The principal issue is whether a jury's fraud-in-the-inducement finding was proper if the jury also finds insufficient evidence of the plaintiff's only alleged specific agreement.

The issue in this special-appearance case, involving two agreements that involved some but not all participants, is whether the transactional-participant doctrine binds non-signatories to an agreement, in this case, establishing Tarrant County as the forum for disputes.

Principal issues in this nuisance and trespass case against three operators of gas-compressor stations and one pipeline company are (1) whether limitations bars the plaintiffs' claims; (2) whether state and federal clean-air laws preempt the claims; (3) whether the town of DISH (yes, all caps - named after the satellite-television provider) has statutory authority to sue; and (4) whether plaintiffs may recover for prospective injury or mental anguish, abatement of an ongoing nuisance or $1,000-a-day fines against the energy companies.

A principal issue is whether the discovery rule delays limitations on a suit to reform a deed based on mutual mistake. In this case the Cades sued four months after limitations ended, after attempting to get Cosgrove to fix the mistake. In conveying their home and the two acres surrounding it, the Cades specified in the real-estate contract that they, as sellers, would retain the mineral interests. But the deed did not reserve the mineral interests. The Cades argue that the discovery rule should extend limitations on their suit, that is, that they could not have known until they did that the deed was contrary to the real-estate contract. The Cades chose the title company to prepare the deed and closing documents, which includes an agreement that Cosgrove, as buyer for a trust, would adjust or correct any errors or omissions necessary to comply with the sales contract. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cosgrove. The court of appeals reversed, holding that neither the Cades nor Cosgrove were entitled to summary judgment.

In this royalties dispute the issues are (1) whether an addendum to an oil-and-gas lease with a "gross value received" royalty provision conflicts with one pegged to "market value at the well" in the printed lease and (2) whether a free-use clause limiting the producer to "operations hereunder" permits the producer without paying royalties to send gas to be processed by a third party, away from the lease, that the producer in part uses to power its production operations.

The issue in this legal-malpractice case is whether limitations are tolled under Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins for assets-transfer advice that led to a judgment against Renda by the federal government for violating the federal Priority Act. Renda sued seven months after the government's judgment and 11 years after the advice on the assets transfer.

The issues are (1) whether in a sale agreement an arbitration provision between Apache and Wagner Oil Co. extended to Wagner's assignees; (2) whether the arbitration clause covers Apache's claims; and (3) whether the declaratory-judgment action filed in Tarrant County violated Texas's mandatory-venue provisions and the contract's terms.

The issues are (1) whether in a sale agreement an arbitration provision between Apache and Wagner Oil Co. extended to Wagner's assignees; (2) whether the arbitration clause covers Apache's claims; and (3) whether the declaratory-judgment action filed in Tarrant County violated Texas's mandatory-venue provisions and the contract's terms.

The issues in this case are (1) whether Texas Health and Safety Code 363.111 empowers a Type A general-law municipality to impose licensing requirements on commercial solid waste operators and impose a percentage of revenue fee; (2) whether a municipal ordinance adopted by Westlake is preempted by Texas Health and Safety Code 361.0961; (3) whether the license fee imposed by Westlake's ordinance is an unconstitutional occupation tax, and whether this issue was mooted when Westlake lowered the fee from 15% to 3%; and (4) whether the court of appeals erred by remanding the issue of attorney's fees to the trial court.

The issue in this case is the sufficiency of an expert report supporting a health care liability claim against a hospital directly under Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

In this fraud suit by Byrd against the law firm that represented his ex-wife in a divorce, the issues are (1) whether attorney immunity protects lawyers who allegedly forged a bill of sale for property awarded to the ex-wife in the decree (with tax consequences to the ex-husband) and (2) whether the burden to show the attorney-immunity doctrine's fraud exception should be borne by the ex-husband as plaintiff. Byrd's suit against Cantey Hanger alleged that the firm prepared paperwork to transfer ownership of an airplane his ex-wife got in the divorce but arranged for its sale from Byrd's leasing company to a third party, falsely listing the ex-wife as the leasing company's manager. As a result, the leasing company incurred tax liability that the divorce decree specified the ex-wife would bear. The trial court granted summary judgment to the law firm on the immunity question. The appeals court affirmed.

The issue in this negligence case seeking sentimental-value damages for a pet dog mistakenly euthanized is whether intrinsic or sentimental value can be recovered.

In this case over a "cost-free" overriding royalty on gross minerals production, from wells on Hyder's property that produced from an adjoining leasehold, a principal issue is whether post-production costs may be deducted from Hyder's overriding royalties. Hyder sued Chesapeake for underpaying royalties from Chesapeake's slant-drilling production from wells on Hyder's land. The central dispute is whether Hyder's lease with Chesapeake for oil-and-gas production from her minerals estate, allowing for post-production costs, should inform a provision that provides a cost-free 5 percent royalty for directional production from adjacent estates. The trial court ruled that Hyder was entitled to an overriding royalty free of post-production costs. The court of appeals affirmed.

06-0127 William Chu v. Chong Hui Hong from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Murry B. Cohen, Houston For respondent: G. Stanley Cramb, Bedford The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether third party can be liable in tort under Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. A principal issue arising from this divorce proceeding is whether an independent tort claim exists against a third party under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act when the alleged misconduct was fraud on the marital community. This case challenges a husband's sale of a doughnut store without his wife's consent as part-owner, allegedly with Chu's help in his capacity as attorney for the buyers. After the sale, the husband transferred the proceeds to Korean relatives before he then filed for divorce. Hong, the ex-wife, sued her ex-husband for divorce and Chu as a third party for fraud on the community estate. Jurors awarded damages for lost value and lost profits for the shop and $1.5 million in punitive damages against Chu. The court of appeals affirmed.

The issues in this challenge to a city ordinance restricting "eight-liner" gaming locations are (1) whether the statutory "fuzzy-animal exception" for games of chance preempts the ordinance and (2) whether the exception violates the state constitution's lottery prohibition

11-0367 City of North Richland Hills v. Laura Friend and Luther Friend from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Fredrick Wayne "Fritz" Quast, Fort Worth For respondents: Darrell L. Keith, Fort Worth For amicus curiae State of Texas: Rance L. Craft, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the city waived its immunity when city water-park staff responded to a 12-year-old girl's heart attack with resuscitation equipment that did not include heart defibrillators available in the park and (2) whether, as in this case, the city and its employees are sued at the same time, the Texas Tort Claims Act bars suit against either or whether the city consented to suit by waiving its immunity under the act. The Friends sued the city after their daughter died. When she collapsed, employees at the city-owned park did not use available defibrillators on her. The Friends argue the city waived its immunity under the theory that the city employees misused tangible personal property because the resuscitation equipment did not contain an integral safety component. The trial court denied the city's jurisdictional plea. The appeals court affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue is whether an intentional tort under the Texas Tort Claims Act is defined only by a government employee's intent to act or by both the intent to act and the resulting harm. In this case Gordon sued for injuries to his wrists after officers arresting him for drunken-driving handcuffed him (too tightly, he complained). The city moved to dismiss on a jurisdictional plea, arguing that Gordon's claim was barred by the intentional-tort exception to the immunity waiver for tangible personal-property use under the tort claims act because the handcuffing itself was intentional. The trial court denied the city's plea. On interlocutory review, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Gordon pleaded facts to establish negligence and the handcuffing, in any event, followed the officers' affidavit testimony that it was according to training standards and not to intentionally injure him.

The principal issue is whether a will beneficiary who seeks an accounting, alleges breach of fiduciary duty against co-executors and seeks a receiver violates a forfeiture clause.

Among issues in this products-liability case, involving severe burn injuries when an air-conditioner compressor exploded, is whether Emerson is liable to Johnson, an experienced air-conditioner technician, for failing to warn of signs of “terminal venting” that led to the explosion. 

The issue in this case is who is liable when parties to a settlement agreement place disputed funds in an account controlled by the attorney of one party, and the attorney steals the funds.The CTMI parties and Fischer settled most of their claims arising from a previous dispute over the sale of a tax-consulting business. The settlement agreement provided that CTMI's attorney, Holmes, would hold the disputed funds in an escrow account until the conclusion of the litigation. Whichever party prevailed was entitled to the funds in the account. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled for Fischer. When Fischer went to collect the funds he was entitled to, the parties learned that Holmes had absconded with the money.CTMI sued Fischer for a declaratory judgment that CTMI had fulfilled its obligations under the settlement agreement by placing the disputed funds in Holmes' account. Fischer counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court rendered judgment for CTMI, but the court of appeals reversed. A main issue in the court of appeals was whether the settlement agreement created a valid escrow agreement. Relying on caselaw describing an escrow agreement as involving the deposit of funds with a neutral third party, the court held that the settlement agreement did not create an escrow agreement because Holmes was not a neutral third party. The court thus concluded that CTMI had breached the agreement by failing to pay Fischer the amount owed to him.

The principal issues in this wrongful-death case are (1) whether the Texas Tort Claims Act's damages cap applies individually and not cumulatively for government contractors and (2) whether a bus driver employed by an independent contractor is a government employee under the Tort Claims Act.

The issue is whether the rule in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v Gandy - that a full adversarial trial must be shown to defeat a collusion allegation - applies to negate a defendant's assignment of a bench-trial award to plaintiffs seeking recovery from the defendant's insurer.

06-0418 HCBeck Ltd. v. Charles Rice from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: David Rodriguez Weiner, Dallas For respondent: Paul Boudloche, Fort Worth The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether contractor is immune because construction-site owner pays workers comp premiums for subcontractor's employee. The principal issue is whether a general contractor has "provided" workers compensation insurance when the construction-site owner pays premiums for a subcontractor's insurance. In this case the site owner paid workers comp premiums for HCBeck employees and for those of a subcontractor, Greer, that HCBeck hired. Its contract with HCBeck, the owner reserved the right to provide workers comp insurance for HCBeck and subcontractors but, if not provided, required that HCBeck buy the insurance from the owner's designated agent. The contract required subcontractors to comply with its terms. Greer, the subcontractor, was not an additional insured under HCBeck's policy. When Rice, the subcontractor's employee, sued HCBeck for negligence over a job injury, HCBeck argued that Rice was a "deemed employee" and that HCBeck was immune because Rice's exclusive remedy was workers comp. The trial court granted summary judgment for HCBeck, but the court of appeals reversed on the immunity issue.

The issues in this violent-sexual-predator commitment case are (1) whether civil-commitment proceedings require legal- and factual-sufficiency review and, if a factual-sufficiency review is required, (2) whether the court of appeals erred in conducting its analysis. 

In this civil-commitment appeal based on the violent sexual-predator law, the principal issue is whether Bluitt's trial appearance by video connection violated his right under the act to "appear" at trial.

10-0687 In re Frank Kent Motor Co. from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For relator: Robert Ruotolo, Dallas For real party in interest: Timothy G. Chovanec, Fort Worth The issue is whether an employee may avoid a signed jury waiver in an employment handbook by claiming the waiver resulted from duress or coercion. Valdez, an ex-employee, sued Frank Kent for wrongful termination, claiming he was fired because of his age, and sought a jury trial. Frank Kent moved to strike the jury demand because Valdez had signed a jury waiver for any employment disputes a year before he was fired. Valdez countered the motion to strike with an affidavit attesting that his supervisor told him he would be fired if he did not sign the waiver. The trial court denied the company's motion to strike. On the company's mandamus petition, the appeals court denied relief. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this dispute over control of Fort Worth's famed Billy Bob's the issues are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a Rule 12 motion on grounds that Fort Worth law firm Kelly Hart & Hallman, hired by one bloc in the corporate struggle, satisfied its burden to show it had "sufficient authority" to represent the company and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to disqualify the firm for ostensible conflict reasons: representing both individual defendants and the company in the derivative action.

11-0255 In re the Office of the Attorney General from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For relators: Kristofer S. Monson, Austin, and Jessica Hall Janicek, Dallas For real party in interest: Thomas M. Michel, Fort Worth The issue is whether a parent in arrears on child support subject to an enforcement motion may be found in contempt if he paid the due child support covered by the motion but not support he owed in the interim before the motion hearing. In this case the Tarrant County Domestic Relations Office sought as much as $23,000 an ex-husband owed in support for his six children, including payments the office believed he would likely fail to pay. After he was served with the enforcement motion, he paid what he owned in full as of September 2008 and moved for reduction in the $5,400-a-month child-support order. By the hearing in February 2009 he was several months and more than $28,000 behind on his payments. The trial court denied his motion to modify the child-support order and found him in contempt for payments he made in September 2008 that he failed to make before the enforcement motion was filed. The court of appeals held that the trial court could not hold the father in contempt if he was current on all overdue support payments covered by the enforcement motion. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Lehrmann not sitting) 10-0238 In re Universal Underwriters of Texas Insurance Co. from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For relator: Don Martinson, Dallas For real party in interest: Scott M. Keller, Dallas For amicus curiae Texas Trial Lawyers Association: Peter M. Kelly, Houston The issue in this insurance dispute is whether Universal waived its right to appraisal either by not invoking it at the time the parties were disputing a claim valuation or when it sent a letter to the claimant advising him of limitations on a lawsuit if he chose to sue. Grubbs Infiniti sued Universal for breaching the insurance contract after Universal paid for hail damage Grubbs claimed for its roof. Universal initially paid the hail-damage claim but not on the roof until Grubbs requested the roof's additional inspection. When Grubbs sued, Universal moved to abate and to compel appraisal under the policy's appraisal provision. The trial court denied the motions and the court of appeals denied the insurer's mandamus petition. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this parental-rights termination, the issue is whether the appeals court, deciding this case en banc, erred in its factual-sufficiency review by failing to evaluate evidence on which a panel relied to reverse the termination order. State child-protection workers moved to terminate the father's parental rights after one of his two children was admitted to a hospital suffering a seizure while under the mother's care. Testimony established an initial diagnosis attributing the seizure to a sodium deficiency, perhaps related to inadequate nutrition. While the child was in the hospital, a doctor assessed her condition as "failure to thrive" and linked that to longstanding food deprivation. But expert testimony said the condition would not be evident to a lay person and the child did not appear emaciated. In a dissent from the court's en banc opinion, two justices on the panel that reversed the termination order objected to the court's failure to evaluate that and other evidence: that without further testing the failure to thrive could not be established, that the child appeared only slightly underweight and that, concerning the other child, limited evidence linked the child's ear injury to a slap and no evidence supported that the second child was malnourished.

In this effort by grandparents to be designated primary decision-makers for their grandchild the issues are (1) whether the Family Code requires a showing that a parent to be either unfit or to have abdicated parental duties before the grandparents have standing to challenge the parent-child relationship and (2) whether the grandparents can show their actual care, control and possession of the child when evidence demonstrated both parents involved with the child's care.

In the Matter of H.V. from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner Tarrant County District Attorney: David M. Curl, Fort Worth For respondent: Michael Shawn Matlock, Fort Worth. The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether juvenile's request to call his mother was unequivocal request for lawyer and, if so, whether weapon discovered from statement was admissible. The issues in this murder case against a juvenile are (1) whether the boy's request to call his mother to seek an attorney was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel and (2) whether a gun found based on information in a suppressed statement was properly excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." In this case H.V., a 16-year-old Bosnian immigrant who had been in the United States four years, was arrested as he tried to carry a bloody carpet from his house while police had the home sealed as they waited for a search warrant. In custody, a magistrate read H.V. his rights for a second time that day (this time he refused to sign a written warning). When he asked to call his mother so she could call an attorney, the magistrate told him that his only options were to ask for an attorney, make a statement to police or not make one. H.V. told the magistrate he was "only 16." The magistrate assured him that he could ask for an attorney if he wanted an attorney. H.V. then consented to talk with investigators. The trial court ruled that his request to call his mother was an unequivocal request for counsel and ordered his statement suppressed and the gun inadmissible as evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the gun was inadmissible because it was obtained as a result of police failure to honor his request for an attorney, not a mere failure to warn him of his rights.

The issues are (1) whether the Texas Workers' Compensation Division has continuing jurisdiction to consider new evidence challenging lifetime workers-compensation benefits awarded years before and (2) whether the workers-comp insurer is precluded by collateral estoppel or the prior ruling in the case from contesting the lifetime benefits. In this case Liberty Mutual in 2009 sought a new hearing to challenge lifetime-income benefits Adcock was awarded in 1997, alleging new evidence that Adcock's disability was no longer permanent. In the earlier hearing Adcock won the benefits for total and permanent functional loss of a foot and hand. On Liberty Mutual's appeal from a determination that Adcock was still entitled to the benefits, the trial court granted Adcock's summary-judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Legislature intended that the Workers' Compensation Division did not have continuing jurisdiction to review lifetime benefits once awarded.

The principal issues are (1) whether Family Code 3.201's two instances making a spouse liable for the other's debts establish the exclusive means to hold a spouse personally liable for the other spouse's debts; (2) whether the attorney fees for the spouse sued for divorce were necessities; and, if so, (3) whether the other spouse failed to discharge his support duty to make him personally liable for the fees. Tedder's wife retained the Gardner Aldrich law firm to represent her after Tedder sued for divorce and child custody. Her contract with the firm specified that she would be responsible for the attorney fees but that the firm would seek to collect from Tedder. Tedder paid $50,000 to the firm, but Gardner Aldrich intervened to secure its unpaid fees after the custody decision. The trial court awarded the firm $151,800 for its unpaid fees against the ex-wife and gave her judgment for fees against her ex-husband. Before the divorce decree was signed, however, Tedder and his ex-wife agreed to leave her solely liable for the fees. The trial court's judgment incorporated their agreement. Several days later she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. On review, the appeals court reversed and rendered judgment against Tedder, holding that the fees were community debt and necessities for which he was jointly and severally liable.

07-0123 Dennis L. Miga v. Ronald L. Jensen from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Jeffrey Levinger, Dallas For respondent: Warren W. Harris, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether restitution is appropriate when judgment leading to a Rule 11 payment agreement is later reversed. The issue is whether restitution is appropriate when a party tenders payment under a Rule 11 agreement and the judgment leading to the agreement is later reversed on appeal. In this case Miga sued Jensen for breach of a stock-option agreement. He won a jury verdict, which the court of appeals affirmed. At that time Miga and Jensen agreed that Jensen would tender $23.4 million to the trial court to stem post-judgment interest. Under the agreement, Miga could withdraw from the account unconditionally. In an appeal of that judgment to this Court, the Court reversed for calculation of lost stock profits in the damages. Jensen then sued for restitution of the money tendered under the Rule 11 agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Jensen and a split court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0776 Jack Edward Milner v. Vicki Ann Milner from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Jeff Kobs, Fort Worth For respondent: Rebecca Tillery, Dallas In this appeal from a contest over property division, the principal issues are (1) whether a mediated settlement conveyed the husband's partnership in companies or just assigned rights to his interests; (2) whether contract law requirements - particularly a meeting of the minds - applies to enforcing a mediated settlement agreement; and (3) whether the divorce decree altered the settlement agreement by allegedly omitting substantive terms and conditions of the settlement. Upon divorce, Jack Milner agreed in a mediated settlement to convey to Vicki Milner his partnership interests in two limited partnerships. The settlement included consent signatures for Jack Milner's other partners because the partnership agreements required all partners agree to take on a new partner. One partner refused. When Vicki Milner tried to withdraw her consent to the medicated settlement, Jack Milner moved for an agreed final divorce decree that did not reference the other partners' necessary consent. After the trial court entered judgment on the mediated settlement and approved the final decree, Vicki Milner moved for a new trial, arguing that the final decree did not properly reflect the mediated settlement. The trial court denied the new-trial motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that mediated settlement satisfied statutory requirements but not the mutual-consent requirement of contract law. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Hecht not sitting) 10-0141 Vernon F. Minton v. Jerry W. Gunn, et al. from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Mr. Thomas M. Michel, Fort Worth For respondents: Mr. David Keltner, Fort Worth A principal issue is whether the controlling question in this legal-malpractice suit arising from a patent-enforcement case is a substantial patent issue that must be answered exclusively by a federal court, that is, whether an exception (experimental-use doctrine) to a defense ("on sale" bar rule) could apply in the underlying patent litigation. Minton sued his attorneys for alleged malpractice, claiming he lost $100 million as a result of their failure to plead an exception to a defense. In the first suit, Minton sued to enforce a patent for an online stock-trading program. The trial court in that litigation granted summary judgment for the defendants because Minton supposedly offered his program for sale more than a year before applying for a patent. By itself, that would trigger the on-sale bar rule, which invalidates a patent if the product is offered for sale for commercial use more than a year before the patent application. The question in this case is whether Minton's attorneys failed to plead the exception to that rule, the experimental-use doctrine. Under the exception, a product offered for test or experiment more than a year before a patent application can negate the on-sale bar rule. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the case presented factual questions, not issues requiring federal court interpretation that would control the state malpractice suit. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

A principal issue is whether the review standard should be greater than deference when a trial court grants a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction without live testimony. In the underlying case Moncrief alleges Gazprom, a Russian company, used trade secrets it acquired in Texas pursuant to negotiating a joint venture with Moncrief to establish a competing gas-production and marketing firm. In response Gazprom says its purpose in the Texas discussions was to settle a related federal lawsuit. Without hearing live testimony, the trial court granted Gazprom's special appearance. The court of appeals affirmed.

In this contract dispute, alleging the plaintiff did not object to a jury question on contract formation until after the verdict, the issues are (1) whether his complaint is waived and, if not, (2) whether the appeals court erred by failing to conduct an appropriate sufficiency review.

The issue in this case, regarding royalty payments under an oil-and-gas lease, is whether the mineral deed required all post-production costs must be proportionally deducted or only costs after the gas reached the transportation pipeline.

The issues are (1) whether a second trial court has jurisdiction to enjoin execution of another's judgment and (2) whether the district clerk acted without authority by attempting to collect litigation costs from indigent parties. In this case the district clerk assessed Campbell and others divorced in Tarrant County court costs despite uncontested affidavits that they were indigent. In each case the decrees cited that individual costs would be borne by the parties. After Campbell and others sued, the cases were consolidated in a district court different from those that granted the divorces. That court then enjoined the clerk from collecting the court costs. A divided appeals court reversed and dismissed, holding that only the courts that issued the decrees had jurisdiction to enjoin the district clerk.

The issue is whether a Texas court has personal jurisdiction over a Louisiana resident who got proceeds from a house sale in Texas in a fraudulent transfer.

05-0882 Perry Homes, et al. v. Robert E. Cull and S. Jane Cull from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth The principal issues are (1) whether a defendant must show prejudice to establish that plaintiffs waived their arbitration rights and (2) whether the defendant is prejudiced by the plaintiffs' pretrial discovery that would not have been available in arbitration. In this case the Culls initially resisted arbitration of their complaints against Perry Homes about construction defects. The Culls argued that arbitration was unconscionable because the chosen arbitration procedure was expensive and biased. After they pursued discovery for close to a year before trial, the Culls then moved for arbitration. Perry opposed their motion, contending the Culls had waived their right to arbitrate. The trial court granted the Culls' motion. Perry challenged the Culls' arbitration award, but the trial court confirmed it and the court of appeals affirmed.

Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, et al. v. Laura Schubert from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioners: David M. Pruessner, Dallas For respondent: William O. Wuester, Fort Worth. The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether mental-anguish damages may be awarded for post-traumatic stress. The principal issues in this false-imprisonment and assault case are (1) whether mental-anguish damages may be awarded based on a post-traumatic stress diagnosis and (2) whether the expert testimony on post-traumatic stress syndrome was reliable. In this case, the daughter of an Assembly of God missionary alleged that members and ministers of a Colleyville church unlawfully restrained her when she was 17 for two hours on two occasions by holding her down and praying over her. In the first instance she told church members she saw a "vision," then collapsed. She claims she was carried into a church classroom and, kicking and screaming, held against her will as church members and a youth minister prayed over her. Three days later church members allegedly found her in a fetal position, took her to a room again and held her "spread eagle" against her will. Her parents initially sued on her behalf for battery and false imprisonment, claiming damages for personal injuries, mental anguish and post-traumatic stress. Defendants contend her mental anguish resulted from traumatic experiences in Africa and argue that she should not have been allowed to recover damages for mental anguish and that her expert testimony on post-traumatic stress disorder was not reliable. A jury awarded damages for mental anguish, admitting evidence of post-traumatic stress. The court of appeals affirmed in part, but reversed on damages awarded for future earnings.

In this case, alleging a pharmacy's negligence in preparing a compound for a physician to treat patients, the issues are (1) whether the pharmacy is a health-care provider under the medical-liability statute and (2) whether the Millers' negligence, fraud and warranty allegations establish health care-liability claims. The Millers sued for complications, including blindness, they attributed to bulk lipoic acid the pharmacy prepared for her doctor to treat her Hepatitis C symptoms. The pharmacy moved to dismiss the suit because the Millers did not serve an expert report required for a health care-liability claim. The Millers argue that the Texas Medical Liability Act, governing health care-liability claims, excludes pharmacists sued for mishandled or defective products. The trial court denied the pharmacy's dismissal motion. In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issues are (1) whether the "strip and gore" doctrine applies to subsume mineral interests under a strip adjoining property conveyed by the strip owner who severed and reserved mineral rights under the strip when she deeded it surface rights to a power company for a transmission line and (2) whether the appeals court erred by affirming an order compelling joinder of adjacent mineral-interest holders mailed royalty checks. In this case Crawford contested the trial court's joinder order in his breach-of-contract suit against XTO for failure to pay royalties based on mineral rights under the strip he got from his mother.

08-0262 Roy Kenji Yamada, M.D. v. Laura Friend, et al. from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Kevin Carey, Fort Worth For respondent: Jeff Kobs, Fort Worth The principal issues are (1) whether this action, claiming wrongful death because defibrillators were negligently placed and improperly used by employees of a municipal water park, should be considered a health care-liability claim and (2) whether the court of appeals erred by dividing allegations into health-care and ordinary negligence claims. In this case a 12-year-old girl collapsed at a municipal water park of a heart attack attributed to cardiac-muscle disease. Her parents sued the city then added Yamada, who provided consultant medical services to the water park, because park employees improperly used a defibrillator. Yamada moved to dismiss the claim against him, arguing that the girl's parents did not file an expert report as required in a health-care liability claim. He based that on a statutory definition of a health-care liability claim as one "for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care ... or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care...." The trial court denied the dismissal motion. On interlocutory review, the court of appeals affirmed the denial for claims it considered ordinary negligence and separated those from health-care liability claims that required an expert report. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in this permissive interlocutory appeal is whether sections 9.201 and 9.203 of the Texas Family Code vest exclusive jurisdiction over a post-divorce partition action in the trial court that rendered the final divorce decree or whether section 23.001 of the Property Code permits a partition action over undivided community property to be filed in another court.

A principal issue is whether the federal Airline Deregulation Act preempts Lufthansa's state-law tortious-interference claim.

The issue in this case is whether a resolution by law firm shareholders provides the firm with the power to redeem shares of a former partner for no value.

The principal issue in this wrongful-death suit is whether the appeals court erred by concluding the Texas Tort Claims Act's discretionary-function exception did not shield the water district's decision to allow a "scour hole" below a dam deeper than the channel's design.

In this jail-inmate injury case a principal issue is whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted "in connection with" to reverse the county's summary judgment, based on immunity, for a broken chair the inmate used during medical treatment.

The issues in this dispute over church property are (1) whether the trust covering the diocese's property was validly created; (2) whether control over that property is an ecclesiastical decision subject to the national church rules; and, if not, (3) whether equitable title to the property is determined by Texas trust and corporate law.

The principal issue in this case is essentially the same ownership question as those in 11-0332, Robert Masterson, et al. v. Diocese of Northwest Texas, et al., below: Whether in Texas a diocese seeking to leave the U.S. Episcopal Church or the larger Episcopal governing entity owns the church property in the diocese. The specific issue is whether ownership should be decided by "neutral principles"--using established trust and property law and taking account of deeds, the governing language employed by a local church and the larger denomination--or by "deference"--determining in a hierarchical church structure where church members place ultimate authority over property use. In this case the Fort Worth diocese, seeking to split from the larger national Episcopal church, appeals directly from summary judgment for the national church. The trial court used the deference approach to decide that the national church owned church property in the diocese.

09-0497 Tyler Scoresby, M.D. v. Catarino Santillan from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner Tyler Scoresby: Michael A. Yanof, Dallas For petitioner Yadranko Ducic, M.D.: David L. Pratt and Randy J. Hall, Fort Worth For respondent: Jason C. N. Smith, Art Brender and Eric Reyes, Fort Worth In this appeal from a trial court's failure to dismiss a health-care liability suit, a principal issue is whether an expert report can be so deficient in addressing the elements of a claim that it constitutes no report at all, requiring dismissal instead of an extension to cure the defects. Santillan sued over alleged mistakes during surgery on a minor son's nasal tumors that led to bleeding and his partial paralysis. Dr. Scoresby, an ear-nose-throat surgeon, moved to dismiss the claim because Santillan's expert report, by a neurologist, did not establish a care standard, show how the standard was breached or how the breach caused the son's injuries. The report also did not include the expert's credentials. Instead of dismissing the suit, the trial granted a 30-day statutory extension to cure a deficient report. Scoresby appealed that ruling, arguing to the court of appeals, as he does in this Court, that the expert report amounted to no report at all, requiring dismissal. The appeals court dismissed the doctor's interlocutory appeal, holding that an extension to cure a deficient report could not be reviewed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

06-0247 Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Association from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Donald Colleluori, Dallas For respondent: B. Daniel Berryman, Fort Worth Principal issues are (1) whether an exception exists to the general rule that an insurer has no liability for defense costs for a claim after a policy's expiration when the insurer told the policyholder it would pay the costs and, if such an exception exists, (2) whether the court of appeals erred by characterizing the claim as one for contract breach for which attorneys fees can be awarded. In this case Ulico sued Allied for a declaration that it did not owe Allied defense costs in a suit Allied won. Allied had filed a claim when it was sued, in a separate suit, but filed it after its policy with Ulico expired. Despite that, Ulico told Allied that it would pay for Allied's defense in a letter that reserved its rights to contest coverage. In a subsequent letter the insurer restated that it would pay defense expenses "pursuant to" the earlier "reservation of rights" letter. The trial court awarded defense costs to Allied, based on waiver and estoppel - that Ulico had given up its right to deny defense costs by assuring Allied that its defense would be paid for. The court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issue is whether the recreational-use statute limits the university's liability to a spectator who fell at a university stadium following an outdoor soccer game. In this case Sandra Williams sued for injuries after she tumbled five feet from the stands to a track when a padlocked gate gave way as she leaned against it. The university filed a jurisdictional plea, arguing that it did not have liability under the recreational-use statute. That argument is based on a statutory clause defining recreation as "any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors" in addition to specific activities like hunting, fishing and camping. Williams contends that watching sports, a passive activity, cannot be broadly defined by a clause amplifying a list of participatory outdoors activities. The trial court denied the university's dismissal motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that watching sports was not among the statute's recreation definitions.

The issues are (1) whether Texas law recognizes tortious interference with inheritance rights; (2) whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's fraud verdict and its damages award; (3) whether damages may be awarded based on the jury's undue-influence finding; and (4) whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that a woman lacked mental capacity to amend her trust.

07-0205 Waffle House Inc. v. Cathie Williams from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Mark Emery, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Susan E. Hutchison, S. Rafe Foreman, Grapevine The issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred in its definition of the duty owed by Waffle House to an employee in a negligent supervision and retention suit based on sexual harassment allegations and (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's punitive-damages award. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us