05-0272 Entergy Gulf States Inc. v. John Summers from Jefferson County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Collyn A. Peddie, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether a premises owner can be a contractor for workers comp purposes. The issue is whether a premises owner who hires an independent contractor and provides workers-compensation insurance for the contractor's employees can be a "statutory employer" for workers-comp purposes. Designation as a statutory employer would protect the premises owner from a negligence suit by an injured employee. In this case Summers, hired by a company to work at Entergy's plant, sued Entergy for negligence for on-the-job injuries. Summers' employer worked under a contract with Entergy that labeled it an "independent contractor" but provided also that Entergy would not be precluded from raising the standard workers comp defense. The company's employees would be considered Entergy's employees, eligible for workers compensation and precluded from suing for negligence. In a later provision Entergy agreed to provide workers comp coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Entergy on the coverage issue. But the court of appeals reversed, holding that under the workers comp statute a premises owner could not be a general contractor. The Court decided this case in August 2007, holding that a change in the workers comp law despite its label as a recodification without substantive change allowed a premises owner to be a general contractor. The Court granted rehearing of that decision. The Court will hear three arguments beginning at 9 a.m. in the Hillcrest Classroom in the Underwood Law Library at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law in Dallas. Each side in each case will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0326 Larry Roccaforte v. Jefferson County from Jefferson County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Laurence Watts, Missouri City For respondent: Steven L. Wiggins, Beaumont In this suit by a deputy constable alleging wrongful termination the principal issues are (1) whether Texas Local Government Code section 89.0041's is jurisdictional (whether Texas Government Code section applies to make it so) and (2) whether section 89.0041 is preempted by Section 1983 for a civil-rights violation. Roccaforte claims he was fired after filing a grievance against the county constable. He did not send notice to the county as required by 89.0041, but served the county judge. The district attorney answered within 30 days. Jefferson County challenged the trial court's jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that compliance with section 89.0041 is not a jurisdictional requirement. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0901 Texas Rice Land Partners Ltd. and Mike Latta v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas LLC from Jefferson County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Amy Warr, Austin For respondent: Lynne Liberato, Houston The principal issue is whether a pipeline qualifies as a common carrier with condemnation power because its owner assured the Texas Railroad Commission the pipeline would be available to ship carbon dioxide for other than Denbury affiliates. Denbury initiated this suit after Texas Rice, which leases farmland to Latta, refused to let Denbury's surveyors onto its property for a pipeline survey. Before the suit, Denbury and Texas Rice had negotiated the survey details but without agreement. Denbury then applied to the Texas Railroad Commission for a common-carrier permit that would allow it to condemn a pipeline easement. The commission approved the common-carrier status and the trial court granted Denbury summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction to bar interference with the survey. Texas Rice argues, as it did to the court of appeals, that a factual dispute exists whether he pipeline will be only for private use. The appeals court affirmed the summary judgment and injunction. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0526 In re United Scaffolding Inc. from Jefferson County and Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For relator: Kathleen M. Kennedy, Beaumont For real party in interest: Chris M. Portner, Beaumont The issue is whether, after remand to specify reasons for a new trial ordered "in the interest of justice and fairness," the trial court's amended new-trial order abused its discretion for failing again to specify reasons. After a hearing on remand, the trial court issued another new-trial order, concluding without more on three points that the jury verdict was "against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence" and - in addition to those reasons or in the alternative - was in "the interest of justice and fairness." In a split decision the court of appeals denied United Scaffolding's second mandamus petition challenging the order. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Two principal issues are (1) whether a mineral-rights owner exercised reasonable diligence, to avoid limitations, by relying on a fraudulent plat the drilling operator filed with the Texas Railroad Commission instead of a third-party survey in the commission's records would have shown the operator's fraud and (2) whether the mineral-rights owner ratified an unauthorized pooling agreement by knowingly accepting royalties from the unit. Hooks sued for underpaid royalties from Samson, the operator, alleging the operator did not pay royalties on minerals it took in slant-drilling from a "bottom hole" that was within the scope of Hooks' lease. Hooks also claimed unpaid royalties from a pooled unit that Samson created by unilaterally terminating an existing producing unit without authority to do so. Samson contends Hooks sued too late on the fraud claim because Hooks could have discovered the misleading information locating the bottom hole before the limitations deadline. Samson also argues that Hooks accepted royalties from the unauthorized unit, negating the breach-of-contract claim. The trial court ruled for Hooks and awarded damages on the fraud and contract claims, but the court of appeals reversed on both.

The principal issue is whether legally sufficient evidence supported a jury's design-defect finding when a fully extended indoor-utility lift fell with a worker at the top of it when it was moved contrary to warnings. Matak's estate sued Genie for defectively designing the lift, arguing that four alternative designs would have prevented his death. With Matak in a bucket 40 feet above a church floor where he was installing fiber-optic cables in a ceiling, a co-worker and a church employee tried to move the lift despite placards on the machine that moving it with the lift extended could result in death or serious injury. Jurors found the lift was defectively designed. The appeals court affirmed judgment for Matak's estate.

The issue is whether an apartment-building contractor should be entitled to indemnity as a "seller" from a component manufacturer. In the underlying case a subcontractor's employee, injured as he worked on an apartment complex, settled a products-liability case with Centerpoint, the general contractor building the complex, and Trussway, manufacturer of a failed truss that led to his fall. Centerpoint then sued Trussway to be indemnified, claiming it was a seller of the Trussway truss by incorporating the truss in the apartment complex Centerpoint constructed and sold to the owners. By doing so, Centerpoint argues, it put the truss into commerce for purposes of products-liability law. Trussway contends Centerpoint sold a service - building an apartment complex - so it could not be a seller and could not qualify for indemnity. The trial court ruled that Centerpoint was a seller. The court of appeals held it was not.

The issues are (1) whether a trial court may, in determining that a reasonable probability exists that a pipeline will be used to transport gas for an entity not affiliated with the pipeline company, consider agreements after the pipeline was initially contemplated; (2) whether the reasonable-probability test should factor how extensive the contemplated "public use" is and whether the "public interest" is relevant; and (3) whether the appeals court translated the reasonable probability test into a subjective analysis.

The issue is whether Byrdson, doing business as Excello Construction in working for the regional-planning commission, provided a service defined by the Local Government Contract Claims Act that would waive the commission's immunity for breach-of-contract claims.

Principal issues in this case against a lawyer who first lied to a client about a trust-fund embezzlement by a colleague, of funds the associated attorney controlled, are (1) whether causation-and-damages evidence must support a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim and, if so, (2) whether a material fact exists to show that causation and those damages.

A principal issue in this dispute over royalties involving two pooled-unit reconfigurations is whether property law or contract principles govern ownership interests.

The issues are (1) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that this case was one for general negligence, not premises liability, and (2) whether a new-trial order can be reviewed on appeal from judgment in the second trial.

The issues are (1) whether deputy constables have collective-bargaining rights under Local Government Code chapter 174 and, if not, (2) whether a collective-bargaining agreement not authorized by the statute void and unenforceable.

In this class action, contesting an insurance company's refusal to renew all-risk homeowners' policies (HO-B coverage), the principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by holding the policyholders were entitled to renewal under their individual policies' stipulation that Farmers "may not refuse to renew . . . because of claims for losses resulting from natural causes."

The issues are (1) whether consequential damages should be measured by a company's unrealized loss in value; (2) whether the consequential damages are reasonably foreseeable for Signature's loss in value and Signature's failed buyout negotiations; (3) whether evidence was legally enough to support the $2.4 million direct-damages award; (4) whether Signature was obligated to indemnify International Paper against claims made by Signature's owner, Ogden; and (5) whether Ogden may independently recover for contract breach under either a theory of assignment or agency.

This appeal concerns whether the trial court in this personal-injury case erred in excluding evidence, charging the jury, and imposing sanctions (including mid-trial document production) and whether those errors, if any, were harmful.

Under Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, notice of a healthcare claim must be accompanied by a medical-authorization form that meets statutory requirements, and notice that is "given as provided in this chapter" will toll limitations on the claim for 75 days. The issue in this case is whether a form that does not strictly comply with statutory requirements will toll limitations.

The central issue in this case is whether a contractual "late charge" on past due royalties allows for compound rather than simple interest.