In this case alleging the Texas Railroad Commission wrongfully plugged an oil-and-gas well, the principal issues are (1) whether the commission has a statutory immunity defense that protects it from damages in this case despite the Legislature's consent that it could be sued and (2) whether the trial court erred by not instructing jurors on good faith. Gulf sued the Railroad Commission for negligence and contract breach for plugging a well it agreed not to plug after the Legislature waived the commission's immunity from suit. In this appeal, the commission argues that a Texas Natural Resources Code provision - section 89.045 - protecting it from a good-faith mistake in plugging the well acts as an affirmative defense. The commission contends the trial court erred by refusing its good-faith jury question because the legislative waiver was from suit alone, not from liability. The appeals court affirmed.

The issues are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide this interlocutory appeal and, if so, (2) whether an agreement by which a contractor provides workers-compensation coverage for a subcontractor and its employees protects the subcontractor from a negligence claim by the general contractor's injured employee. The second issue raises an ostensible conflict between Texas Labor Code sections 406.122(b) and 406.123(a) and (e) on defining a subcontractor's employees as the general contractor's when workers comp is involved. (Section 406.122(b) arguably excludes them, 406.123 ostensibly does the opposite.) In this case, by agreement, Union Carbide provided workers-comp coverage for subcontractor TIC and its employees. Injured on the job, Martin first drew benefits from Union Carbide's workers-compensation insurer. Then Martin, a Carbide employee, sued TIC, claiming it negligently caused his injury and, by section 406.122(b)'s exclusion of independent subcontractors, could not be Carbide's deemed employee. The trial court denied TIC's summary-judgment motion that workers comp was Martin's exclusive remedy. Reviewing the trial court's summary-judgment decision, the court of appeals affirmed. It held on its own motion that Labor Code sections 406.122 and 406.123 were irreconcilable. But, because neither Martin nor TIC raised the conflict, the court said the company did not meet its burden to establish its exclusive-remedy affirmative defense by failing to eliminate section 406.122(b)'s bearing on the deemed-employee question.