In this challenge to a summary judgment's reversal, that Anadarko's entitled to defense expenses under its insurance policy for Deepwater Horizon damages, the issues are (1) whether the policy's joint-venture provision applies to defense costs and, if so, (2) whether either of two exceptions to that provision applies.

07-0572 Gail Ashley v. Doris D. Hawkins from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas, and Kimberley M. Spurlock, Humble For respondent: James B. Manley, Cleveland For amicus curiae State of Texas: Rance L. Craft, Austin The issue is whether the statute of limitations is tolled during a person's absence from the state but amenable to service. In this case Hawkins sued Ashley, claiming injuries from an automobile accident. Hawkins filed a petition 60 days before the limitations period ended. The trial court dismissed the claim for failure to prosecute it, then reinstated it, then dismissed it again, then reinstated it a second time. A year after filing suit Hawkins served Ashley, who moved to California after the accident. Ashley moved to dismiss for summary judgment, based on limitations and failure to diligently pursue the claim, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 16.063 suspended limitations regardless of Hawkins' diligence in serving process. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The main issue is whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that allocates a pool of paid leave to further a union's interests violates any "Gift Clause" in the Texas Constitution (Article III, Sections 50, 51, 52(a) and Article XVI, Section 6(a)).

The issue is whether Byrdson, doing business as Excello Construction in working for the regional-planning commission, provided a service defined by the Local Government Contract Claims Act that would waive the commission's immunity for breach-of-contract claims.

The issue is whether an apartment-building contractor should be entitled to indemnity as a "seller" from a component manufacturer. In the underlying case a subcontractor's employee, injured as he worked on an apartment complex, settled a products-liability case with Centerpoint, the general contractor building the complex, and Trussway, manufacturer of a failed truss that led to his fall. Centerpoint then sued Trussway to be indemnified, claiming it was a seller of the Trussway truss by incorporating the truss in the apartment complex Centerpoint constructed and sold to the owners. By doing so, Centerpoint argues, it put the truss into commerce for purposes of products-liability law. Trussway contends Centerpoint sold a service - building an apartment complex - so it could not be a seller and could not qualify for indemnity. The trial court ruled that Centerpoint was a seller. The court of appeals held it was not.

The issues are (1) whether a trial court may, in determining that a reasonable probability exists that a pipeline will be used to transport gas for an entity not affiliated with the pipeline company, consider agreements after the pipeline was initially contemplated; (2) whether the reasonable-probability test should factor how extensive the contemplated "public use" is and whether the "public interest" is relevant; and (3) whether the appeals court translated the reasonable probability test into a subjective analysis.

05-0272 Entergy Gulf States Inc. v. John Summers from Jefferson County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Collyn A. Peddie, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether a premises owner can be a contractor for workers comp purposes. The issue is whether a premises owner who hires an independent contractor and provides workers-compensation insurance for the contractor's employees can be a "statutory employer" for workers-comp purposes. Designation as a statutory employer would protect the premises owner from a negligence suit by an injured employee. In this case Summers, hired by a company to work at Entergy's plant, sued Entergy for negligence for on-the-job injuries. Summers' employer worked under a contract with Entergy that labeled it an "independent contractor" but provided also that Entergy would not be precluded from raising the standard workers comp defense. The company's employees would be considered Entergy's employees, eligible for workers compensation and precluded from suing for negligence. In a later provision Entergy agreed to provide workers comp coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Entergy on the coverage issue. But the court of appeals reversed, holding that under the workers comp statute a premises owner could not be a general contractor. The Court decided this case in August 2007, holding that a change in the workers comp law despite its label as a recodification without substantive change allowed a premises owner to be a general contractor. The Court granted rehearing of that decision. The Court will hear three arguments beginning at 9 a.m. in the Hillcrest Classroom in the Underwood Law Library at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law in Dallas. Each side in each case will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues are (1) whether a trespass action exists in Texas for deep subsurface-wastewater migration; (2) whether lack of consent must be proven as a trespass element or whether it's an affirmative defense; and (3) whether the trial court should have directed a verdict on the consent issue because the plaintiff, FPL Farming, could not have consented to a trespass that had not occurred. In this case FPL Farming sued Environmental Processing, a wastewater injection-well operator on adjacent land, over the projected wastewater migration 8,000 feet below FPL's rice farm. FPL sought injunctive relief and damages for trespass, negligence and unjust enrichment. Before its suit, FPL lost its administrative challenge to Environmental Processing's amended permit to allow pumping more wastewater underground. The administrative-law judge ruled that FPL's farming would not be impaired. A jury decided in Environmental Processing's favor. The appeals court reversed, holding in part that FPL could recover for common-law trespass.

Principal issues in this case against a lawyer who first lied to a client about a trust-fund embezzlement by a colleague, of funds the associated attorney controlled, are (1) whether causation-and-damages evidence must support a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim and, if so, (2) whether a material fact exists to show that causation and those damages.

09-1010 FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems L.C. from Liberty County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Ms. Claudia Wilson Frost, Houston For respondents: Mr. Richard G. Baker, Liberty In this subsurface-trespass case, the principal issues are (1) whether a permit-holder with authority to inject wastewater underground can be immune because of the state-issued permit from liability when the wastewater intrudes beneath neighboring property and, if so, (2) whether that constitutes an unconstitutional taking. A turning-point issue is whether subsurface water migration can be actionable as a trespass. FPL Farming, owner of two tracts in Liberty County, initially opposed the state's 1996 wastewater-injection permits to Environmental Processing Systems on land near FPL's. FPL Farming settled with Environmental Processing, but sued when the state (then the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) granted an amendment in 1999 to increase the allowed injection rate. FPL Farming alleged the wastewater migrated under its land. A jury rejected FPL's claims and the court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0592 Fresh Coat Inc. v. K-2 Inc. from Montgomery County and the 9th District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Kevin Jewell, Houston For cross-petitioner/respondent: Thomas C. Wright, Houston A principal issue is whether a subcontractor hired to mix and install an allegedly defective stucco product is entitled to manufacturer's indemnity for a settlement with the homebuilder, like the subcontractor a "seller," to satisfy contractual indemnity. The issue raises the question whether the contractual liability is "independent liability" that would exclude it from Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 82.002(a)'s requirement that manufacturers indemnify sellers. In this case the homebuilder settled with the homeowners and sought indemnity from Fresh Coat and K-2, the manufacturer (also known as Finestone). Fresh Coat settled claims by the homebuilder and homeowner and cross-claimed for indemnity from Finestone. A jury awarded Fresh Coat its requested indemnity damages, but the court of appeals deleted the amount Fresh Coat paid the homebuilder in their settlement. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Under Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, notice of a healthcare claim must be accompanied by a medical-authorization form that meets statutory requirements, and notice that is "given as provided in this chapter" will toll limitations on the claim for 75 days. The issue in this case is whether a form that does not strictly comply with statutory requirements will toll limitations.

The principal issues in this Texas lawsuit over an accident in Mexico that Mexican children and killed their parents are (1) whether civil procedure Rule 44 allows appointment of the children's uncle, a Texas resident, as next friend to bring this claim for the children when they have legal guardians in Mexico and (2) whether a next friend can be a plaintiff as defined by the forum non conveniens statute. The trial court denied Bridgestone's dismissal motion, based on its argument that Texas was an improper forum. Under Mexican law the maternal grandparents automatically were guardians without court appointment. Texas' forum non conveniens statute defines plaintiff in pertinent part as both the injured and their personal representative as long as the personal representative does not accept the appointment in bad faith. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against an investor in a petrochemical manufacturing company under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.

In this action brought by a designated sexually violent offender, seeking mandamus relief against the state's effort to commit him for inpatient treatment under an amended statute when the original judgment specified outpatient treatment, the issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by granting relief on an preserved ground not argued in the mandamus petition - that denial of counsel violated the petitioner's statutory rights - and (2) whether the petitioner has either a statutory or constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in the commitment proceeding.

10-0605 In re Commitment of Michael Bohannan from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Catherine Palmore, Huntsville For respondent: Kenneth Nash, Huntsville The issue in this sexual predator-commitment case is whether Bohannon's expert, a therapist without forensic training, was properly disqualified from testifying whether he suffered a behavioral abnormality, a necessary factor to assessing a sexually violent predator. On the state's challenge of the expert's qualifications, the trial court after a Daubert hearing barred her testimony on whether Bohannon was likely to reoffend because the court determined she is not a psychiatrist or psychologist and lacks forensic training. The appeals court reversed, holding that the expert, experienced in treating sexual offenders, was qualified to assess his recidivism risk ad her testimony would assist the jury. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0526 In re United Scaffolding Inc. from Jefferson County and Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For relator: Kathleen M. Kennedy, Beaumont For real party in interest: Chris M. Portner, Beaumont The issue is whether, after remand to specify reasons for a new trial ordered "in the interest of justice and fairness," the trial court's amended new-trial order abused its discretion for failing again to specify reasons. After a hearing on remand, the trial court issued another new-trial order, concluding without more on three points that the jury verdict was "against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence" and - in addition to those reasons or in the alternative - was in "the interest of justice and fairness." In a split decision the court of appeals denied United Scaffolding's second mandamus petition challenging the order. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Among the issues in this parental-rights termination case are (1) whether a trial court had a duty to appoint the pro se father an attorney for trial despite his failure to file an indigence affidavit or to request an attorney until after the trial began and (2) whether the mother's affidavit relinquishing her parental rights was voluntary, knowing and intelligent when a month later a probate court appointed a guardian for her for mental-health reasons. Father. Despite providing an address for service, the father was served by publication for status hearings and for the termination trial and appeared for trial after being subpoenaed. He told the court he was not aware that he had a right to an attorney. At the end of the first day of trial, the court told the father an attorney would have been appointed for him if he had appeared at a pretrial hearing and requested one, but at that point it was too late. Mother. Before the state took possession of the child, the mother and grandmother executed a guardianship by which the grandmother had responsibility for the child. Child Protective Services took the child after she fell on stairs in the grandmother's loft apartment. In June 2010 the mother irrevocably relinquished her rights to the child. In July 2010 the county court ordered the mother placed under the grandmother's guardianship on evidence that the mother had an IQ of 57 and was bipolar.

The issues in this libel case are (1) whether the Texas Citizens' Participation Act, intended to halt harassment suits targeting free expression, requires the plaintiff's claim to be dismissed and, if Toledo established the elements for her libel suit to get past the law's first hurdle, (2) whether KMBT sufficiently established protection under the fair-report privilege to warrant dismissal on that basis. Toledo, a Port Arthur pediatrician, sued KBMT, a Beaumont television station, for defaming her when it reported on a Texas Medical Board disciplinary action against her. In essence, she alleged the station went beyond the medical board's press release - stating that she was disciplined in part for inappropriate sexual conduct with a patient - by adding to its reports that she was a pediatrician. She claims that damaged her reputation because it suggested the medical board acted because she sexually abused a child. In the final of four broadcasts about the board's action, KBMT added that the patient was an adult (her 60-year-old boyfriend). The trial court denied the station's dismissal motion and the appeals court affirmed.

The issues in this action challenging traffic fines resulting from so-called red-light-enforcement are (1) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Garcia failed to exhaust administrative remedies specified by the red-light-camera statute and (2) whether the ultra-vires exception to governmental immunity applies because the city allegedly violated the red-light-enforcement statute by using improperly installed and operated cameras.

Justice O'Neil is not sitting. 08-0390 MBM Financial Corp. and Marimom Business Systems Inc. v. The Woodlands Operating Co., L.P. from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Jennifer Bruch Hogan, Houston For respondent/cross-petitioner: Karen D. Smith, The Woodlands Among principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by reversing an attorneys-fees award for a breach-of-contract allegation for which nominal damages were awarded; (2) whether the appeals court erred by determining attorneys fees were proper in a declaratory relief action; and (3) whether the court erred by failing to award fees for a fraud claim that arose from the contract action. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue is whether Oncor can revise the description of its property on the appraisal roll after having settled the total value of its property on the roll with the appraisal district.

This case presents primarily two issues: (1) whether a newspaper is entitled to a substantial-truth defense despite publishing an article that was not literally true and (2) whether a local prosecutor is a limited-purpose public figure.

09-0326 Larry Roccaforte v. Jefferson County from Jefferson County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Laurence Watts, Missouri City For respondent: Steven L. Wiggins, Beaumont In this suit by a deputy constable alleging wrongful termination the principal issues are (1) whether Texas Local Government Code section 89.0041's is jurisdictional (whether Texas Government Code section applies to make it so) and (2) whether section 89.0041 is preempted by Section 1983 for a civil-rights violation. Roccaforte claims he was fired after filing a grievance against the county constable. He did not send notice to the county as required by 89.0041, but served the county judge. The district attorney answered within 30 days. Jefferson County challenged the trial court's jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that compliance with section 89.0041 is not a jurisdictional requirement. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The central issue in this case is whether a contractual "late charge" on past due royalties allows for compound rather than simple interest.

A principal issue in this dispute over royalties involving two pooled-unit reconfigurations is whether property law or contract principles govern ownership interests.

The principal issue in this case is whether a contractual mediation requirement is a limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity on contract claims under the Local Government Contract Claims Act.

This appeal concerns whether the trial court in this personal-injury case erred in excluding evidence, charging the jury, and imposing sanctions (including mid-trial document production) and whether those errors, if any, were harmful.

09-0901 Texas Rice Land Partners Ltd. and Mike Latta v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas LLC from Jefferson County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Amy Warr, Austin For respondent: Lynne Liberato, Houston The principal issue is whether a pipeline qualifies as a common carrier with condemnation power because its owner assured the Texas Railroad Commission the pipeline would be available to ship carbon dioxide for other than Denbury affiliates. Denbury initiated this suit after Texas Rice, which leases farmland to Latta, refused to let Denbury's surveyors onto its property for a pipeline survey. Before the suit, Denbury and Texas Rice had negotiated the survey details but without agreement. Denbury then applied to the Texas Railroad Commission for a common-carrier permit that would allow it to condemn a pipeline easement. The commission approved the common-carrier status and the trial court granted Denbury summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction to bar interference with the survey. Texas Rice argues, as it did to the court of appeals, that a factual dispute exists whether he pipeline will be only for private use. The appeals court affirmed the summary judgment and injunction. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0970 Nicholas Traxler v. Entergy Gulf States Inc. from Orange County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Jane S. Leger, Beaumont For respondent: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio The issues in this case involving an electrocution are (1) whether "transmission line" defined by the Texas Utility Code (and requiring a certain height above a roadway) applies to the power line above the road in this case and (2) whether a utility has a duty to agree on safety precautions for lines across a roadway. In this case Traxler sued Entergy, a power-distribution company, for negligence and negligence per se after a distribution line strung across a roadway burned him. Traxler, an employee of a house-moving company, was riding atop a house to assure obstacles were cleared as the house proceeded along a road. He alleges the power line he contacted was two feet lower than the Utility Code requires for a transmission line. He also contends Entergy failed to agree with the moving company about safety procedures as he argues the state Health and Safety Code requires. A jury awarded Traxler more than $1 million. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that the power line that burned Traxler was not a transmission line covered by the Utility Code's height requirement. The appeals court also held that state law did not impose a duty on Entergy to assure safety procedures. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us