. Siegel, Dallas The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether statutory forum non conveniens factors, if met, compel dismissal. In this case, in which a multi-district litigation court refused to dismiss an asbestos claim for forum non conveniens, principal issues are (1) whether the dismissal motion must be granted if statutory factors are satisfied and (2) whether the supremacy clause is violated by trial court's stipulation that defendants waive their right to remove the case to federal court after dismissal for improper forum. In this case a Maine resident sued companies in Texas over asbestos disease he contracted while working in Maine. General Electric and the other companies moved to dismiss, arguing that Maine was a more appropriate forum than Texas. The multi-district litigation court refused to dismiss, reasoning that Texas was more appropriate to try the case even though neither the plaintiff nor his injury had any connection with Texas. The court noted that the defendants refused to agree not to remove the case to federal court once it was filed in Maine because the plaintiff, who was dying, would be subject to slower-acting federal MDL courts than Texas'. The court of appeals refused to grant mandamus relief.

The issue is whether the juvenile court erred in transferring a case to criminal district court where the defendant was a minor at the time of the murder but was charged after his 18th birthday.

The issues in this effort to prevent discovery of an anonymous blogger's identify are (1) whether Texas court rules governing discovery before a lawsuit is filed means that the trial court must have "personal jurisdiction" over the "John Doe" defendant--that is, the authority to hear a case against a person only after he has been served with papers notifying him of a suit--before his identity may be discovered; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the anticipated defamation and business-disparagement suit can be tried in Harris County courts when the court doesn't have jurisdiction over the anonymous blogger; and (3) whether the court abused its discretion by ordering the blogger's identify disclosed from Google, considering a First Amendment right to anonymous speech. The John Doe relator -- the blogger's pseudonym is Trooper -- claims the Harris County court must have personal jurisdiction over him for this Rule 202 proceeding, although the Ohio company bringing the discovery action argues that personal jurisdiction is not required at this pre-suit stage as it would be after a suit is filed. It contends that personal jurisdiction would be impossible when the potential defendant to a suit is anonymous. The company chairman, Robert T. Brockman, is from the Houston area. The trial court granted the discovery petition. The court of appeals denied the blogger's mandamus petition to prevent disclosure of his identity.

The principal issues in this inconvenient-forum dispute are (1) whether a wrongful-death action in Texas arising from a nonresident's death in an out-of-state accident should be dismissed; (2) whether the Texas-residency exception to the forum non conveniens statute applies (a) if a plaintiff, a resident of Texas, sues as a wrongful-death beneficiary individually as well as administrator of an out-of-state estate and as next friend of another wrongful-death beneficiary and (b) a second wrongful-death beneficiary, also a Texas resident, sues only in an individual capacity; and (3) whether claims in the suit that may not be dismissed bears on the nonresident-claims analysis.

In this mandamus proceeding concerning a discovery order the issues are (1) whether the statutory medical-committee privilege protects documents potentially discoverable under the anticompetitive exception to the statutory medical peer review-committee privilege and (2) whether "anticompetitive action" requires that an anti-trust claim be pleaded. Memorial Hermann sought mandamus relief from a trial court's discovery order in a former cardiothoracic surgeon's defamation lawsuit against the hospital and several physicians. The surgeon, Dr. Miguel Gomez, alleges in part that his criticism of hospital-management changes and operations led to physicians manipulating death rates of patients he treated, submitting that data to the hospital's peer-review committees and distributing it by an Internet list service. Gomez resigned from the staff at Memorial Hermann Memorial City Medical Center and became surgery department chair at another west Houston hospital, then sued, moving to compel discovery from the statutory medical peer-review committee and the hospital's medical committee. Memorial Hermann contends that documents held by the medical committee are privileged and that privilege overcomes the anticompetitive exception to the privilege attached to documents held by the medical peer-review committee. The trial court granted Gomez's discovery motion. The court of appeals denied the hospital's mandamus petition.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred by denying the defendants' motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.

A principal issue in this suit alleging an insurer's mishandling of a Hurricane Ike-damage claim is whether, in reviewing a new-trial order after In re Toyota Motor Sales, an appeals court can determine if factually sufficient evidence supports the verdict or if the trial court is entitled to more deference. In this case the Bents successfully moved for a new trial after a jury split its verdict on the Bents' claims that the insurer breached their policy (no) and violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (yes). United States Automobile Association, the insurer, petitioned for mandamus relief, which the court of appeals granted after conducting a factual review to determine whether evidence supported the jury's verdict. The Bents argue that such a review amounts to double stacking factual-sufficiency reviews, allowing the appeals court to substitute its judgment for a trial court's after that court heard evidence and observed witnesses and ruled evidence did not support the verdict. But USAA contends that such a factual review is an appropriate guard against the trial court's substituting its judgment for the jury's.

In addition to the exclusive-jurisdiction question, an issue in this case alleging a utility power-pole contractor negligently contributed to Hurricane Harvey flooding is whether the so-called filed-rate doctrine controls. The negligence, nuisance and water code-violation claims are based on flood damage Houston homeowners blame on roadway “mats” the power company's contractor used for a power substation's construction. Those mats allegedly clogged drainage in a nearby bayou when Harvey's rains washed them away. Texas-New Mexico Power argues the company's tariff has a force-majeure clause that bears on the homeowners' claims. The company contends the filed-rate doctrine bars a customer from suing over issues that a publicly filed tariff's terms govern.

The issues in this parental rights-termination suit are (1) whether the statutory provision permitting termination on a showing that a parent failed to comply with her service plan is applicable only to a child removed by the state because he was abused and neglected and (2) whether other grounds pleaded for terminating parental rights but not found by the trial court should have been considered on appeal to affirm the termination order. In this case the child subject to the termination proceeding was removed after his mother was accused of abusing his older sister. The trial court ordered the mother's parental rights terminated on two bases of several the state alleged: That she failed to follow the service plan the state established for the child's return to her care and that termination was in the child's best interest. On the mother's appeal that insufficient evidence supported the grounds on which the trial court relied, the court of appeals held that termination under the service-plan provision required evidence that the child's removal resulted from abuse or neglect of that child. The appeals court did not consider the state's argument that other pleaded grounds sufficed to terminate the mother's parental rights.

A principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by not considering alternative grounds to terminate parental rights that were properly pleaded and supported by evidence.

08-1044 In the Matter of B.W. from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Michael Choyke, Houston For respondent: Dan McCrory, Houston The principal issues are (1) whether a child 13 or younger can be adjudicated for a prostitution offense when a child under 14 cannot legally consent to sexual conduct and (2) whether the state violated the child's due-process rights by failing to investigate whether she was compelled to prostitute herself. In this case the girl, a foster-care runaway, argues that she could not be adjudicated for an offense that involved an act she was legally incapable of consenting to. That would lead to an absurd result, she argues, taking her offense outside the general scope of juvenile law making juveniles subject to penal code violations as young as 10. And she contends her due-process rights were violated because she could have had an immunity defense to prostitution if juvenile prosecutors had pursued suspicion that she was forced into prostitution by her 32-year-old boyfriend. She essentially pleaded guilty ("true") to the prostitution allegation, but moved for a new trial on her contention she was too young to be adjudicated for the offense. The trial court denied her motion and the court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

At issue in this case is whether a court of appeals can abuse its discretion by declining to hear a permissive interlocutory appeal without providing its reasoning.

The issue is whether the university, by using a copyrighted photograph without permission or attribution on a website, constitutionally "took" the photo, entitling the photographer to compensation.

The issues in this medical-malpractice case are (1) whether the appeals court erred by finding the broad-form negligence jury charge improper when the trial suggested failure to obtain informed consent but without evidentiary or legal support and (2) whether plaintiff's sole expert should have been barred from testifying by statute.

In this challenge to pension-board actions involving Houston city employees the city transferred to a non-profit corporation - doing the same work, but outside the city's pension plan - the principal issue is whether the pension board acted without authority by defining the transferred workers as municipal employees subject to the pension system. Employees who were transferred from the city's convention service sued the pension system, one group arguing that they should be allowed to draw pensions because their city employment ended and another contending that they should be able to stop their pension contributions as they deferred their retirements. In its dispute with Houston, the pension system countered two moves to remove the employees from the pension plan. When the city first transferred the employees to a city-controlled government corporation, the pension system changed its definition of municipal employee to include workers hired by a local-government corporation. Then the city moved the employees to a non-profit company that would lease their services to the city-controlled corporation. The pension-system board continued to consider the employees to fall under the pension plan. The trial court granted the pension system's jurisdictional plea and the appeals court affirmed, holding in part that the pension system's employee definition was within its authority under state law.

The issue is whether Houston's historic-preservation ordinance is a zoning law subject to Texas Zoning Enabling Act and the city charter's zoning limits.

The principal issue is whether an oilfield operator has a right to use adjacent surface property to service its drilling in a pooled unit that includes non-working mineral interests beneath the adjacent tract. In this case the Hegars sued for trespass, arguing that Key continued to use a road it no longer reasonably needed to service drilling on adjacent land. Key used a road it had used for drilling operations in the so-called Rosenbaum-Curbo tract before its operating lease terminated because its well ceased production. To do so, Key acquired a mineral interest in the Rosenbaum-Curbo tract, then pooled that with the adjacent land where it operated a producing well. The Hegars, who acquired the surface estate above the Rosenbaum-Curbo tract and a fractional mineral interest beneath it, complained that heavier traffic resulted from Key's drilling a second well on the adjacent land. The trial court found for the Hegars, ruling that Key's use of the road across the Hegars' property was not reasonably necessary because its lease terminated. After first reversing the trial court, the court of appeals on rehearing held for the Hegars, holding in part that Key could use the road as long as it produced from the Rosenbaum-Curbo tract but concluded that it was not.

The issues in these cases surround class certification: whether the trial courts performed the required "rigorous analysis" to determine whether the certification prerequisites were met and whether the certification orders listed all the elements of the 175 defenses, as the Rules of Civil Procedure require. In addition, one petition asks whether a court of appeals' opinion declining an application for a permissive interlocutory appeal must state a basic analysis for doing so and whether the requirements for certifying an interlocutory appeal were met.

The principal issues from this challenge to a medical resident's dismissal from a malpractice claim are (1) whether the trial court's dismissal order was interlocutory and (2) whether the resident is protected by governmental immunity if she is hired and paid by a separate foundation but supervised by employees of a medical school clinic.

The main issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs' negligence suit against Leibman to recover damages for injuries sustained in a dog attack triggered the Texas Medical Liability Act's expert-report requirement.

The principal issues in this defamation case by an ex-husband against his ex-wife are (1) whether Hogan complied with the Defamation Mitigation Act by sending a sufficient correction, clarification or retraction request and, if not, (2) whether the consequence for an insufficient request is dismissal.

This appeal addresses personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer and its U.S. subsidiary.

07-0490 Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors Inc, et al. v. Brendan J. Fielding from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Warren W. Harris, Houston For respondent: Levon G. Hovnatanian, Houston Principal issues arising from this declaratory-judgment action are (1) whether a provision requiring an accountant to purchase clients if he left the firm was ancillary to his employment agreement and an enforceable covenant not to compete; (2) whether the Covenants Not to Compete Act preempts the plaintiff's attorneys fees claim; and (3) whether the client-purchase provisions are severable. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0783 Irving W. Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: James Eloi Doyle and Kimberly Hoesl, Houston For respondent: Jennifer H. Davidow, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether an extension-of-time motion to remedy an medical-malpractice expert's report is fatally late if filed after an initial hearing on the defendant's dismissal motion. In this case alleging a hospital patient was injured when part of a bed collapsed, principal issues are (1) whether the claims implicate health-care liability and, if the claim poses medical-malpractice, (2) whether an extension-of-time motion to remedy an expert's report is fatally late if filed after an initial hearing on the defendant's dismissal motion. In the hospital recovering from back surgery, Marks fell after the footboard of his bed gave way when he grabbed it to pull himself out of bed. Among its allegations, his suit complained that the hospital failed to properly train its staff caring for him, failed to provide him necessary assistance, failed to provide a safe environment and failed to assemble the bed properly. St. Luke's moved to dismiss the suit because no expert report was filed on time. The trial court dismissed and a divided court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this defamation and business disparagement case are: (1) whether one of the statements the jury found to be defamatory had been published to a third party; (2) whether there was legally sufficient that another defamatory statement caused the plaintiff to suffer economic damages; (3) whether the statements were protected by qualified privilege; and (4) whether the plaintiff's expert testimony regarding causation and lost profits was conclusory.

The issue in this case is whether companies that collect and test employment-related drug-screen samples owe a duty of care to the third-party employees being screened.

The principal issue is whether a medicated settlement agreement partitioning 2010 income to each spouse for filing individual tax returns and dividing future earnings as of June 2010 included a $4.5 million performance bonus Miguel Loya got in March 2011 as undisclosed property under the agreement. Subsidiary issues are (1) whether that discretionary bonus is community property after the divorce and (2) whether Leticia Loya's claim is precluded by the medicated agreement.

The issues in these cases surround class certification: whether the trial courts performed the required "rigorous analysis" to determine whether the certification prerequisites were met and whether the certification orders listed all the elements of the 175 defenses, as the Rules of Civil Procedure require. In addition, one petition asks whether a court of appeals' opinion declining an application for a permissive interlocutory appeal must state a basic analysis for doing so and whether the requirements for certifying an interlocutory appeal were met.

The issues in these cases surround class certification: whether the trial courts performed the required "rigorous analysis" to determine whether the certification prerequisites were met and whether the certification orders listed all the elements of the 175 defenses, as the Rules of Civil Procedure require. In addition, one petition asks whether a court of appeals' opinion declining an application for a permissive interlocutory appeal must state a basic analysis for doing so and whether the requirements for certifying an interlocutory appeal were met.

The issue in this retaliation suit is whether the Whistleblower Act's immunity waiver applies to a charter school as a "local government entity."

The issues in this wrongful-death case, involving assumed liabilities from the sale of a treadmill manufacturer, are (1) whether the appeals court properly defined a product-liability claim under the assets-sale agreement to require both bodily injury and property damage; (2) whether the appeals court erred by holding that the company buying the other assumed the implied warranty of merchantability under the agreement; and (3) whether the cause of action for breach of the implied merchantability warranty constitutes a product-liability claim.

The issues are (1) whether a jury finding that a former plant owner's licensed engineers supervised equipment design blamed for a worker's injury satisfies a 10-year repose statute barring a lawsuit against licensed engineers who design, plan or supervise real-property improvements; (2) whether evidence conclusively established the former plant owner constructed the equipment to invoke a 10-year repose statute that would protect it from suit; and (3) whether recovery should be barred because the plaintiff failed to get jury findings supporting premise-liability or products-liability claims. Jenkins, injured when acid-adjustment machinery allegedly malfunctioned, sued Occidental for negligence in 2007, claiming Occidental negligently designed the acid-adjustment system 15 years earlier An Occidental engineer supervised the design team, which included licensed engineers and others who were not. An Occidental employee who oversaw the machinery's fabrication was not a licensed engineer. Based on the repose statutes, the trial court granted Occidental judgment despite the jury's verdict for Jenkins. The court of appeals reversed.

This is a suit challenging a City of Houston drainage fee ordinance.

The issue in this case is whether a sales executive who negotiated a long-term contract but was terminated before any sales were made is entitled to a million-dollar commission. Baylor Miraca Genetics Laboratories hired Brandon Perthuis to help develop genetic tests and serve as the company’s head of sales. Perthuis's employment agreement stated "Your commission will be 3.5% of your net sales" but did not define "net sales" or explain the parameters of the commission structure.

The issues in this dispute over reimbursed bonuses from rescinded federal offshore-mineral leases are (1) whether disposing assets that a contract expressly excludes should be decided by contract law or by equity (the appeals court decided the case by equity) and (2) whether Torch Energy, which conveyed its lease interests by two contracts to Plains Exploration, excluded claims to the repaid bonuses under either contract. After the federal claims court ordered the federal government to reimburse the mineral-right holders what they had paid (Plains' share was $83 million) Torch sued Plains for half of that. The trial court rejected Torch's contract-breach claims and its equitable claim for money "had and received." The appeals court affirmed the trial court's ruling that Plains had not breached its contract with Torch, but found the contract ambiguous on the bonus reimbursement and remanded Torch's claim that Plains owed Torch for money had and received.

This case raises questions about the extraterritorial reach of Texas's civil barratry statute and whether barratry claims are subject to a two or four-year statute of limitations.

10-0353 Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chatha from Waller County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Beth Klusmann, Austin For respondent: Ellen Sprovach, Houston The issue is whether the 180-day limitations on an employment-discrimination suit under the Texas Commission in Human Rights Act runs from the alleged discriminatory act or the last paycheck resulting from that act. In this case Chatha sued, alleging pay discrimination for her position as a full professor. She initially was denied the promotion, but promoted after she complained and applied again. But she alleged her pay was not appropriate for the promotion. Prairie View moved to dismiss on a jurisdictional plea because Chatha's discrimination complaint to administrative agencies was beyond the 180-day statutory window for when the discriminatory practice - her promotion with alleged inadequate pay - "occurred." Under a federal amendment to the federal statute that the state Human Rights Act follows in substance, occurred is defined as including the discriminatory effects of an employer's decision. That leaves a question whether the Texas statute of limitation must follow the federal amendment. The trial court denied the university's plea and the appeals court affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this appraisal contest the issue is whether the appeals court erred by ordering PRSI, as an entity claiming property-tax exemption under a foreign-trade zone designated for a predecessor, to pay Harris County taxes on PRSI's inventory.

Among the principal issues are (1) whether the appeals court improperly dismissed a declaratory-relief claim after the state disclaimed ownership before trial to a private beach; (2) whether the state unconstitutionally took property by leasing the private beach and by replacing the private owners' names with the state's on tax rolls; and (3) whether the "no self-help" rule applies in Texas to allow the dry-beach property owner to claim ownership of beach property the state rebuilt that extended the dry beach seaward from the definitive tide line. In this case, involving the state's actions over dry-beach property Porretto claimed in front of the Galveston Seawall, she sought to declare her property rights after the state leased parts of her beach to third parties. When she tried to sell her property, Porretto contends, she couldn't because the state's actions clouded her title and argues that the leases still encumber the property despite the state's ownership disclaimer. The trial court declared title in Porretto's favor, found the state's actions amounted to an unconstitutional taking and awarded Porretto $5 million. The appeals court reversed the title declarations and ordered that Porretto take nothing.

In this case, alleging two movie-theater chains conspired against a third in violation of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act, the issues are (1) whether a factual dispute exists that AMC and Regal acted in a conspiracy and (2) whether a genuine factual dispute exists that AMC and Regal caused damages to iPic, a boutique movie chain.

The principal issues in this shareholder-derivative suit are (1) whether the business-judgment rule protects against challenges to board decisions involving a closely held corporation; (2) whether the shareholder bringing the challenge must plead and prove fraud by directors or self-dealing to have standing to file the derivative suit; and (3) whether a derivative action must be brought by a shareholder in the subsidiary and wholly owned operating company. In this case Webre, who owns almost a quarter of Texas United, a holding company, sued on Texas United's behalf and for United Salt, the wholly owned operating subsidiary, over an acquisition he contends was pushed on the company's board by United Salt's officers. Webre's claims include fiduciary-duty breaches by the officers and fraud. The officers and both companies challenge Webre's standing. The trial court dismissed the derivative claims for lack of standing and the appeals court reversed.

The principal issues are (1) whether the bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring claims in this case and (2) whether expunction of a lis pendens notice qualifies two entities that took title to the subject properties as bona fide purchasers.

The principal issues are (1) whether the bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring claims in this case and (2) whether expunction of a lis pendens notice qualifies two entities that took title to the subject properties as bona fide purchasers.

The principal issues in this challenge to an award for deceptive-trade practices, arising from a teenaged babysitter's sexual assault of two boys in his care, are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supports the producing-cause element for liability based on flyers soliciting babysitting work for the teen and (2) whether the deceptive trade-practices act's general exclusion of bodily injury and mental-anguish claims bars all damages for personal injury. The boys' parents sued Bryant, a preschool teacher at a church school the boys attended, and the church and school, alleging Bryant's flyer promoting her son for child-care services deceived them because it did not mention his attention-deficit disorder, depression and low self-esteem or that Bryant discovered him several times viewing adult heterosexual pornography. The boys' parents had used Bryant's daughter for babysitting in the past without incident. A jury found the flyer deceptive, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that legally sufficient evidence did not support Bryant's acts as the cause that produced the boys' injuries.

The issues in these consolidated reverse-condemnation claims, based on flooding resulting from Hurricane Harvey, are (1) whether Texas Government Code chapter 2007 applies to both physical and regulatory takings and (2) whether chapter 2007's emergency-related exclusions apply to the river authority's water release from Lake Conroe to relieve the swelling lake from the hurricane's heavy rainfall.

This case examines whether a trial court can sever unresolved claims following a grant of partial summary judgment, thereby creating an appealable final judgment.

In this defamation action by a former contractor Shell fired in the wake of a federal bribery investigation, the issues are (1) whether Shell's internal-investigation report to the Justice Department alleging the contractor's possible complicity is absolutely privileged and (2) whether the Justice Department's investigation of Shell under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act constitutes a quasi-judicial proceeding. The underlying case arose from a Shell subcontractor's federal conviction for bribing Nigerian customs workers. Under threat of federal prosecution itself, Shell launched its own investigation of the company's dealings with the convicted subcontractor and reported the results to the Justice Department. Shell alleged that either Writt, who supervised payments to the convicted subcontractor, or his contract engineer approved, allowed or failed to stop the bribery scheme. After Shell fired Writt, he sued Shell for defamation and wrongful termination, contending he objected to Shell's suspect payments to certain contractors. The trial court granted summary judgment for Shell, ruling the company's report to the Justice Department was absolutely privileged. The court of appeals reversed, holding the report was not made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding and was subject only to a qualified privilege.

10-0429 Shell Oil Co., et al. v. Ralph Ross from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Marie R. Yeates, Houston For respondent: Mark L. Perlmutter, Austin Among principal issues in this royalty dispute are (1) whether Shell's alleged fraudulent concealment bars limitations on the suit to recover underpaid royalties; (2) whether the lessee had a due-diligence duty to inquire about the payments based on statements and other public information; and (3) whether Shell's weighted-average calculation for royalties complied with the lease. In this case the appeals court affirmed the jury's verdict that Shell and related entities fraudulently concealed the basis for its royalty calculations on leased wells and those in pooled units and that the calculations breached Ross's lease. Ross sued after the four-year limitations period had ended, but contends limitations are tolled if Shell fraudulently concealed the price structure for paying royalties on gas from the wells. Shell argues that Ross could have discovered the pricing discrepancies from publicly available information and, as with the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment should not allow Ross to avoid limitations. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0340 Spir Star AG v. Louis Kimich from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Sarah B. Duncan, Austin For respondent: Scott Rothenberg, Houston The issue is whether Texas has personal jurisdiction over a German manufacturer that allegedly does business in the state only though a Texas limited partnership exclusively selling its products in North and South America. In this case Kimich was injured when a defective high-pressure hose manufactured by Spir Star AG struck him. Kimich first sued his employer for premises liability, then Spir Star Ltd., the Texas partnership, and finally Spir Star AG, the manufacturer. The trial court denied the manufacturer's special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction. Holding in part on representations made on Spir Star Ltd.'s Web site, the court of appeals concluded that the manufacturer established Spir Star Ltd. in Texas and, doing so, brought itself under Texas jurisdiction. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

This case concerns the proper burden of proof to support a permanent protective order that prohibits contact between a parent and minor child.

The issues are (1) whether an outdoor-advertising company should be compensated for leased billboards lost when the state condemned the land on which they stood and (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the company's expert to value the billboards based on advertising income. Clear Channel challenged the state's determination that its two billboards were personal property apart from the condemned land and subject only to the state paying for their relocation. Trial courts ruled that the billboards were not personal property and should be valued as part of the condemned real property. After hearing Clear Channel's expert testify that the billboards should be valued based on lost advertising income, a jury awarded the company $268,000. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the billboards were real-estate improvements. The appeals court also held that Clear Channel's expert testimony on valuation was admissible.

Case details to come.

06-0933 Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P. v. Harris County Toll Road Authority and Harris County from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Mike A. Hatchell, Austin For respondents: Bruce S. Powers, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue is whether the Transportation Code (section 251.102) allows for reimbursement of the utility's relocation costs and provides for waiver of governmental immunity to enforce the claim. The issues in this dispute over costs of relocating underground cables are (1) whether the Transportation Code (section 251.102) allows for reimbursement of relocation costs and provides for waiver of governmental immunity to enforce the claim and (2) whether the utility has a sufficient property interest along a right-of-way to bring an inverse-condemnation claim for costs of moving its underground cables. In this case Southwestern Bell sued the county and toll-road authority for refusing to pay the $1.5 million it billed for relocating the cables to accommodate roadway expansion. The trial court awarded costs to the telephone company, but the court of appeals reversed.

The issues in this case involving an state-jail inmate's injury are (1) whether sovereign-immunity is waived under the tort-claims act because jailers used an outdoor-use-only gas gun inside the jail to quell resistant prisoners and loaded it with mislabeled shells, allegedly negligent use or condition of tangible personal property, and, if so, (2) whether waiver is defeated because the shooting was an intentional tort or in response to an emergency or riot.

The principal issue in this Whistleblower Act case is whether a government employee's internal complaint about alleged fraud to his supervisors constitutes a good-faith report to an "appropriate law enforcement authority" when the agency has a division to prosecute such fraud but the supervisors do not have authority to do so. In this case Okoli told his supervisor at the Department of Human Services that employees illegally manipulated filing dates on assistance applications, allegedly at her instruction to show better efficiency in processing the applications. After she disciplined him, he reported the allegation to higher supervisors but not the department's inspector general, the unit charged with prosecuting law violations within the department. Three months after his initial report, the supervisor fired Okoli. Okoli sued the department, alleging retaliation under the whistleblower statute. The trial court denied the department's jurisdictional plea to dismiss the suit and the appeals court affirmed.

In this trespass-to-try-title dispute against the General Land Office, to claim ownership of the bed beneath a bayou, the principal issue is whether a 1929 statute - the Small Bill - intended tidally influenced water among criteria to define which state claims were relinquished to land given by certain patents across navigable streams or water courses.

08-0751 Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Timothy J. Ruttiger from Galveston County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Pete Schenkkan, Austin For respondent: Byron C. Keeling, Houston Among principal issues in this workers-compensation case alleging bad faith under the Insurance Code and common law are (1) whether an injury became an independent injury under Aranda v. Insurance Company of North America when it was aggravated because the insurer initially refused to cover it; (2) whether the worker exhausted his administrative remedies when the parties entered a "benefit dispute agreement" that the injury was covered; (3) whether lawsuits allowed under the Insurance Code apply to workers-compensation claims; and (4) whether common-law duties of good faith and fair dealing were abolished by post-Aranda Labor Code amendments. In this case Ruttiger sued after he was denied workers-comp benefits for a hernia he claimed he suffered when lifting heavy objects at work. Texas Mutual decided to investigate the claim after Ruttiger's boss, who initially signed his workers-comp claim, later told the insurer she heard Ruttiger suffered the injury playing softball. Without investigating more, the insurance company adjustor denied Ruttiger's claim. In the first-stage administrative review of the denied claim, Ruttiger and Texas Mutual agreed on a "benefit dispute agreement" that paid him benefits. The trial court awarded damages on Insurance Code violations and gave alternative remedies on common law and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims if the Insurance Code remedies failed on appeal. The appeals court affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue is whether a court lacks jurisdiction to review an administrative death-benefits denial if a workers-compensation claimant files in the wrong court - in this case, in probate court where a wrongful-death suit was pending - within the appeal deadline to district court.

In this challenge by a law student contesting his dismissal after a controversy implicating grading in a first-year course, the issues are (1) whether the dismissal is properly characterized as academic and raises due-course-of-law protections; if so, (2) whether the appeals court properly concluded the law student alleged a viable procedural due-course-of-law claim; and (3) whether the appeals court properly concluded the law student alleged a viable substantive due-course-of-law claim.

This case concerns the application of the futility doctrine to inverse-condemnation and takings claims.

The issues in this case are whether a party's characterization as a "unit of local government" as classified by the Texas Tort Claims Act is a question of law or fact, and further, whether the TTCA's damages caps limit the Act's waiver of immunity from suit.

09-0236 State of Texas v. K.E.W. from Galveston County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Donald S. Glywasky, Galveston For respondent: Thomas W. McQuage, Galveston The principal issue in this challenge to an involuntary commitment order was whether the appeals court correctly applied the clear-and-convincing standard to assess likelihood of serious harm to others. K.E.W., suffering schizophrenia and at times agitated, came to a mental-health clinic looking for a specific staff member whom he said he wanted to impregnate. Aliens implanted a computer chip in him, he explained, because he was chosen to populate a new human race. The trial court ordered him committed, but the appeals court held that his talk without more than agitation was not an overt act that was clear and convincing evidence of serious harm to himself or others. The state argues that the court of appeals only needed to find a scintilla of evidence to support the commitment order and not an elevated review standard. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this challenge to evidence supporting a wrongful-death and medical-malpractice verdict, the issues are whether sufficient evidence showed a standard-of-care breach and, if so, whether proximate cause of the death resulted from that breach.

The issues are (1) whether physician reports on asbestos disease meet the requirements of the statutory safety-value provision for an impairment diagnosis for someone who did not or could not be diagnosed by a lung-function test and, if not, (2) whether dismissal violates the state constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws. In this case the asbestos pretrial court rejected Union Carbide's dismissal motion based on the plaintiff's failure to provide pulmonary-impairment evidence caused by asbestos. A 2005 statute requires lung-function testing before an asbestos-injury claim may proceed to trial, but the safety-valve provision provides an exception in unique and extraordinary circumstances. Based in part on a pulmonologist's evaluation, the court found that Emmite, a 35-year Union Carbide employee allegedly exposed to asbestos at work, could not physically or mentally take the lung-function test before he died but other exams confirmed asbestosis and significant impairment. A majority of the court of appeals, hearing the appeal en banc, affirmed the pretrial court's order denying dismissal. But the court split without a majority on whether the pulmonary-testing requirement was unconstitutional.

In this dispute over a medical resident's termination, in which he alleged contract, defamation and tortious-interference claims, a principal issue is whether his amended petition was proper to keep individual UT employees in the suit after the medical school moved to dismiss them under the Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision.

The issues in this defamation case are (1) whether the appeals court erred by holding a newspaper article addressed matters of public concern and (2) whether the court erred by legally sufficient evidence supported actual damages awarded.

08-0169 Tangie Walters v. Cleveland Regional Medical Center, et al. from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Christopher Bradshaw-Hull, Houston For respondents: Diana L. Faust, Dallas, and Richard Sheehy, Houston The issue is whether the Texas Constitution's open-courts provision cancels the statute of limitations on a medical-malpractice claim based on a sponge left in a patient's abdomen 10 years before a doctor finally discovered it. Walters sued, seeking in part damages for medical bills she paid over the years because of pain she suffered as doctors misdiagnosed the source. The trial court granted summary judgment for the medical center, surgeon and nurse, based on the two-year limitations on a med-mal claim. The court of appeals affirmed. Walters argues that the constitution requires she knew or should have known of her injury before the limitations period ends to show the statutory limitation is arbitrary or unreasonable. The defendants counter that an open-courts claim requires an impossibility-to-know or exceedingly difficult-to-discover standard before the constitution overrides the limitations period. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us