This case, a dispute regarding the lease of a family ranch, raises four primary issues. First, does a person named in a trust agreement as a contingent beneficiary have standing under the Trust Code to bring claims against trustees? Second, does a co-trustee of a trust have standing to bring claims against non-co-trustee third parties? Third, does a co-trustee of a trust that owns a limited partnership share of a partnership have derivative standing to bring claims on behalf of the partnership? And fourth, is a co-trustee with arguable notice of other co-trustees' likely breach of fiduciary duty required to search public records for evidence of that breach?

10-0223 Centocor Inc. v. Patricia Hamilton and Thomas Hamilton, et al. from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Robert M. (Randy) Roach Jr., Houston For respondents/cross-petitioners: Craig T. Enoch, Austin For cross-respondent Michael G. Bullen, M.D.: Thomas F. Nye, Corpus Christi For amici curiae Texas Medical Association, et al.: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas Principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by discounting the learned-intermediary doctrine when fraud allegations were based on a drug-marketing video shown to patients; (2) whether expert testimony should have been required to assist in establishing that the existing warning was unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the product's side-effects warning can prove causation of one of those effects. In his case the Hamiltons sued after Patricia Hamilton developed lupus-like symptoms from a drug she used to treat her Crohn's disease. They alleged Centocor, the drug manufacturer, used direct-to-patient advertising that did not include side-effects warnings about symptoms she developed. A jury found Centocor committed fraud and awarded damages, including punitive damages. On review, the appeals court rejected Centocor's argument that the learned-intermediary doctrine shielded it from liability because Mrs. Hamilton's prescribing doctor was responsible for warning her about adverse effects. It held the doctrine was defeated when the manufacturer was misleading in a promotional video by omitting potential adverse effects. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this case by school districts challenging rulings that each owes the state more money under the school-finance law because of increased property values, the issues are (1) whether the education commissioner acted without authority by his interpretation of the school-finance law to require the districts to give back money and, if so, (2) whether the trial court's relief - granting credits by an accounting adjustment - is properly prospective in an ultra vires suit. After the commissioner ordered the Sterling City district to pay more to account for higher property-tax revenues, the district sued, contending the commissioner ordered the "claw back" by going beyond three statutory factors controlling when a district could be ordered to rebate money to the state. The trial court denied the commissioner's jurisdictional plea, based on sovereign immunity, concluding the commissioner acted without authority and immunity does not protect his discretion to interpret the school-finance law without judicial review. The court of appeals affirmed.

In this wrongful-termination case brought by an assistant district attorney, the issue is whether the district attorney's office is protected by immunity allegedly for firing the assistant prosecutor for notifying a defense attorney about exculpatory information the assistant discovered.

In this mandamus petition from a dispute over a disallowed affidavit contesting medical expenses, the issues are (1) the trial court improperly struck the insurer's expert's counter-affidavit on medical expenses for lacking expertise and (2) whether mandamus relief is appropriate.

The issue is whether statutory attorney fees constitute compensatory damages or costs awarded in the judgment for a deposit to supersede the judgment on appeal. In this mandamus action Nalle Plastics seeks relief from a Corpus Christi law firm's successful effort to increase Nalle's supersedeas deposit to reflect its attorney-fees award. The court of appeals denied the mandamus petition seeking to overturn the trial court's order increasing the deposit.

A principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by rejecting a law firm's effort to compel arbitration with a client by deciding the arbitration agreement was one-sided and legally unconscionable based only on the firm's contract. In this case Lopez sued for malpractice, unhappy with the mediated result of the underlying suit. His agreement with the firm specified that any claim he brought against it would be subject to arbitration, but that the firm could litigate any dispute to collect its fees. The trial court refused the firm's arbitration motion. In a split decision the court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issues are (1) whether Family Code section 42.003 apply to non-abduction cases and, if so, whether legally sufficient evidence supports liability against petitioners; (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supported recoverable damages under the Family Code; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred in upholding tort liability based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

This case concerns the effect of a statutory provision requiring that certain insurance-coverage disputes be presided over by a judge appointed by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation.

10-0927 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

A principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by rejecting a law firm's effort to compel arbitration with a client by deciding the arbitration agreement was one-sided and legally unconscionable based only on the firm's contract. In this case Lopez sued for malpractice, unhappy with the mediated result of the underlying suit. His agreement with the firm specified that any claim he brought against it would be subject to arbitration, but that the firm could litigate any dispute to collect its fees. The trial court refused the firm's arbitration motion. In a split decision the court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issues in this defamation case are (1) whether "substantial truth" may be established as a common-law doctrine by accurately reporting third-party allegations and (2) whether the appeals court erred by finding a fact issue overrode summary judgment based on reviewing several articles together instead of individually.

The issue is whether suppressed evidence may establish contraband necessary to justify civil forfeiture when the contraband resulted from a search following a warrantless arrest based on an allegedly unreliable informant's tip. In trial to contest the forfeiture Herrera, the vehicle owner, moved to suppress drugs and weapons found in the car after it was searched incident to his arrest. The trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible because state troopers arrested him illegally, without sufficient cause to stop him and search his vehicle. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the forfeiture statute - Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 59.03(b) - precluded the state's seizing the vehicle after an illegal search.

(Justice O'Neil and Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0528 The John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Ann M. Fernandez from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg consolidated with 08-0529, Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Fernandez and 08-0534 Frost National Bank v. Ann M. Fernandez For petitioner Foundation: Macey Reasoner Stokes, Houston For petitioner Frost as trustee: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Julie Pendery, Dallas This appeal involves bills of review seeking to reopen two cases decided more than 30 years ago and a 60-year-old declaratory judgment on a will construction involving a South Texas ranching fortune. The bills to set aside the judgments were brought on behalf of Ann M. Fernandez, who claims she is a daughter born out of wedlock to famed rancher John G. Kenedy Jr. and a Kenedy housemaid. The principal issues are (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction for its summary judgment favoring the foundation when bills of review in the county probate court seeking the same relief were pending while the probate court determined the heirship claim and (2) whether the discovery rule saves the would-be heir's claim because the purported paternity was recently discovered. The district court ruled that Fernandez lacked standing to bring her suits, but the court of appeals held that the district court should have abated its cases while the probate court determined heirship, a threshold for the standing question. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice O'Neil and Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0528 The John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Ann M. Fernandez from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg consolidated with 08-0529, Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Fernandez and 08-0534 Frost National Bank v. Ann M. Fernandez For petitioner Foundation: Macey Reasoner Stokes, Houston For petitioner Frost as trustee: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Julie Pendery, Dallas This appeal involves bills of review seeking to reopen two cases decided more than 30 years ago and a 60-year-old declaratory judgment on a will construction involving a South Texas ranching fortune. The bills to set aside the judgments were brought on behalf of Ann M. Fernandez, who claims she is a daughter born out of wedlock to famed rancher John G. Kenedy Jr. and a Kenedy housemaid. The principal issues are (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction for its summary judgment favoring the foundation when bills of review in the county probate court seeking the same relief were pending while the probate court determined the heirship claim and (2) whether the discovery rule saves the would-be heir's claim because the purported paternity was recently discovered. The district court ruled that Fernandez lacked standing to bring her suits, but the court of appeals held that the district court should have abated its cases while the probate court determined heirship, a threshold for the standing question. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice O'Neil and Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0528 The John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Ann M. Fernandez from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg consolidated with 08-0529, Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Fernandez and 08-0534 Frost National Bank v. Ann M. Fernandez For petitioner Foundation: Macey Reasoner Stokes, Houston For petitioner Frost as trustee: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Julie Pendery, Dallas This appeal involves bills of review seeking to reopen two cases decided more than 30 years ago and a 60-year-old declaratory judgment on a will construction involving a South Texas ranching fortune. The bills to set aside the judgments were brought on behalf of Ann M. Fernandez, who claims she is a daughter born out of wedlock to famed rancher John G. Kenedy Jr. and a Kenedy housemaid. The principal issues are (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction for its summary judgment favoring the foundation when bills of review in the county probate court seeking the same relief were pending while the probate court determined the heirship claim and (2) whether the discovery rule saves the would-be heir's claim because the purported paternity was recently discovered. The district court ruled that Fernandez lacked standing to bring her suits, but the court of appeals held that the district court should have abated its cases while the probate court determined heirship, a threshold for the standing question. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Two principal issues in this contest over interest from a divorce decree's enforcement are (1) whether the appeals court's decision that relief should have been granted instead of the trial court's denial of it by interlocutory order triggers interest from the interlocutory-order date and (2) whether a judgment ostensibly disposing all claims is final if a claim for attorney fees remains pending and requires additional evidence. This appeal is the third stage in a case dating to 1997, when Johnson sought to enforce agreed-upon alimony in the original decree from a common-law marriage. In its most recent decision the appeals court held that prejudgment and post-judgment interest accrued from the trial court's erroneous denial in 1998 of Johnson's enforcement motion. Ventling argues that interest should be calculated from the court of appeals' judgment in 2012 because the 2012 judgment cannot supersede the 1998 interlocutory order on the enforcement motion. Johnson contends interest should date from 1998, when the trial court should have entered a proper judgment.