06-1071 State Farm Lloyds v. Becky Ann Johnson from Collin County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: Michael W. Huddleston, Dallas For respondent: Russell J. Bowman, Dallas The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the principal issue is whether an appraisal clause in a homeowner's policy gives appraisers authority to consider causation, coverage and liability in determining "amount of loss." The principal issue is whether an appraisal clause in a homeowner's policy covers a dispute over just the insurer's amount-of-damage calculation instead of one determining causation, coverage and liability questions in setting the loss amount. In this case Johnson sued State Farm after it refused her request for an appraisal under a clause providing an appraisal mechanism if the insurer and insured "fail to agree on the amount of loss...." State Farm had determined that Johnson's policy covered only $499 for hail-damaged shingles along the top of the roof, but her expert recommended a new roof, finding more extensive hail damage. The trial court granted State Farm's summary-judgment motion, but the court of appeals held in reversing the case that the dispute about the extent of hail damage was a dispute about the loss amount.

07-0970 Lauri Smith and Howard Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Trust from Collin County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioners: Robert D. Ranen, Plano For respondent: Scott Hayes, Dallas The principal issue is whether $47,000 in attorneys fees are reasonable when the judgment obtained was for $65,000, less than a third of what was sought. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0284 City of Dallas v. Kenneth E. Albert, et al. from Collin County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas consolidated with 07-0288, City of Dallas v. David S. Martin, et al. For petitioner: Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas For respondents: Charles W. McGarry, Dallas, and E. Lee Parsley, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether governmental immunity protects the city from a declaratory judgment that could impose a billion-dollar liability for back pay, benefits and interest to Dallas police, firefighters and emergency workers; (2) whether a suit like this, seeking to enforce an ordinance passed by referendum, is exempt from governmental immunity; and (3) whether by withdrawing a counterclaim the city may restore its immunity. Employees sued to declare the effect of a 1979 referendum imposing by ordinance, they argue, minimum salary increases across the board and for breach of contract for the city's alleged failure to provide those raises. The trial court denied the city's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals held that a declaratory-judgment action waives governmental immunity for prospective relief, affirming the trial court in part, but the court reversed the trial court on the city's immunity on the contract-breach claims. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0284 City of Dallas v. Kenneth E. Albert, et al. from Collin County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas consolidated with 07-0288, City of Dallas v. David S. Martin, et al. For petitioner: Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas For respondents: Charles W. McGarry, Dallas, and E. Lee Parsley, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether governmental immunity protects the city from a declaratory judgment that could impose a billion-dollar liability for back pay, benefits and interest to Dallas police, firefighters and emergency workers; (2) whether a suit like this, seeking to enforce an ordinance passed by referendum, is exempt from governmental immunity; and (3) whether by withdrawing a counterclaim the city may restore its immunity. Employees sued to declare the effect of a 1979 referendum imposing by ordinance, they argue, minimum salary increases across the board and for breach of contract for the city's alleged failure to provide those raises. The trial court denied the city's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals held that a declaratory-judgment action waives governmental immunity for prospective relief, affirming the trial court in part, but the court reversed the trial court on the city's immunity on the contract-breach claims. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

A principal issue in this case, pleaded as an inverse-condemnation claim by a developer that deeded property for a community park with a buy-back provision if the park were not developed, is whether the developer retained a property interest sufficient to support inverse condemnation because the city built a library on the land instead. When El Dorado sued, the city asserted the trial court did not have jurisdiction because El Dorado sought contract damages but did not plead a contract claim and lacked standing because it did not have a property interest in the land. The trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea and the appeals court affirmed, holding that inverse condemnation traditionally requires a property interest and that El Dorado seeks compensation for a right to repurchase property under a contract.

A principal issue in this challenge, involving a statutory-offset provision to determine how much a borrower may owe a lender after a foreclosed property sale, is whether the lender may calculate the loan deficiency based on the property's actual resale price rather than the foreclosure-sale price. The bank foreclosed after Martin defaulted on a $790,400 loan for a speculative house he built in 2006. The bank then bought the house at a foreclosure sale for $539,000, based on its calculation that the house's fair-market value was $770,000 and deducting its foreclosure costs. Fifteen months later the bank sold it for $599,000, crediting Martin $599,000 and adding post-foreclosure costs before it sold the house to calculate his loan deficiency. Martin sued, arguing that the statutory offset applied: that what he owed the bank should have been the difference between how much he owed on the loan when the bank foreclosed and the $539,000 the bank paid for the house. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment on its calculation, ruling that the offset did not apply because the bank credited Martin for the higher price it sold the house. The court of appeals reversed, holding the offset provision applied.

The issue is whether evidence to support an easement by necessity must show a public road to which the easement would have led when the landlocked tract was created in 1866. In this case, seeking declaration of an easement because of necessity, both the trial court and the court of appeals denied the easement the Staley Family Partnership sought across the Stiles' land. The appeals court held Staley failed to show that an easement was necessary when the Staley tract was created. Proof that an easement would have led to a public road in 1866 is unnecessary, Staley argues, when evidence showed then, as now, the only access to the land was by crossing the Stiles property.

The issue is whether the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act preempts a common-law sexual-assault claim against an employer for a vice-principal's conduct that would be actionable as sexual harassment under the anti-discrimination statute.

In this defamation case defamation case by a developer against a homeowner the issue is whether the case should be dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act.

In this expunction case the issue is whether a person arrested at once for two separate offenses - convicted of one, a misdemeanor, and acquitted of the another, a felony - may clean her record of the charge for which she was acquitted.

In this Texas Citizens Participation Act case, arising from a former employee's alleged breach of a non-disclosure agreement, the issues are (1) whether S&S, an emergency-medical-technician training company, provided clear and specific evidence it suffered actual damages resulting from a contract breach when the employee publicly expressed concerns about S&S's advertising to prospective students and (2) whether it sufficiently established by clear and specific evidence it was entitled to specific performance and injunctive relief.

The issue is whether a December 12, 2016, memorandum in a child-custody modification that arguably did not meet statutory requirements for a final order constitutes a final order nonetheless for appellate purposes, setting up resolution of a conflict among appeals courts.

In this appeal from a parental-rights-termination order, based on the father's voluntary relinquishment affidavit, the issues are (1) whether the father's collateral attack on the termination order should be allowed for his allegations that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it ordered his parental rights terminated and (2) whether Texas Family Code chapter 152 - incorporating the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act - defines the trial-court's subject-matter jurisdiction.

The issue is: When a legal malpractice plaintiff does not seek discretionary review himself, does the statute of limitations on his legal malpractice claim toll under Hughes-legal-malpractice tolling while his co-party in the underlying litigation seeks discretionary review?

The issue in this case is whether claims against an assisted living facility arising out of a resident's fall on the facility's sidewalk, pleaded as premises liability claims, are health care liability claims under the Texas Medical Liability Act and therefore require an expert report.

This case presents issues concerning the scope of a release provision in an acreage swap agreement between two oil-and-gas lessees.

The issue is whether the statute of limitations bars a refinancing lender's equitable-subrogation claim.

This case concerns when a sale occurs under the statute of repose for products liability, which requires a claimant to sue the manufacturer or seller "before the end of 15 years after the date of the sale of the product by the defendant."

The issue in this case is whether an employee's statement that she sent an email reporting sexual harassment to her employer raises a material fact issue as to whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassing behavior.

At issue is whether a plaintiff can maintain fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims against his accountants.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court must sever and abate Insurance Code claims when a motorist sues her insurance company for underinsured motorist benefits and violations of the Insurance Code.