10-0283 Christopher N. Epps and Laura L. Epps v. Bruce Fowler Jr. and Stephanie L. Fowler from Williamson County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Mr. N. West Short, Georgetown For respondents: Mr. Frank B. Lyon, Austin In this case involving the plaintiffs' dismissal of deceptive trade-practices claims by non-suiting them, the issues are (1) whether the defendant is entitled to contractual attorneys fees as the prevailing party and (2) whether the appeals court should have remanded instead of rendering judgment to allow the defendants to press a reserved sanctions motion. When the Fowlers sued over an alleged foundation defect in the house the Eppses sold them, the Eppses denied the allegations and claimed their attorneys fees, based on the home-sale contract. The Fowlers non-suited their claims, but the Eppses proceeded to trial on the fees issue and won almost $23,000. The court of appeals rendered judgment that the Eppses take nothing. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0671 Kerry Heckman, et al. v. Williamson County, et al. from Williamson County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Harry Williams IV, Seattle For respondents: Henry W. Prejean, Georgetown, and C. Robert Heath, Austin In this proposed class action brought under section 1983, misdemeanor defendants allege the county denied their constitutional rights to appointed counsel and to open-court hearings. The issues are (1) whether the plaintiffs have standing to seek class certification even though named plaintiffs no longer suffer alleged injuries and (2) whether the claims should have been remanded to consider the county's argument that policy changes made the claims moot. Four misdemeanor defendants and the mother of a juvenile facing a marijuana-possession complaint variously complain that they were systematically denied appointed counsel in their first appearances in court (all later were appointed counsel) and that their initial appearances, in a secure section of the county jail, were closed to the public, including defendants' families. When the trial court denied the county's jurisdictional plea, the county took an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed, holding that none of the plaintiffs had standing on all claims of the proposed class. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this case, involving a roofer's injury claim after he fell from an allegedly defective ladder, are (1) whether the bank is protected by Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 95 without a written agreement with a contractor who worked for the bank before; if so, (2) whether Carpenter and the bank had a "handshake" agreement to fix a roof leak; and (3) whether the roofer's injury arose from a condition or use of a real-property improvement if he only agreed to determine a leak's source and to prove it to an insurance adjuster. In this case Carpenter sued the bank after falling from the bank's extension ladder, alleging the ladder was defective. First Texas argues that Carpenter was its contractor bound by an agreement to find the leak, show the adjuster and fix the leak with insurance proceeds. Carpenter contends he agreed to find the leak, but that his previous work for the bank was based on written contracts resulting from bidding. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment, concluding the bank did not owe Carpenter a duty under chapter 95 to warn the ladder might be unsafe because he was its contractor. The appeals court reversed, holding no evidence proved a written or oral contract that Carpenter would repair the leak.

The issues in this case are (1) whether a homeowners’ association has standing to sue a planning and zoning commission for approving a nonconforming plat, and (2) whether mandamus relief is available to compel that commission to rescind its approval of the plat until the plat complies with relevant regulations.

The issue in this case is whether sovereign immunity or the separation of powers doctrine protects government lawyers from professional discipline procedures arising from alleged misrepresentations made to a court.