07-0960 In the Interest of B.G., et al. from Angelina County and the 12th District Court of Appeals, Tyler For petitioner: Brent L. Watkins, Lufkin For respondent: Trevor A. Woodruff, Austin The issue in this parental-rights termination is whether Family Code section 263.405 is constitutional by imposing a 15-day deadline to file a statement of points to preserve appellate grounds. In this case the father acted as his own attorney in the termination hearing after firing his lawyer just before trial. He filed his statement of appellate points 40 days late after the trial court appointed a second attorney to handle his appeal. The first, appointed just after the hearing, did not file anything. In the statement the father claimed the termination order could not be supported by sufficient evidence and he had been prevented from offering certain evidence. The trial court found him indigent and his appeal not frivolous, but concluded that no meaningful issue had been preserved for appellate review and denied the father his request that he be furnished the hearing transcript without cost. On appeal he argued he was denied due process, but the court of appeals held the issue should have been presented to the trial court but was forfeited because it had not. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0313 Terri Loftin v. Janice Lee and Bob Lee from Angelina County and the 12th District Court of Appeals, Tyler For petitioner: Robert T. Cain Jr., Lufkin For respondents: Douglas J. McCarver, Nacogdoches Principal issues are (1) whether liability for alleged negligence in a horseback-riding accident is barred under the Texas Equine Activity Act and (2) whether a fact issue exists as to the horse owner's reasonable and prudent effort to determine the rider's ability to safely ride and manage the horse she rode. The Lees sued Loftin for Janice Lee's injuries when the horse she was riding bolted in a muddy bog and threw Lee. Lee alleged the horse panicked when it sank in the mud and Loftin was negligent in conducting the trail ride through the bog. The trial court granted Loftin summary judgment, based on the equine safety statute. But the court of appeals found fact issues existed as to whether inherent risks to horseback riding included riding on a muddy trail and whether Loftin properly assessed Lee's riding ability under the circumstances. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0377 Aaron Glenn Haywood v. Margarita Garza de Escabedo from Angelina County and the 12th District Court of Appeals, Tyler For petitioner: Mr. Peter M. Kelly., Houston For respondent: Mr. Frank G. Cawley, Addison The issue is whether Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 41.0105 annuls the collateral-source rule, either as an evidentiary rule or a damages rule, when an injured person's initial medical expenses differ from those "actually paid or incurred" by an injured person or on that person's behalf. In this case Escabedo moved to limit damages testimony that would show what Haygood, who was injured in an automobile accident, was billed. That amount differed by as much as $95,000 from what the medical-care providers would have charged him beyond what Medicare paid for his care but for Medicare restrictions. After the trial court allowed testimony on the $110,000 the hospital would have charged, the jury awarded that much as damages. The court of appeals held that section 41.0105 restricts not only recoverable damages but also relevant evidence to prove damages. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this premises-liability case are (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting spoliation evidence based on the grocer's retaining a security-video clip showing the plaintiff's fall and the moments before and after it but not longer, which might have borne on constructive notice of a grease spill; (2) whether the trial court generally erred by instructing the jury on spoliation (and specifically by placing the burden of disproving prejudice on Brookshire); and (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's negligence finding. In this case Aldridge, a former professional football player, asked the see the video of his fall a few days after he slipped at the store. The store refused. After he sued, the store produced eight minutes of what store cameras caught on tape, starting a minute before Aldridge entered the store and ending a minute after he fell. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the spoliation evidence and its spoliation instruction.

In this appeal from a jury finding for Lufkin on its claims for fraud and fraudulent inducement, the issues are (1) whether reliance was clearly disclaimed despite contract language that exchanges between IBM and Lufkin staffs about project goals and objectives "is the basis of our understanding"; (2) whether fraudulent-inducement damages preclude recovery for fraud; and, assuming liability for fraud and fraudulent inducement, (3) whether Lufkin proved its damages by legally sufficient evidence; (4) whether Lufkin suffered damages for contract breach; and (5) whether Lufkin is bound by incorporation of a clause limiting damages the trial court excluded because of a verification issue.