In this challenge to "stigma" damages awarded for contaminated but remediated property, the principal issues are (1) whether stigma damages may be recovered for temporary environmental contamination in the absence of permanent physical injury; (2) whether the jury must find permanent injury before awarding such damages; and (3) whether the real estate-appraisal testimony was legally sufficient to support the stigma-damages award. Mel Acres Ranch sued for negligence, nuisance and trespass after tracing livestock deaths and defects to industrial waste that Houston Unlimited discharged for years on its nearby property. Even though Houston Unlimited worked to prevent further pollution and evidence showed contamination levels below state standards, Mel Acres sought and won damages for property-value loss, based on the contamination record on its deed.

The principal issue is whether an oilfield operator has a right to use adjacent surface property to service its drilling in a pooled unit that includes non-working mineral interests beneath the adjacent tract. In this case the Hegars sued for trespass, arguing that Key continued to use a road it no longer reasonably needed to service drilling on adjacent land. Key used a road it had used for drilling operations in the so-called Rosenbaum-Curbo tract before its operating lease terminated because its well ceased production. To do so, Key acquired a mineral interest in the Rosenbaum-Curbo tract, then pooled that with the adjacent land where it operated a producing well. The Hegars, who acquired the surface estate above the Rosenbaum-Curbo tract and a fractional mineral interest beneath it, complained that heavier traffic resulted from Key's drilling a second well on the adjacent land. The trial court found for the Hegars, ruling that Key's use of the road across the Hegars' property was not reasonably necessary because its lease terminated. After first reversing the trial court, the court of appeals on rehearing held for the Hegars, holding in part that Key could use the road as long as it produced from the Rosenbaum-Curbo tract but concluded that it was not.

A principal issue is whether the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss department employees from a wrongful-death lawsuit under the Texas Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision when the plaintiff added federal Section 1983 claims while the department's dismissal motion was pending. Cannon sued the department and employees, alleging tort claims, after her son, a patient at the Brenham State School, died after employees restrained him. In a jurisdictional plea, the department asserted sovereign immunity, then moved to dismiss claims against the employees, arguing that Cannon could not sue both the department and the employees. Before the trial court acted on that dismissal motion, Cannon dropped her tort claims and amended the suit to allege only federal civil-rights violations under Section 1983. But the department contends claims against the employees effectively were dismissed when it moved to dismiss because the statute makes dismissal mandatory. In its review, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to drop the claims against the employees.

The issue in this mandamus effort to thwart a venue-change order is whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.020's mandate for venue by agreement trumps section 65.023's provision for venue in the defendant's domicile county for injunctive relief.