In this challenge to a summary judgment's reversal, that Anadarko's entitled to defense expenses under its insurance policy for Deepwater Horizon damages, the issues are (1) whether the policy's joint-venture provision applies to defense costs and, if so, (2) whether either of two exceptions to that provision applies.

07-0572 Gail Ashley v. Doris D. Hawkins from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas, and Kimberley M. Spurlock, Humble For respondent: James B. Manley, Cleveland For amicus curiae State of Texas: Rance L. Craft, Austin The issue is whether the statute of limitations is tolled during a person's absence from the state but amenable to service. In this case Hawkins sued Ashley, claiming injuries from an automobile accident. Hawkins filed a petition 60 days before the limitations period ended. The trial court dismissed the claim for failure to prosecute it, then reinstated it, then dismissed it again, then reinstated it a second time. A year after filing suit Hawkins served Ashley, who moved to California after the accident. Ashley moved to dismiss for summary judgment, based on limitations and failure to diligently pursue the claim, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 16.063 suspended limitations regardless of Hawkins' diligence in serving process. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issue is whether judicial error breaks causation for a legal-negligence claim when the appeals court reversed the trial loss based on trial-court error. In this case the Neubaums claim as damages their costs for an appeal to remedy their lawyers' trial error. In the underlying lawsuit, alleging the Neubaums charged usurious interest for a loan to a customer through an agent, the jury found March, the agent, loaned the money on the Neubaums' behalf. But on review the court of appeals reversed, holding no evidence proved the agent acted for the Neubaums. In this malpractice case the Neubaums allege their lawyers in the original case were negligent in part because one lawyer's illness left the trial in the hands of a firm lawyer, Stanfield, who never tried a case before. The Neubaums contend their lawyers failed to conduct discovery early enough to find the company that sued for usury was working a Ponzi scheme; that a usury "cure" letter was never admitted as evidence (and the jury never considered it as an issue); and that their lawyers did not hire an expert to review the company's bank records until after the trial. But in the malpractice case the Neubaums did not allege Stanfield, the trial lawyer, acted negligently on the issue whether March acted as the Neubaums' agent. At trial of the usury case Stanfield objected that evidence did not prove March was the Neubaums' agent and raised that argument in moving for a new trial, both of which the trial court rejected. In this malpractice case the law firm argued that it could not be liable for the trial court's error in the underlying usury case and that error caused the Neubaums' appellate costs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. A divided court of appeals reversed in part, holding the law firm failed as a legal matter to establish that its alleged negligence did not proximately cause the Neubaums' damages. By holding that the law firm should have established by expert testimony that causation was broken, the appeals court seems to reject the rule that judicial error creates a new and independent cause.

The main issue is whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that allocates a pool of paid leave to further a union's interests violates any "Gift Clause" in the Texas Constitution (Article III, Sections 50, 51, 52(a) and Article XVI, Section 6(a)).

08-0592 Fresh Coat Inc. v. K-2 Inc. from Montgomery County and the 9th District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Kevin Jewell, Houston For cross-petitioner/respondent: Thomas C. Wright, Houston A principal issue is whether a subcontractor hired to mix and install an allegedly defective stucco product is entitled to manufacturer's indemnity for a settlement with the homebuilder, like the subcontractor a "seller," to satisfy contractual indemnity. The issue raises the question whether the contractual liability is "independent liability" that would exclude it from Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 82.002(a)'s requirement that manufacturers indemnify sellers. In this case the homebuilder settled with the homeowners and sought indemnity from Fresh Coat and K-2, the manufacturer (also known as Finestone). Fresh Coat settled claims by the homebuilder and homeowner and cross-claimed for indemnity from Finestone. A jury awarded Fresh Coat its requested indemnity damages, but the court of appeals deleted the amount Fresh Coat paid the homebuilder in their settlement. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this Texas lawsuit over an accident in Mexico that Mexican children and killed their parents are (1) whether civil procedure Rule 44 allows appointment of the children's uncle, a Texas resident, as next friend to bring this claim for the children when they have legal guardians in Mexico and (2) whether a next friend can be a plaintiff as defined by the forum non conveniens statute. The trial court denied Bridgestone's dismissal motion, based on its argument that Texas was an improper forum. Under Mexican law the maternal grandparents automatically were guardians without court appointment. Texas' forum non conveniens statute defines plaintiff in pertinent part as both the injured and their personal representative as long as the personal representative does not accept the appointment in bad faith. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief.

In this action brought by a designated sexually violent offender, seeking mandamus relief against the state's effort to commit him for inpatient treatment under an amended statute when the original judgment specified outpatient treatment, the issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by granting relief on an preserved ground not argued in the mandamus petition - that denial of counsel violated the petitioner's statutory rights - and (2) whether the petitioner has either a statutory or constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in the commitment proceeding.

10-0605 In re Commitment of Michael Bohannan from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Catherine Palmore, Huntsville For respondent: Kenneth Nash, Huntsville The issue in this sexual predator-commitment case is whether Bohannon's expert, a therapist without forensic training, was properly disqualified from testifying whether he suffered a behavioral abnormality, a necessary factor to assessing a sexually violent predator. On the state's challenge of the expert's qualifications, the trial court after a Daubert hearing barred her testimony on whether Bohannon was likely to reoffend because the court determined she is not a psychiatrist or psychologist and lacks forensic training. The appeals court reversed, holding that the expert, experienced in treating sexual offenders, was qualified to assess his recidivism risk ad her testimony would assist the jury. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this action challenging traffic fines resulting from so-called red-light-enforcement are (1) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Garcia failed to exhaust administrative remedies specified by the red-light-camera statute and (2) whether the ultra-vires exception to governmental immunity applies because the city allegedly violated the red-light-enforcement statute by using improperly installed and operated cameras.

Justice O'Neil is not sitting. 08-0390 MBM Financial Corp. and Marimom Business Systems Inc. v. The Woodlands Operating Co., L.P. from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Jennifer Bruch Hogan, Houston For respondent/cross-petitioner: Karen D. Smith, The Woodlands Among principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by reversing an attorneys-fees award for a breach-of-contract allegation for which nominal damages were awarded; (2) whether the appeals court erred by determining attorneys fees were proper in a declaratory relief action; and (3) whether the court erred by failing to award fees for a fraud claim that arose from the contract action. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

05-1023 Montgomery County v. David Park from Montgomery County and the 10th District Court of Appeals, Waco In this retaliation action, the principal issues are (1) whether elimination of job duties that indirectly may affect pay constitutes an adverse personnel action under the Whistleblower Act and (2) whether alleged sexual harassment by a county commissioner reported to the sheriff's office or the county attorney constitutes a good-faith report to "an appropriate law enforcement authority." Park, a sheriff's lieutenant, sued the county after the commissioner he reported prompted a change in security-staffing responsibility for the county convention center. Because Park was responsible for scheduling convention-center security officers - including himself - he lost extra pay. His base compensation was unchanged. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county, but the court of appeals reversed, holding in part that Park raised material fact issues, including whether his work assignment and pay were adversely affected.

The issue is whether Oncor can revise the description of its property on the appraisal roll after having settled the total value of its property on the roll with the appraisal district.

The principal issue in this case is whether a contractual mediation requirement is a limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity on contract claims under the Local Government Contract Claims Act.

The principal issues are (1) whether an insured must prove an alleged injury independent from denied policy benefits to proceed with a deceptive-or-unfair-insurance-practices claim under Insurance Code chapter 541 or, if not, (2) whether finding an insurance contract was not breached precludes the insured from separately recovering policy benefits under the Insurance Code.