Among the principal issues:

Whether the district court correctly denied the state's request to dismiss the constitutional claims on grounds that they are not capable of judicial resolution, the plaintiffs do not have standing to bring them and the claims are not ripe. The state argues in essence that financing schools is a policy consideration reserved to the Legislature and, even if the claims are justiciable, the school-district plaintiffs by seeking to enjoin the state from operating an unconstitutional public-school system do not have standing and the claims are not ripe because the Legislature has constructed a more-demanding system that is only in its beginning stages and cannot be evaluated yet.

Whether the school-finance system is inadequate as a whole under the state constitution's Article VII, section 1 adequacy requirement and particularly whether it provides adequately for educating so-called English language learners - ELL students - and economically disadvantaged students. The state responds that the trial court's inadequacy ruling is based on financial "inputs" and not student performance - outputs - the standard it argues the Court has used in previous school-finance cases to evaluate adequacy.

Whether the state's school system is constitutionally unsuitable under Article VII, section 1's suitability requirement. In response the state argues that suitability, the means to achieve a constitutionally adequate school system, is satisfied if the system is adequate. But the school-district plaintiffs contend an adequate school system can be unsuitable if the state fails to finance it sufficiently to meet the state's educational goals - they insist funding is not sufficient - and by the state's alleged failure to calculate the costs of providing an adequate education.

Whether the school system fails the constitutional requirement that it be financially efficient. The state maintains that the gap between what so-called property-poor districts can raise by taxes and what property-wealthy districts raise has narrowed from when the Court held in the last school-finance decision that the school system was efficient.

Whether the trial court erred by rejecting charter schools' particular claims that their state financing is inadequate, unsuitable and inefficient and that the state's provision for charters is unequal, relative to public schools'.

Whether the trial court erred by denying intervenors' claims that the school system is "qualitatively" inefficient - that is, they argue among other factors, that mandated class sizes, limits on available charter schools and state teacher certifications breed waste, limit competition and further inefficiency.

Whether the state's school-finance scheme imposes an unconstitutional statewide property tax. The standard for a statewide ad valorem tax, as the Court determined in the last school-finance decision, is whether essentially the state imposes a tax "cap" that leaves school districts with no meaningful discretion in raising and spending money.

The issue in this case is whether a formerly incarcerated individual is entitled to compensation for wrongful imprisonment under the Tim Cole Act.

This direct appeal arises from a final judgment in a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute and related agency rule that prohibit the production of consumable hemp products for smoking.

This direct appeal arises from two suits challenging the constitutionality of the Legislature's recent reapportionment of the State's senatorial and representative districts based on the 2020 census. The suits were transferred to and consolidated before a special three-judge district court under Chapter 22A of the Government Code. In the direct appeal, the State parties