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CROSSTEX NORTH TEXAS PIPELINE L.P. V. ANDREW AND SHANNON GARDINER (15-0049) - view video
3/29/2016 @ 9:00 AM (length 45:15)
Originating county: Denton County
Originating from: 2nd District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth
Case Documents
In this noise-nuisance case two principal issues are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supports the negligent-nuisance claim and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in its determination that factual support did not support the nuisance claim by failing to follow the Pool v. Ford Motor Co. analysis. In this case the Gardiners sued Crosstex over loud noise and vibrations from a gas-compressor station Crosstex built across from their undeveloped 95-acre Denton County pastureland. Crosstex tried to mitigate the noise when the Gardiners initially complained, but the sides disputed the results at trial. Among their complaints, the Gardiners alleged intentional and negligent nuisance and negligence based on the compressor station's installation and operation. The trial court directed a verdict for Crosstex on the negligent operation and installation claims. Jurors then found the company liable for negligent nuisance but not for intentional nuisance, awarding the Gardiners $2 million based on residential development as the highest and best use of their land. The court of appeals held that legally sufficient evidence supported the Gardiners' negligent-nuisance claim but that sufficient factual support did not. In this appeal Crosstex argues the Gardiners failed to offer sufficient legal support for their negligent-nuisance claim because they did not establish a standard of care or show Crosstex's use of its property for the compressor station was unreasonable. The company contends that its nuisance liability is divorced from weighing the gas compressor's benefits against the purported harm. The Gardiners, on the other hand, reject the notion that expert testimony should be needed to establish a care standard in a noise-nuisance case and that unreasonableness is shown by failure to use ordinary care in creating the nuisance.
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EX PARTE K.T - CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-0075 (20-0977) - view video
1/13/2022 @ 9:50 AM (length 47:13)
Originating county: Denton County
Originating from: 2nd District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth
Case Documents
The sole issue in this petition is whether a defendant is entitled to expunction of his arrest records after acquittal when he has one prior conviction for an offense that is the same as or similar to the one for which he has been acquitted. The facts in these consolidated cases are virtually identical: The defendants, K.T. and Ferris, were each convicted of DWI; each fully discharged the resulting sentence. Four years after their respective convictions, each defendant was arrested and charged with a second DWI offense. Each was acquitted, resulting in one DWI conviction and one DWI acquittal for each defendant. Both K.T. and Ferris filed petitions for expunction of the arrest records pertaining to their acquittals, and each trial court granted the petitions. In both cases, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) filed motions for new trials, contending that neither K.T. nor Ferris qualified for expunction due to an exception for acquittal expunctions. Both trial courts denied the motions for new trial; DPS appealed in both cases.
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IN RE GAYLE E. COPPOCK (08-0093) - view video
12/10/2008 @ 9:50 AM (length 45:14)
Originating county: Denton County
Originating from: 2nd District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth
Case Documents
08-0093 In re Gayle E. Coppock from Denton County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For relator: William E. Trantham, Denton For real party in interest: Amie S. Peace, Dan C. Coffey, Denton The issues in this habeas corpus proceeding involving an ex-spouse found in contempt for "coarse or offensive" communications are (1) whether the divorce decree ordered or commanded no coarse or offensive communication and, if so, (2) whether that would be an unconstitutional prior restraint on the ex-spouse's free speech or void for vagueness and (3) whether the trial court order substantively changed its decree after it lost jurisdiction to do so. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us
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MEHTA V. MEHTA (23-0507)
Scheduled 2/18/2025 @ 9:00 AM (starts in 86 days, 8 hours, 3 minutes )
Originating county: Denton County
Originating from: 2nd District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth
Case Documents
The principal issue in this case is whether child-support payments should be considered when determining a spouse's eligibility for spousal maintenance.
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NICOLE VAN DORN PRESTON ET AL. V. M1 SUPPORT SERVICES L.P. (20-0270) - view video
9/14/2021 @ 10:40 AM (length 42:14)
Originating county: Denton County
Originating from: 2nd District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth
Case Documents
In this cas.e from a Navy helicopter accident principals issues are (1) whether the appeals court applied the proper review standard to the contractor's jurisdictional plea; (2) whether Texas's political-question doctrine applies in domestic settings; (3) whether the appeals court erred when it affirmed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable political question; (4) whether the political-question doctrine necessarily applies when the government-contractor defense has been invoked; and (5) whether allocating fault to nonparties renders the case nonjusticiable.
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TOWN OF LAKEWOOD VILLAGE V. HARRY BIZIOS (15-0106) - view video
3/8/2016 @ 9:50 AM (length 41:48)
Originating county: Denton County
Originating from: 2nd District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth
Case Documents
The issue is whether a general-law city has authority to require construction in its extraterritorial jurisdiction comply with its building-code requirements. In this case Lakewood Village sued to stop Bizios from constructing a house in the area over which it claims jurisdiction outside its city limits - its ETJ - until he got a building permit. Bizios's home site was in a subdivision approved by Denton County and Little Elm, a home-rule city, but within Lakewood Village's extraterritorial jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the injunction, holding that state law permitted home-rule cities to enforce building codes within their extraterritorial jurisdictions, but general-law municipalities cannot.
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TTHR LIMITED PARTNERSHIP D/B/A PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL OF DENTON V. CLAUDIA MORENO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF F.C., A MINOR (11-0630) - view video
11/6/2012 @ 11:30 AM (length 38:54)
Originating county: Denton County
Originating from: 2nd District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth
Case Documents
A principal issue in this health care-liability claim is whether the court of appeals erred by remanding for the trial court to consider a second extension to cure a deficiency the appeals court found in an expert report. Moreno sued doctors, nurses and the limited partnership that operates a Denton hospital where Moreno's son allegedly suffered kidney and nerve damage during a forced delivery. After the trial court granted Moreno an extension to cure a deficient expert report, and she submitted another report to address the deficiency, the defendants challenged the reports' sufficiency in an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals determined that the expert reports were deficient as they regarded direct-liability claims against the hospital and nurses and therefore were deficient on Moreno's vicarious-liability theory against the hospital for the nurses' actions. The appeals court remanded for the trial court to consider giving Moreno time to cure the deficiency. In this interlocutory appeal from that decision, the defendants argue that the state's health-care liability law allows only one extension to cure a deficient report.
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