05-0721 SSP Partners and Metro Novelties Inc. v. Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corp. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg In this indemnity action from a wrongful-death and products-liability case, the principal issues include (1) whether the court of appeals erred by holding the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine applied to a U.S. company held out as the product manufacturer by its closely allied foreign company and (2) whether the U.S. firm is the manufacturer because it and the foreign company are indistinguishable. SSP Partners sued Gladstone USA for indemnity after a judgment in a case alleging a child died as a result of a defective lighter. The trial court granted Gladstrong USA's motion asserting that no evidence showed it manufactured the lighter. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that the common-law apparent manufacturer doctrine survives statutory indemnity provisions in Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code chapter 82.

05-0940 Central Ready Mix Concrete Co. Inc. v. Luciano Islas from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg A principal issue is whether a contractor owes any duty for the safety of an independent subcontractor's employees performing dangerous work. In this case Islas sued Central Ready Mix for injuries he suffered as he cleaned the rotating mixer on one of Central's cement trucks. Islas, employed by a subcontractor hired by Central to clean the trucks' mixing drums, was caught as he was climbing out of the mixing drum when a co-worker started the truck and the mixer began turning. A jury determined that Central was 20 percent responsible, but the trial court granted the company's motion to disregard the verdict. The court of appeals reversed.

06-0952 In re Eduardo "Walo" Gracia Bazan from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For relator: Kelly K. McKinnis, McAllen For real party in interest: Cheryl Hole, Edinburg The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether 'forgiveness doctrine' operates to bar removal of officer convicted of crime alleged before re-election. The issue is whether is a constable may be removed from office and suspended pending appeal for a conviction that occurred years before his re-election. Bazan, a constable elected from a Hidalgo County precinct, seeks mandamus relief from a court order removing him for a felony conviction and suspending him during his appeal. Bazan was convicted of stealing a car by deception on allegations dating to October 2001, three years before he was re-elected. The trial court cited two provisions of the Texas Local Government Code requiring the removal and suspension, but Bazan argues that Local Government Code section 87.001 bars his removal for crimes that occurred before his re-election. The state argues that the Texas Constitution prohibits anyone convicted of bribery from holding public office, that Bazan's crime was bribery, so the constitution trumps Local Government Code section 87.001. The court of appeals denied Bazan's mandamus petition.

06-0178 Forest Oil Corp. and Daniel B. Worden v. James Argyle McAllen, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioners: Geoffrey L. Harrison, Houston For respondents: Craig T. Enoch and David Morris, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether arbitration clause in settlement bars. The principal issues are (1) whether a disclaimer in a settlement contract - that no other representations were made - bars a claim that an arbitration clause in the settlement was fraudulently induced; (2) whether reliance on a representation contrary to the contracts was justified; and (3) whether reliance on a representation during settlement negotiations was justified. In this case McAllen sued for personal injuries and for death of an endangered rhinoceros that allegedly resulted from radioactive pipe that Forest Oil had used on McAllen's property and that the company donated for McAllen's use on a reserve for exotic animals. McAllen and Forest Oil's settlement agreement ended a royalties dispute and included, among other provisions, an arbitration agreement for environmental claims not covered by the settlement. When Forest Oil moved to compel arbitration, McAllen countered that he was fraudulently induced to agree to arbitration on assurances that contamination or environmental problems did not exist on the land. The trial court denied arbitration and the court of appeals affirmed.

06-0550 New Texas Auto Auction Services, L.P. v. Graciela Gomez de Hernandez, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Scott T. Clark and Roger W. Hughes, Harlingen For respondents: Rebecca E. Hamilton, Dallas The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether auctioneers are 'sellers' in products-liability actions. In this case principal issues are (1) whether auto auctioneers can be "sellers" subject to strict liability and (2) whether the auctioneer was negligent for selling a vehicle subject to a defective-tire recall notice. Hernandez sued New Texas Auto Auction after a wreck in Mexico that killed her husband when he was driving an SUV the auction service owned and sold at auction to another auctioneer. The second auctioneer later sold the SUV to a dealer, which then sold it to Hernandez's husband. She alleges the tire defect caused the accident and claims both strict liability, based on the auctioneer as seller, and negligence because New Texas sold the vehicle with defective tires. New Texas Auto Auction argues that Texas should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts, which excludes auctioneers as sellers. The trial court granted summary judgment for the auctioneer on the strict-liability question and for Hernandez on the negligence issue. The court of appeals reversed on the strict-liability claim.

06-0372 Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare L.P. v. Alice H. Hawley and James A. Hawley from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Charles Watson, Austin For respondents: Darrin Mitchell Walker, Kingwood The Supreme Court will hear arguments on among principal issues in this medical-malpractice and wrongful death case against a hospital are (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing an instruction on new and independent cause when a pathology report diagnosed cancer that the patient did not receive for almost a year; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing a "lost chance" instruction when conflicting evidence assessed the patient's survival chances; and (3) whether by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the independent pathologist's negligence the trial court commingled valid and invalid liability theories. The Hawleys sued the hospital, claiming the hospital was at fault for the pathology report's delay and that when she learned of the cancer after it became untreatable. She died while the case was on appeal. The trial court refused instructions on new and independent cause - that the doctors' delay in reading the pathology report caused any delay in the prospect of treatment; on "lost chance" - that the delay did not harm her because her chances of survival might have been less than 50 percent; and on not taking account of the pathologist's possible negligence as negligence by the hospital, because the pathologist worked for an independent contractor, not the hospital. The court of appeals affirmed.

05-0801 S. Murthy Badiga, M.D. v. Maricruz Lopez from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Diana L. Faust, Dallas For respondent: E. A. Villareal Jr., Edinburg The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether in a medical-malpractice case a trial court's refusal to dismiss for failure to file a timely expert report can be subject to an interlocutory appeal. In this case the expert report was served three and a half months after the 120-day deadline, after the trial court granted two motions to extend time. A principal issue in this medical-malpractice case is whether an interlocutory appeal can be taken from a trial court's refusal to dismiss the lawsuit because an expert report was not filed on time. In this case the expert report was served three and a half months after the 120-day deadline, after the trial court granted two extensions. To support the second motion, Lopez contended the report was late because of a clerical error, not indifference. The case poses a statutory conflict between a provision that prohibits interlocutory appeals from orders denying dismissal when an extension is granted to cure a deficient expert report and a provision allowing such appeals when a dismissal motion is denied when an expert report is not filed on time. In this case the court of appeals dismissed the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0240 Miguel Hernandez, M.D. v. Julious Ebrom and Richard Hunnicutt from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: I. Cecilia Garza, McAllen For respondents: Richard W. Hunnicutt, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether failure to bring interlocutory appeal on dismissal denial waives the challenge. A principal issue in this medical-malpractice case is whether by failing to file an interlocutory appeal the defendant waived his challenge to the trial court's denial of his dismissal motion. The court of appeals held that it had no jurisdiction over Hernandez's appeal because he waited until after the plaintiff dropped the case and provided in the nonsuit that it could not be filed again. As amended, while this suit was pending in the trial court, the medical-malpractice statute stipulates that an interlocutory appeal may be taken from an order denying a dismissal motion. A key question is whether that provision is mandatory or permissive. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0272 Dealers Electric Supply Co. v. Scoggins Construction Co. Inc. and Bill R. Scoggins from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Ben L. Aderholt, Houston For respondents: William F. Kimball, Harlingen For amici curiae American Subcontractors Association Inc. and Houston Hispanic Chamber of Commerce: J. Brett Busby, Houston The principal issue is whether the McGregor Act, prohibiting liens against a public building and providing for suit against principals and sureties over payment bonds, is an exclusive remedy to recover for credit extended to a subcontractor that abandoned an elementary school construction project. In this case Dealers sued for payment on $78,000 worth of materials an electrical subcontractor got under a joint checking account before abandoning the construction and absconding with the materials. At first Dealers sued the subcontractor, Scoggins and two bond companies from which Scoggins bought bonds to meet its McGregor Act obligations. Then when Dealers dropped the suits against the bond companies because it missed statutory notice deadlines, it continued the suit for payment under the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act and under the joint checking account. The trial court determined that Scoggins owed Dealers almost $136,000 in damages, costs and interest. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the McGregor Act was Dealers' exclusive remedy, which it lost for failure to give statutory notice to the bond companies. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0175 Whirlpool Corp. v. Margarita Camacho and Santos Camacho. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Lynne Liberato, Houston For respondent: Kevin Dubose, Houston Among principal issues in this product-liability case are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by failing to analyze expert testimony properly under a legal-sufficiency challenge, (2) whether expert testimony was improper because it was speculative on the safer alternative design and on the causation element; and (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to give a spoliation instruction because Whirlpool did not have notice of possible suit for three months despite plaintiffs' experts evaluating a home fire scene within two days of a fatal fire. In this case the Camachos sued after fire destroyed their trailer home and killed their son. They claim defective design of a clothes dryer allowed accumulated lint to be drawn to the dryer heater, where it ignited, then started clothes in the dryer afire and spread to the house. Whirlpool's challenge to the reliability of this theory, based on testing outside a dryer, was in part that the theory failed to explain that two T-shirts in the dryer did not burn. Whirlpool also complains that the Camachos had notice they would sue within days of the fire, but did not notify the company for several months, during which the fire scene was dismantled. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0815 Intercontinental Group Partnership v. KB Home Lone Star L.P. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Jesse R. Castillo, San Antonio For respondent: Renee F. McElhaney, San Antonio The issue is whether in a contract-breach action the plaintiff can be the prevailing party, for attorney fees purposes, when the jury found the defendant breached the contract but did not award damages. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0465 State of Texas v. $281,420 in U.S. Currency from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Timothy A. Davis, Edinburg For amicus curiae Solicitor General: Sean D. Jordan, Austin For respondent: Edward A. Mallett, Houston The issues in this forfeiture case are (1) whether money found bundled in plastic and secreted in a truck axle can be determined to be contraband in the absence of more than suspicious circumstances and, if not contraband, (2) whether the last person in control of the truck should get the money if all potential owners lost their interests by default judgments. Huerta, a tow-truck driver who was hired to bring a truck tractor from Houston to the Rio Grande Valley, sued to intervene in this forfeiture action. Huerta said he was promised a 30 percent finder's fee of more than $281,000 he discovered in the truck axle and turned over to state authorities. The state claimed the money as drug-related contraband. A jury found that the money was not contraband, that Huerta was in joint or actual possession of it when it was seized and that he should get a $70,000 reward. The trial court overturned that verdict, giving all the money to the state. The court of appeals reversed and awarded Huerta the money. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0544 In re Scoggins Construction Co. Inc. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For relator: Craig A. Morgan, Austin For real party in interest: Lee H. Shidlofsky, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it denied Scoggins, a general contractor for a school-construction project, permission to join subcontractors in the school district's breach-of-contract suit against Scoggins or to designate them as responsible third parties for allocating damages and (2) whether Scoggins has an adequate remedy by appeal if the trial court did abuse its discretion. After the Mercedes school district sued Scoggins, the trial court refused Scoggins' motion for leave to add the subcontractors pursuant to civil procedure Rule 38 or to designate them as responsible third parties under Civil Practices and Remedies Code chapter 33. The appeals court denied mandamus relief. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0159 Samuel Garcia Jr., M.D. v. Maria Gomez, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: I. Cecilia Garza, McAllen For respondents: Savannah L. Robinson, Danbury The principal issue is whether an attorney's unchallenged testimony as to what he would have charged in a case, without more, legally supports an attorneys-fee sanction for filing a medical-malpractice claim without an expert report. Gomez first sued Garcia for medical malpractice, based on Dr. Garcia's alleged failure to use a screen during surgery to prevent an embolism. The patient died after an embolism. When an X-ray revealed such a filter had been implanted, Gomez quit pursuing the claim, but did not nonsuit the case and did not file an expert report by the 120-day deadline. Garcia moved for attorneys fees under Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 74.351(b). Garcia's attorney testified without challenge as to reasonable fees in such a case. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions and the appeals court affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-1066 Michael T. Jelinek, M.D., and Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Francisco Casas and Alfredo DeLeon Jr. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner Jelinek: I. Cecilia Garza, McAllen For petitioner Columbia: Sarah B. Duncan, Austin For respondents: John N. Mastin, San Antonio Principal issues are (1) whether the hospital preserved error in this medical-malpractice case when the claimed error concerns an instruction that is not in the record and (2) whether an expert report assessing the doctor's alleged negligence was inadequate for inferring support for the care standard and for causation. After first suing for wrongful death, Casas amended the petition to claim suffering and mental distress because his wife, after bowel surgery for a perforated colon and with a known infection, did not get antibiotics for four days because the hospital did not automatically renew her prescription. At one point in this lapse odor from the infection was so great fans were used to dissipate it. At trial, the hospital contends, it offered an "unavoidable accident" instruction that the court denied. But the instruction was not in the record. Jelinek, who prescribed the antibiotics but was on vacation when the prescription expired, argues that the expert report did not address how his deviation from the applicable care standard proximately caused Mrs. Casas' suffering and mental distress. The appeals court affirmed a jury award for Casas, holding that the claimed instructional error was not preserved, and affirmed the trial court's ruling that the expert report on Jelinek's alleged negligence was adequate. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0223 Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: J.W. Dyer, McAllen For respondents: Stephen L. Tatum, Fort Worth, and Eileen M. Leeds, Brownsville Principal issues in this contract and negligence case, involving Sharyland's complaint that the city's sewer contractors violated state regulations for sewer- and water-line separation, are (1) whether those regulations (Texas Administrative Code section 317.13(1)(B)) apply to these sewer lines connecting lots to sewer mains; (2) whether the economic-loss rule bars Sharyland's negligence claim against the contractors; and (3) whether Sharyland is a third-party beneficiary of Alton's contract with the sewer-line installers. In this case Sharyland sued the city and the city's sewer-line contractors after discovering sewer lines placed above its water lines allegedly violating state regulations. Sharyland argues that it should not have to wait for sewer leakage to contaminate its water before suing for damages that would include remediation costs and loss of value to a once-legal water supply system. Alton and the sewer contractors argue that the administrative regulations do not cover the sewer lines in question because those regulations do not apply to individual connections to the sewer mains. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0857 Jose Carreras, M.D. v. Carlos Francisco Marroquin, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Ronald G. Hole, McAllen For respondents: Fernando G. Mancias, Edinburg The issue is whether the medical-malpractice limitations period is postponed under Civil Practices and Remedies Code section when the plaintiff gives pre-suit notice within the two-year limitations but not the required medical-information release. After his wife died following surgery, Marroquin sued Dr. Carreras. His notice of the lawsuit did not include a release for his wife's medical records. He then filed suit after the two-year limitations had run, but authorized the release several months later. Marroquin argues that section 74.051(c) tolls limitations when the pre-suit notice is sent and the required release, which section requires to be filed with the pre-suit notice, is independent of the tolling provision and has its own penalty for noncompliance. The trial court denied Carreras' summary-judgment motion and the court of appeals affirmed. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0953 Ford Motor Co. v. Richard H. Garcia from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Michael Eady, Austin For respondent: Isaac Tawil, McAllen The principal issues are whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees to a guardian ad litem for work allegedly outside the scope of his appointment or relied on insufficient evidence in its award. Ford appealed Garcia's $28,200 award for his appointment as a guardian ad litem. The trial court appointed him to protect the interests of a man in a settlement by Ford with the man, who suffered traumatic brain injury, and his wife. Ford argues the guardian ad litem billed for review of litigation documents and other work that exceeded his need to assure the injured man's interests in a proposed settlement. Ford also argued the guardian's invoice did not specify how much time was spent on his review or how much was spent by his staff. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's award of Garcia's fee. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0802 Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Gloria Garcia from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: David P. Hansen, Austin For respondent: Savannah Robinson, Danbury Two principal issues in this age-discrimination claim are (1) whether a prima-facie case can be established when the replacement worker is older than the discharged employee bringing the claim and (2) whether the 60-day filing deadline in the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act includes within it service of process and, if so, whether compliance is jurisdictional. Garcia, who was 48 when she was fired, sued the district for discrimination after filing her administrative complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission. Mission school district moved to dismiss the lawsuit, based on a jurisdictional plea because Garcia failed to state jurisdictional facts to support her age-discrimination claim by showing her work replacement was older than she was. The trial court denied the district's plea. The appeals court affirmed on the age claim, reasoning that the district's contention that Garcia's replacement was three years older did not conclusively negate the required element that she might "otherwise show that she was discharged because of age" apart from showing her replacement was younger. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issue is whether an ostensible innocent purchaser is charged with knowing that a judgment conveying an easement to the city that intended to correct a clerical mistake invalidly voided a prior judgment giving the city fee-simple title to the disputed property. A.P.I. Pipe and Supply bought land that included almost 10 acres burdened by the drainage easement established by the judgment nunc pro tunc, then sued TxDOT and Edinburg (which conveyed the easement to TxDOT). A.P.I. Pipe and Supply alleged TxDOT took stone and other materials excavated from the property that belonged to A.P.I. The court of appeals held that A.P.I. could rely on the void later judgment because A.P.I. had no duty to determine whether the judgment granting the easement was void.

The principal issues in this diesel-spill case are (1) whether sanctions were excessive that struck Petroleum Solutions' statute-of-limitations defense and included a spoliation instruction because an independent analyst lost a connector suspected as the cause of the diesel leak and (2) whether the trial court erred by indemnifying Titeflex, a component manufacturer, for attorney fees and costs. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions order.

Among issues in this effort to vacate a Texas trial setting on product-liability claims from a rollover accident in Mexico are (1) whether the person killed in the accident and his death beneficiaries are a "single plaintiff" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 71.051(h)(2) and (2) whether only the decedent's residence must be considered when determining the plaintiff's status as a legal Texas resident under section 71.051(e). In this case Juan Tueme Mendez, the driver of a Ford Explorer in the accident that killed his brother, Cesar Mendez, sued his brother's estate administrator in a Texas probate court where probate was filed. The administrator then sued Ford and the tire manufacturer. The administrator, Cesar Mendez's daughter, is a U.S. citizen and Texas resident. Both Mendez brothers were Mexican citizens with U.S. visas, although Ford and the administrator, together with Cesar's relatives who intervened, dispute whether Cesar was a Mexican resident. Two relatives who intervened, another of Cesar's daughters and her mother, are U.S. citizens and Texas residents. The trial court denied Ford's motion to dismiss, arguing that the forum was inconvenient. Ford petitioned for mandamus relief, but the court of appeals denied it.

The issues are (1) whether a settlement check jointly payable to the hospital lienholder and claimant releases the insurer from liability under the state's hospital lien statute and (2) whether the hospital lienholder may sue the insurer when the settlement check was cashed with only the claimant's signature. In this case two people injured in accident caused by State Farm's insured got checks made out to them and to the hospital, which secured its reimbursement with hospital liens, and cashed them without the hospital's endorsement. The hospital sued to recover from State Farm, but the trial court awarded summary judgment for the insurance company. The appeals court affirmed, holding that State Farm met its statutory duty to comply with the lien and its release.

The issues in this contract-breach and fraud case are (1) whether, as the court of appeals held, statutory limits on exemplary damages must be pleaded as an affirmative defense and (2) whether the appeals court erred by affirming prejudgment interest, lien foreclosures and a fraud finding without considering the jury's contract-breach finding to be legally and factually sufficient. Aypco sued Zorrilla after she allegedly quit paying for Aypco's work under a contract to build her house and for additional work not covered by the contract she ordered on another house. A jury found for the contractor on both the breach-of-contract and fraud claims. The trial court awarded slightly more than $56,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in exemplary damages, plus interest and fees, after Aypco elected to recover for fraud. The court also ordered mechanic's and materialman's liens on Zorrilla's two properties foreclosed to satisfy the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed.

In this interlocutory appeal from denied special appearances by a Mexican television producer, anchor and broadcaster sued for defamation in Texas, the principal issue is whether defendants have minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction in Texas based on the broadcast signal's international reach, their efforts to sell advertising in Texas, their sending reporters to Texas and U.S. cable channels' rebroadcast of their programming in Texas. In this case the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the special appearances to contest jurisdiction in Texas, holding that Texas has personal jurisdiction, both specific and general, over the defendants. TV Azteca and the other defendants argue that the allegedly libelous broadcasts were produced in Mexico and, although the plaintiff, Mexican pop superstar Gloria Trevi, lives in Texas, concerned events about her that occurred in Mexico and Brazil.

The issues are (1) whether a limited partnership that owns a hospital may be vicariously liable for a physician's negligence when the doctor is a limited partner and (2) whether the general partner may be vicariously liable too. In this case the Andrades sued for their daughter's injuries that they attribute to an obstetrician's negligence during her birth. They added as defendants the hospital limited partnership and the hospital's general partner, RGV Med. Their suit bases that vicarious liability principally on Texas Business Occupations Code section 152.303(a), which makes a partnership responsible for injuries when a partner - the doctor in this case - acts in the partnership's ordinary business or with the partnership's authority. Both the hospital limited partnership and its general partner argue that they did not control the doctor's medical judgment and that their ordinary business was providing and operating the hospital, not obstetrical services. The trial court denied summary judgment for the partnership and general partner. The appeals court affirmed on interlocutory review, holding summary judgment was precluded by an unresolved fact question: whether the doctor was acting within the scope of the partnership business or with its authority.

The issues are (1) whether a property owner may be liable to an independent contractor's employee for negligent entrustment of equipment; (2) whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 95 applies to negligent entrustment; (3) whether a reference to the defendant as a "slave master" in closing argument was reversible error, even in the absence of black jurors; and (4) whether the jury was improperly charged by broad form submitting comparative responsibility for negligent entrustment together with premises liability.

In this negligence lawsuit against an architecture firm, the principal issues are (1) whether the factual basis of each claim is established by the required merit certificate and (2) whether, and how, an expert must establish knowledge and expertise to assess professional practice by such a certificate.

The principal issues are (1) whether the rule in Tooke v. City of Mexia - that statutory "sue and be sued" language does not waive governmental immunity - applies retroactively to attack a 1995 judgment as void and (2) whether, if Tooke is retroactive, governmental immunity deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to declare the judgment void.

The issue is whether an insurance company's attorney fees and the basis for them are discoverable when the insurer is not seeking its fees but is contesting fees the insureds seek for underpayment of their damage claims.

The principal issue in this discovery dispute is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of documents in "native" or "near-native" format (with metadata) instead of static images, like Portable Document Format (PDF) or Tagged Image File Format (TIFF).

The principal issue in this discovery dispute is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of documents in "native" or "near-native" format (with metadata) instead of static images, like Portable Document Format (PDF) or Tagged Image File Format (TIFF).

The issues in this contract-breach and fraud case are (1) whether pleadings or evidence determine one indivisible injury existed and (2) whether the collateral-source rule bars credit for settlements paid by the defendant's insurer and the plaintiffs' former law firms.

In this dispute over nurses' pay - an allegation that under an implied contract they were salaried employees instead of paid hourly - the issues are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding the hospital agreed to pay them fixed, annual salaries and (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting the Fair Labor Standards Act's definitions of exempt and non-exempt positions.

The issues are (1) whether the appeals court correctly interpreted the substantial-certainty test to determine that evidence showed an intentional injury; (2) whether the substantial-certainty test should be abandoned in favor of one to show "pure intent"; and, if not, (3) whether the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to establish a fact question under the substantial-certainty test.

In this defamation case by an upstart concrete-block manufacturer against its established competitor, the issues are (1) whether the suspect statements about a company's products are defamatory as a matter of law; (2) whether evidence legally establishes reputational harm; and (3) whether evidence legally supports the jury's damages award.

The issues in this insurance-coverage dispute - whether a "golf cart" is covered under an automobile-liability policy are (1) whether the appeals court's extrinsic-evidence exception to the eight-corners rule conflicts with the duty-to-defend jurisprudence; (2) assuming the appeals court's extrinsic-evidence exception is not categorically wrong, whether the court erred in resorting to extrinsic evidence in this case because the pleadings potentially implicated coverage; (3) whether the phrase "does not include mobile equipment" in the insurance policy's definition of "auto" is effectively a policy exclusion; and (4) whether the trial court erred by entering its amended final judgment without considering the one-satisfaction rule.

The issue presented in this case is whether a governmental entity possesses immunity against another co-equal governmental entity's exercise of its eminent domain authority. If immunity exists, an additional question is whether the Legislature has waived that immunity by granting to the condemnor in the Water Code the power to condemn "any land."

At issue in this case is whether a statutory county court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to an independent, county-specific statute is subject to the same jurisdictional limitations as if the court were exercising its concurrent constitutional county court jurisdiction.

The issue in this case is whether the statute of limitations is equitably tolled for a plaintiff's subsequent suit after the court dismissed the plaintiff's earlier suit based on its failure to file a statutorily compliant expert certificate.

The issue is whether a nonprofit health organization certified under Section 162.001(b) of the Occupations Code can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician employed by the organization.