The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether 'safe harbor' element was shown in dram shop action. The principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by holding that a bar and pool hall owner failed to establish a "safe harbor" under Texas' statutory dram shop law by proving that it did not encourage employees to serve alcohol to an intoxicated customer. Parker sued 20801, the owner of Slick Willie's, alleging that its employees provided him perhaps 15 free drinks at the bar's grand opening before he was assaulted in the parking lot by another bar patron. Parker claimed the drinks were a proximate cause of the head injuries he suffered in the fight. The trial court granted summary judgment to 20801 Inc., but the court of appeals reversed on the safe harbor provision.

The principal issues are (1) whether for a civil-conspiracy claim limitations are established by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.003(a) - two years - or four years under a vicarious-liability theory or as an independent claim, or both, and (2) whether limitations begins with the conspiracy's last act or at the time of the underlying tort.

The principal issue is whether the Court should adopt the "sham-affidavit" doctrine, that an affidavit contradicting previous testimony to raise a fact question to avoid summary judgment must explain the contradiction.

In this challenge to void a home-equity loan for constitutional defects, and to recover principal and interest, the issue is whether the borrowers' notice eight years later that the loan did not comply with constitutional requirements voids the loan or makes it voidable and subject to a four-year limitations. The Woods sued the bank and Ocwen, alleging fraud and contract breach based on alleged constitutional defects. The trial court denied the Woods' summary-judgment motion and granted the bank's and Ocwen's. The appeals court affirmed, holding a home-equity loan that does not comply with constitutional requirements is voidable, that as voidable a suit on it is subject to a four-year limitations and the Woods' suit was filed too late.

Two principal issues arise from this election ballot-language challenge: (1) whether the city established no material-fact issue exists that a municipal charter amendment's ballot description was legally sufficient and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a new-trial motion based on the mayor's public statements after the election. Dacus and others sued to invalidate voters' 2010 approval of a proposition that would create a dedicated fund to pay for drainage-system improvements by charging property owners fees in addition to property taxes. They argue that those fees, a chief feature of the improvements' financing, were omitted from the ballot description and that how the ballot described it - a dedicated "pay as you go" fund - was misleading. They also cite Mayor Parker's statements after the election as new evidence that should have established their right to a new trial after the trial court granted the city summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the city, holding in part that the ballot language needed only to refer to the proposition's character and purpose, its chief features.

A principal issue is whether the common-law mirror-image rule applies to civil procedure Rule 167 settlement agreements. Amedisys sued Kingwood in a dispute over Kingwood's hiring an ex-Amedisys employee. Kingwood offered $90,000 to settle "all claims asserted or which could have been asserted" against it. Amedysis wrote back to accept Kingwood's offer by the offer deadline, but the acceptance terms omitted reference to claims that could have been asserted. Kingwood refused to pay. The trial court granted Amedysis summary judgment for breach of the settlement contract. The appeals court reversed.

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0833 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International Inc. v. Greenberg Peden P.C. and Gerard J. Swonke from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Gregory S. Coleman, Austin For amicus curiae, Abrams Scott & Bickley: Christopher S. Johns, Austin For respondents: Robert M. (Randy) Roach Jr., Houston In this dispute over an allegedly ambiguous contingency-fee agreement involving work by an attorney acting of counsel, the principal issues are (1) whether potential ambiguity should be construed against the attorney who drafted it for an existing client and (2) whether the trial court should have instructed jurors on the lawyer's fiduciary duty to the client. In this case Swonke, of counsel to Greenberg Peden, worked for Anglo-Dutch on a lawsuit it eventually won with a $70.5-million verdict. Anglo-Dutch refused to pay Swonke the percentage he claimed he was owed because it contended Greenberg Peden, not Swonke individually, represented the company. The trial court ruled for Swonke. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the ambiguous agreement should not be construed against the attorney who drafted it. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this employment retaliation case the principal issues are (1) whether the employee alleging age- and gender-discrimination engaged in protected activity when she complained by email and (2) whether legally sufficient evidence established a causal link between the email and her discharge.

10-0615 Ashford Partners Ltd. v. ECO Resources Inc. from Fort Bend County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Charles Watson, Austin For respondent: Michael P. Cash, Houston Principal issues in this lease dispute over a construction defect are (1) whether Ashford, which took over ECO's building lease when it bought the building, had a duty to complete the construction "punch list" according to ECO's plans even though ECO had signed an estoppel agreement with the previous owner "accepting the premises without exception" and (2) whether the damages measure for the construction defect should be diminished lease value instead of repair costs. After the building's foundation cracked and tilted, Ashford sued the contractor and sued to declare it had not breached the lease with ECO. ECO countersued for breach, arguing that Ashford, as the landlord by assignment, assumed the original landlord's obligation to complete the building according to plans. The trial court awarded ECO damages for diminished lease value and attorneys fees. On review, the appeals court affirmed, holding in part that Ashford exclusively failed to complete a necessary punch-list item linked to the foundation problem after it assumed the lease but before the deadline for completing the punch list. The court of appeals also held diminution of the lease value was the proper damages measure because ECO leased the building and did not own it. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in this laundry-service breach-of-contract case is whether a cancellation clause providing damages at 40 percent of remaining weekly payments based on the last invoice constitutes an unenforceable penalty.

There are three primary issues in this case. The first is whether the executor of an estate owed a fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries. The second issue is whether a decedent's estate was required to, and did, disclose all material facts in connection with a release executed by beneficiaries to the decedent's marital trust. The third issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding certain financial documents from the summary judgment evidence.

The issue in this case is whether a contract is ambiguous.

The principal issue is whether judicial error breaks causation for a legal-negligence claim when the appeals court reversed the trial loss based on trial-court error. In this case the Neubaums claim as damages their costs for an appeal to remedy their lawyers' trial error. In the underlying lawsuit, alleging the Neubaums charged usurious interest for a loan to a customer through an agent, the jury found March, the agent, loaned the money on the Neubaums' behalf. But on review the court of appeals reversed, holding no evidence proved the agent acted for the Neubaums. In this malpractice case the Neubaums allege their lawyers in the original case were negligent in part because one lawyer's illness left the trial in the hands of a firm lawyer, Stanfield, who never tried a case before. The Neubaums contend their lawyers failed to conduct discovery early enough to find the company that sued for usury was working a Ponzi scheme; that a usury "cure" letter was never admitted as evidence (and the jury never considered it as an issue); and that their lawyers did not hire an expert to review the company's bank records until after the trial. But in the malpractice case the Neubaums did not allege Stanfield, the trial lawyer, acted negligently on the issue whether March acted as the Neubaums' agent. At trial of the usury case Stanfield objected that evidence did not prove March was the Neubaums' agent and raised that argument in moving for a new trial, both of which the trial court rejected. In this malpractice case the law firm argued that it could not be liable for the trial court's error in the underlying usury case and that error caused the Neubaums' appellate costs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. A divided court of appeals reversed in part, holding the law firm failed as a legal matter to establish that its alleged negligence did not proximately cause the Neubaums' damages. By holding that the law firm should have established by expert testimony that causation was broken, the appeals court seems to reject the rule that judicial error creates a new and independent cause.

A principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by remanding, in the interest of justice, the question whether the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's intentional-tort exception applies. The court of appeals at first reversed and rendered judgment against Lee, whose leg was crushed and later amputated when a crane fell under maneuvering stress. Then the court remanded, reasoning that its elaboration on the intentional-tort exception (before the Court's June 12 Mo-Vac Service Co. v. Escobedo decision) justified a remand. For the intentional-tort exception to apply in worker-comp cases, the Court held in Mo-Vac, the employer must believe that its actions are substantially certain to result in a particular injury to a particular employee, not merely highly likely to increase overall risks to employees in the workplace. The appeals court determined its outline of the substantial-certainty test's requirements required remand to allow Lee to support his argument that he was in a "danger" zone - a localized area - that Berkel's supervisor knew would result in injury.

The issue in this wrongful-death action is whether an engineering firm working for a toll-road authority has derivative immunity involving a triple-fatality accident. Oliveres sued for negligence and premises defects after her son died in a collision with a wrong-way drunken driver who entered a tollway by way of an exit ramp. Oliveres alleged Brown & Gay failed to design proper signs to avoid the accident. Brown & Gay argues that it falls within the scope of the toll-road authority's immunity because the toll-road authority had the right to control its work. The trial court granted Brown & Gay's jurisdictional plea, but the appeals court reversed, holding that Brown & Gay was an independent contractor and not the Fort Bend County Toll Road Authority's employee.

In this condemnation-valuation case a principal issue is whether harmful error resulted from trial court's excluding evidence, based on the project-influence doctrine, that the state interfered with pollution remediation and depressed the property's value. In this case Caffe Ribs challenged a condemnation award of $7.3 million for property it argues was worth $9.9 million when the state condemned it. The trial court excluded Caffe Ribs' evidence that its land was subject to a pollution-cleanup plan and that the state interfered with the remediation plan. Based on the jury's fair-market valuation, the trial court awarded $4.9 million. The court of appeals affirmed. Caffe Ribs argues that the trial court misapplied the project-influence doctrine, which bars enhancing the value of land because of a new higher use based on the plans for it after condemnation.

In this case involving burn injuries from a fire at a church fundraiser, the issues are (1) whether volunteers for a vendor on the church property are invitees under premises-liability law; (2) whether the trial court's failure to instruct jurors to disregard a "nobody's responsible" argument should be reversed when unavoidable accident was not pleaded; (3) whether families of the four injured teenagers the waived any challenge to the evidence by not contesting the jury's zero-damages finding; and (4) whether the appeals court applied the correct factual-sufficiency standard in reviewing the no-liability verdict.

The issue in this case is whether an employee's report of sexual harassment by a coworker and comments about the matter to another coworker fall within the employee's scope of employment for purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act.

The issues are (1) whether the implied covenant of seisen attaches automatically to a special-warranty deed and (2) whether the merger doctrine applies to bar Chicago Title's contract-breach claim.

A principal issue in this dispute over a third-party administrator's payments to hospitals for services to HMO patients is whether the Texas Prompt Pay Statute requires privity between the hospitals and the health-maintenance organization. Several hospital groups sued Aetna for payment delays after Aetna refused to pay claims by two third-party administrators that went insolvent. In this case the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Aetna, holding that the prompt-pay law required that the hospitals must have contracted directly with Aetna and not with its delegated claims-processors.

In this next stage of dueling between the city and the city's pension system over onetime municipal employees employed by spinoff city corporations - and whether and how much the city owes for their pension contributions - the principal issues are (1) whether under the first stage decision by this Court, Klumb v. Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, the employees are covered by the pension system; (2) whether the pension system's ultra vires suit appropriate to enforce a meet-and-confer agreement with the city; (3) whether the pension system's public-information suit is barred because it was against the city and not a public-information officer; and (4) whether the pension system instead of its board has standing under the pension-requirements statute.

The principal issue is whether a city order forcing homeowners to vacate their condominium units later reversed for violating their due-process rights precludes their inverse-condemnation suit for the time they were barred from their homes. After city investigations that found the building was not covered by an occupancy permit and the condominium units unsafe, Houston city officials ordered the residents to vacate their homes. In ensuing litigation, the vacate order was reversed on due-process grounds. The homeowners then sued for inverse condemnation. On that claim, the trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea, which argued in part that the homeowners had no right to occupy the property without the required occupancy permit and that the city did not take the property for public use. A divided appeals court reversed.

At issue in this case is whether a police officer acted with reckless disregard such that the Texas Tort Claims Act's emergency exception does not apply, and whether the officer acted in good faith such that he is entitled to official immunity.

The issue in this case is whether the Tort Claims Act waives the City of Houston's immunity in a negligence suit for damages caused by a Houston Police Department officer.

Principal issues in this employment-discrimination appeal are (1) whether a fire captain's reassignment from "fire suppression" work to training duties - allegedly because he avoided firefighting - constituted unlawful discrimination without a medical evaluation and (2) whether the trial court properly gave injunctive relief without a damages award and the city, in response to an arbitration order, had returned him to firefighting duty before he filed his lawsuit. Proler also argues that the city's petition for review was not filed in time, so the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. In this case the city challenges a trial court's decision affirming a hearing officer's order reinstating Proler, the fire captain, to duty in a fire station. Proler complained that his assignment to the training academy for a second time was discrimination based on a perceived but undiagnosed disability. In a split decision the appeals court upheld the trial court's employment-discrimination ruling.

At issue in this breach-of-contract case is whether League City's entering into an agreement with Jimmy Changas, Inc., for the construction of a restaurant was a governmental action such that the City is immune from suit or a proprietary action.

This case addresses whether the Texas Citizens Participation Act applies to claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, and breach-of-contract stemming from the sale of a major sports network.

The issues in this challenge to the Health and Human Services commissioner and inspector general's refusal to provide a contested-case hearing on an audit under the vendor drug program are (1) whether the challenger's request for findings and conclusions extended the deadline to appeal and thus preserved appellate jurisdiction and (2) whether McNeill was entitled to a contested-case hearing.

06-1018 D.R. Horton-Texas Ltd. v. Markel International Insurance Co. Ltd. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Robert B. Gilbreath, Dallas For respondent: Les Pickett, Houston A principal issue in this insurance dispute over an alleged construction defect causing mold damage is whether a duty to indemnify can exist when a duty to defend does not, based on pleading allegations. After settling with the complaining homeowners, D.R. Horton sued Markel because Markel refused to defend it in the homeowners' suit or to indemnify it as an "additional insured" under Markel's policy covering a responsible subcontractor. Markel moved for summary judgment, claiming the homeowners did not name the subcontractor in their lawsuit and arguing that D.R. Horton could not show the subcontractor's responsible without extrinsic evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this challenge to a municipal utility's rates are (1) whether Data Foundry, as a city-owned utility customer, has standing under the Public Utility Regulatory Act to challenge alleged excessive or discriminatory rates the city utility charges and (2) whether Austin's purported exclusive jurisdiction forbids judicial review of Data Foundry's common-law or constitutional rights, or both.

The principal issues are (1) whether an implied easement by prior use endures after the necessity has ended and (2) whether the bona-fide purchaser affirmative defense applies against an easement claim by implied grant and, if so, what investigation a reasonable buyer must conduct.

06-0162 Donald Davis v. Fisk Electric Co., et al. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Renuka Jain, Houston For respondents: J. Cary Gray, Houston In this wrongful-termination case alleging the firing was racially motivated, the principal issues are (1) whether the trial court erred by overruling so-called Batson challenges to peremptory strikes against five of six potential jurors who were black and (2) whether any difference exists between striking black potential jurors for race, which Batson prohibits, and striking them for acknowledging they had been victims of discrimination or because they reacted in voir dire to a racial epithet likely to be in trial testimony. For four of the five strikes, counsel offered as proof unsworn statements about nonverbal occurrences in the courtroom. The trial court overruled Davis's objections to the strikes. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the questions about discrimination and the racial epithet were asked of all potential jurors and that Davis did not dispute Fisk's characterizations of nonverbal occurrences in the courtroom but only noted that no record evidence supported them.

The issues in this challenge to a medical-malpractice verdict are (1) whether legally sufficient causation evidence supports the verdict; (2) whether affidavits from subrogation agents to establish medical expenses comply with Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 18.001's requirements for reasonable and necessary expenses; and (3) whether the appeals court erred by holding the trial court properly excluded the defendants' damages expert.

In this wrongful-death case involving a fight at a company store between an employee and an employee's father, based on allegations of failure to supervise, a principal issue is whether ExxonMobil's effort to join an emergency physician as a third-party defendant must be supported by the doctor's ordinary negligence or by willful and wanton negligence (the emergency-physician liability standard under Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 74) to show proportionate responsibility under chapter 33.

07-0043 Dynegy Midstream Services, Ltd. v. Apache Corp. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Mike A. Hatchell. Austin For cross-petitioner/respondent: Geoffrey L. Harrison, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on (1) whether the court of appeals erred by holding that the gas processor breached its percentage-of-proceeds contract by deducting "unaccounted-for" gas from what Apache was paid and (2) whether expert testimony may prove breach of an unambiguous percentage-of-proceeds contract by establishing custom for processors to pay for unaccounted-for gas even though such gas is not sold and does not generate proceeds. Principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by holding that the gas processor breached its percentage-of-proceeds contract by deducting "unaccounted-for" gas from what the producer was paid and (2) whether expert testimony may prove breach of an unambiguous percentage-of-proceeds contract by establishing custom for processors to pay for unaccounted-for gas even though such gas is not sold and does not generate proceeds. Apache sued because it claimed audits showed deduction for unaccounted-for gas in what Dynergy paid Apache under contracts that did not mention unaccounted-for gas. Jurors found for Apache, awarding more than $1.5 million, but the trial court rendered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Dynergy. It also declared judgment for Apache on payments for future "field condensate" and awarded Apache $75,000 in attorneys fees. The court of appeals reversed, for the most part reinstating the jury's findings for Apache. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

11-0059 El Paso Marketing L.P. v. Wolf Hollow I L.P from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: D. Mitchell McFarland and S. Shawn Stephens, Houston For respondent: Solace Kirkland, Houston A principal issue is whether contract remedies preclude a power-plant owner's negligence claim for damage from gas-delivery interruptions and contaminated gas. The plant owner, Wolf Hollow, contends it had no contract obligations because it assigned its gas-delivery contract to its agent, El Paso Marketing, its gas supplier. El Paso assumed the gas-delivery contract Wolf Hollow had with Enterprise, a pipeline company. Both the assigned contract and Wolf Hollow's supply contract with El Paso had clauses waiving consequential damages resulting from interruptions and problems with gas quality. El Paso sued Wolf Hollow to declare it had no liability and brought Enterprise into the suit as a third-party defendant. Wolf Hollow then sued Enterprise for negligently causing the gas-supply interruptions that forced Wolf Hollow to buy replacement power and for negligently delivering contaminated gas that damaged its plant. The trial court granted El Paso and Enterprise summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed in part, but remanded Wolf Hollow's negligence claim against Enterprise. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this fraud and contract-interference case are (1) whether Texas courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Parex, a Canadian company; if so, (2) whether Parex's separate Bermuda subsidiary ratified Parex Canada's pre-incorporation jurisdictional conduct as its promoter; and (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supports specific personal jurisdiction over Ramshorn International, a Colombia company, based in part on a subsidiary's employee's conduct as agent.

The principal issues in this rental-equipment appraisal challenge are (1) whether the appeals court's remand to determine reasonableness improperly relegated to the jury a statute's constitutionality; (2) whether the appraisal district's constitutional challenge to Tax Code section 23.1241 is as-applied or facial; and (3) whether this Tax Code section is constitutional.

In this contract-breach case the principal issues are (1) whether the detrimental-activity provisions in Exxon's executive-incentive programs are enforceable under Texas law and (2) whether a choice-of-law clause specifying New York law should be applied in disputes over the incentive programs should govern in this case. In this case Drennen, who retired after 31 years at Exxon when he lost his position, sued after Exxon canceled his incentive bonuses because he went to work for Hess, a company Exxon considered to be a competitor. Exxon alleged Drennen's employment with Hess created a material conflict that breached the incentive-program agreements. As he considered retirement, Drennen contends he was told his incentive awards would be secure as long as he did not work for four other major oil companies, a list that did not include Hess. The trial court decided in Exxon's favor, but the appeals court reversed, holding that the incentive agreements' detrimental-activity provisions are unenforceable under Texas law.

The principal issue is whether extrinsic evidence - evidence of factors beyond an unambiguous contract - may be considered to show a third party was a contract beneficiary.

05-0661 FKM Partnership Ltd. v. University of Houston Board of Regents from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston In this condemnation case the principal issues are (1) whether remand is proper to allow the university to prove necessity in a condemnation proceeding and (2) whether the university must pay fees, expenses and temporary-possession damages when its amended condemnation petition proposes taking less property. FKM Partnership moved to dismiss the university's amended condemnation petition, filed after special commissioners awarded damages, because the university's new plans to take less property altered the subject matter of its original petition that the special commissioners had considered. The trial court dismissed the university's suit and awarded FKM fees, expenses and temporary damages for the university's possession of the property. The court of appeals reversed.

The issue in this case is whether Texas law recognizes implied-agreement privity for collateral estoppel purposes based on an alleged implied agreement to be bound to a bellwether trial.

In this deed-construction dispute involving a purported royalty reservation in a conveyance, a principal issue is whether the Duhig rule acts to prevent the grantors from claiming a fractional royalty interest reserved in a warranty deed that was not disclosed in previous conveyances.

The issues in this dispute over a statute-of-limitations waiver are (1) whether a loan guaranty waiving limitations to recover a deficiency is specific enough to make it valid despite public-policy concerns and (2) whether the affirmative defense that a limitations waiver is void for public policy is itself waived when raised in a response to a summary-judgment motion.

The issues in this appeal from summary judgment denying coverage under a directors-and-officers liability policy are (1) whether the insured-vs.-insured exclusion applies and (2) whether Primo is collaterally estopped from recovering against Great American.

The issues in this contest over unemployment benefits are (1) whether Harris County Appraisal Review Board members are employees of the county appraisal district and (2) whether they fall under the employment exception for members of the judiciary.

Justice Willett is not sitting. 05-0986 Harris County Hospital District v. Tomball Regional Hospital from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Sandra Hachem, Houston For respondent: Randal L. Payne, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether the immunity issue for hospital district sued for reimbursement by hospital authority. The issue is whether the Harris County Hospital District is immune from the Tomball hospital's suit seeking compensation because it allegedly treated indigent patients that Harris County should have under state law. Tomball sued to be reimbursed for care given to Harris County patients that Tomball alleges were turned away from Harris County hospitals or referred by those hospitals to Tomball's. Harris County claims in part that it is exempt from paying other hospitals for treating patients eligible for free care under the Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act. The trial court dismissed Tomball's suit on Harris County's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute's language that a hospital district could "sue and be sued" was an unambiguous immunity waiver.

The issues in this case involving a road-rage shooting by an off-duty county deputy constable are (1) whether the county has immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act's intentional-tort exclusion and (2) whether the deputy's firearm use authorized by the county falls under the tort-claims act's definition of negligent use of tangible personal property and, if so, (3) whether the county proximately caused the shooting injuries.

In this case alleging negligence based on patent representations in a previous sale, the issues are (1) whether a third party's attack on the patents' validity strips the Court of jurisdiction and, if not, (2) whether attorney immunity applies to the business-transactions context.

The issue is whether Gold, the plaintiff injured aboard a ship on which he was working before the ship was seaworthy, may claim maintenance and cure damages under the Jones Act.

The central question in this case is whether an employer is liable to an employee when that employee is injured while crossing a public roadway that divided the employer's property.

07-0784 and 07-0785 Harry Holmes II v. Douglas G. Beatty from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Richard P. Hogan, Jr. and Jack W. Lawter, Jr., Houston For respondent: Joseph S. Horrigan, Houston In this case challenging distribution of brokerage-account assets and securities certificates held jointly by deceased spouses, a principal issue is what the Probate Code requires to establish survivorship rights by agreement in otherwise community property. Holmes and Beatty, children from different marriages, were executors of each of their parents' estates. The parents left about $10 million in joint brokerage accounts and securities acquired as community property and variously designated as "JT TEN" and "JT WROS" on the fronts. Two the accounts were labeled "JT TEN" and a box for "Joint (WROS)" was marked for a third account. Some certificates attempted to define the designations on the back as "JT TEN - as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common," but others did not. The trial court found survivorship rights in two of six disputed asset categories, but the court of appeals reversed in those two and held a right of survivorship existed in one account in which the trial court had not (the box classifying the account as "Joint (WROS))." The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0784 and 07-0785 Harry Holmes II v. Douglas G. Beatty from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Richard P. Hogan, Jr. and Jack W. Lawter, Jr., Houston For respondent: Joseph S. Horrigan, Houston In this case challenging distribution of brokerage-account assets and securities certificates held jointly by deceased spouses, a principal issue is what the Probate Code requires to establish survivorship rights by agreement in otherwise community property. Holmes and Beatty, children from different marriages, were executors of each of their parents' estates. The parents left about $10 million in joint brokerage accounts and securities acquired as community property and variously designated as "JT TEN" and "JT WROS" on the fronts. Two the accounts were labeled "JT TEN" and a box for "Joint (WROS)" was marked for a third account. Some certificates attempted to define the designations on the back as "JT TEN - as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common," but others did not. The trial court found survivorship rights in two of six disputed asset categories, but the court of appeals reversed in those two and held a right of survivorship existed in one account in which the trial court had not (the box classifying the account as "Joint (WROS))." The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

This case concerns a pair of ballot propositions, Propositions 1 and 2, that were submitted to Houston voters in 2004. Both were designed to provide tax relief to city residents. The ordinance submitting them to an election included a "poison pill" provision after the text of Proposition 1. The provision stated that "[i]f another proposition for a Charter amendment relating to limitations in City revenues is approved at the same election at which this proposition is also approved, and if this proposition receives the higher number of favorable votes, then this proposition shall prevail and the other shall not become effective."

Both cases concern the 2003 voter-approved Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, which created a judicial alternative to strikes and other labor techniques to protect the public from the dangers of a striking fire or police force.

In this case two principal issues are (1) whether the city's public-works director acted without authority in calculating impervious cover for imposing a drainage utility-district fee to pay for the effects of runoff and (2) whether the director acted without authority in determining which properties "benefitted" from the city's drainage system. Houston Belt & Terminal Railway and other railroads sued over drainage-utility assessments based on the public-works director's determination of how much impervious cover existed on their properties. They argue the basis for those assessments were aerial maps showing green and brown areas - brown assumed to be impervious cover - instead of digital-map data, as they contend the city ordinance requires, from tax plats, assessments and "other similar reliable data." By using the aerial maps, the director determined almost all the railroads' property was impervious. The trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea to dismiss the challenge. The appeals court reversed in part.

In this challenge to "stigma" damages awarded for contaminated but remediated property, the principal issues are (1) whether stigma damages may be recovered for temporary environmental contamination in the absence of permanent physical injury; (2) whether the jury must find permanent injury before awarding such damages; and (3) whether the real estate-appraisal testimony was legally sufficient to support the stigma-damages award. Mel Acres Ranch sued for negligence, nuisance and trespass after tracing livestock deaths and defects to industrial waste that Houston Unlimited discharged for years on its nearby property. Even though Houston Unlimited worked to prevent further pollution and evidence showed contamination levels below state standards, Mel Acres sought and won damages for property-value loss, based on the contamination record on its deed.

Both cases concern the 2003 voter-approved Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, which created a judicial alternative to strikes and other labor techniques to protect the public from the dangers of a striking fire or police force.

The issue in this mandamus effort to thwart a venue-change order is whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.020's mandate for venue by agreement trumps section 65.023's provision for venue in the defendant's domicile county for injunctive relief.

In this production dispute the principal issue is whether a party - in this case, the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association - waives attorney-client privilege to documents provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for an expert who also is the party's employee.

This and the related 12-0198 action involve a royalty-owners class suing for underpayment the issues are (1) whether interlocutory review or relief by mandamus or prohibition are proper to force the trial court to reconsider class certification by res judicata issues the Court arguably ordered be reconsidered on remand in the previous appeal, Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co.; (2) whether the Supreme Court has interlocutory jurisdiction to review the trial court's addition of implied-covenant-to-market claims on remand by the certified class and (3) whether the implied-covenant-to-market claims should be struck as matter of law. As to the first issue, Phillips and ConocoPhillips argue that Bowden required reconsideration of the class certification based on the res judicata issues. Yarbrough counters that Bowden confirmed class certification of the subclass in this appeal and ordered res judicata be considered only if the trial court certified a new class.

In this case involving allegations, among them in three lawsuits failure to warn and products liability, by sex-trafficking victims, the issue is whether the trial courts committed clear error by denying Facebook’s motions to dismiss on the basis of immunity under the federal Communications Decency Act.

07-0040 In re GlobalSantaFe Corp. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For relator: Christopher Dove, Houston For real party in interest: John M. Black, Houston In this mandamus seeking the pretrial court to retain jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on the principal issue is whether and by how much the Jones Act preempts Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 90. In this petition seeking to compel the pretrial multidistrict litigation court to retain jurisdiction over a silica case, the principal issue is whether and by how much the federal Jones Act preempts the state's multidistrict litigation procedures. Under the Jones Act, a ship's hand or sailor claiming a work injury aboard ship may file a state lawsuit free of any minimum-injury requirement imposed on personal-injury suits by state law. Lopez, who claims injury from silica, argues that restrictions imposed on his case by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 90, the MDL procedures, are substantive limitations forbidden by the federal law: The MDL procedures for silica cases exist to bar people with minimum injury from filing suit and a medical report that failed to meet a threshold standard to forgo the MDL pretrial process was a report the Jones Act barred. The MDL pretrial court remanded Lopez's case to the trial court and the court of appeals denied GlobalSantaFe the mandamus relief it sought.

The issues in this case are whether an insured's nonrecourse settlement with a third party may inform contract liability and damages against insurers after the insurers allegedly breached their duties to their insured and whether the no-direct-action rule precludes the third party from intervening in the insured's suit against its insurers.

Beyond a question of mandamus jurisdiction, the principal issues are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to exclude the opposing corporate representative from a hearing at which trade-secret testimony was presented and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering disclosure of an affidavit submitted in camera to the appeals court that contained trade-secret information. In this case M-I Swaco, M-I L.L.C.'s business-operation name, challenges the trial court's decision to allow an opposing party's corporate representative into a hearing on trade secrets. Jeff Russo, M-I Swaco's former business-development manager, sued to declare his non-competition agreement with the company unenforceable after the company demanded he stop working for a competitor. In a temporary-injunction hearing, M-I Swaco sought to exclude a representative from Russo's new company, also a party M-I Swaco sought to enjoin, during testimony about trade secrets Russo might have taken from his former employer. When the trial court refused the motion, M-I Swaco petitioned the appeals court for mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied the petition, but also denied Russo's motion to get an affidavit M-I Swaco filed for the appeals court's in camera consideration on testimony it planned to introduce. In the trial court again, the court granted Russo's motion to get the affidavit as a witness statement. M-I Swaco filed for mandamus relief in this Court.

The issue in this dispute over a hospital lien, by an uninsured patient contesting the hospital's bill as unreasonable, is whether the hospital's payment agreements for insurers and federal Medicare and Medicaid providers may be disclosed as relevant.

In its mandamus petition the state presents this issue: Whether county election officials, the respondents in this proceeding, must reject applications for mail-in ballots that claim "disability" under Texas Election Code section 82.002(a) based solely on the "generalized risk of contracting a virus." In related litigation Travis County initially sued to declare the novel-coronavirus-contagion fear satisfied the Election Code's disability prong for qualifying to vote by mail. In answering this mandamus petition Travis County and four others argue in part that the state's contention that county elections officials are subject to mandamus - to be ordered to comply with a "ministerial duty" to follow state election law - instead imposes on county elections officials a duty to accept and process applications for mail-in ballots without inquiring about a voter's claimed disability. Under the Texas Election Code a voter may seek to vote by mail if they claim a "disability" that would prevent them from voting in person. The attorney general contends the county elections officials who are respondents in this case have indicated that contagion fears meet the Election Code's disability definition despite the election law's confinement of it to a "sickness or physical condition" on election day. The counties' broad interpretation, the state argues, has created confusion about the law and is leading to increasing vote-by-mail applications based on what the state contends is an erroneous legal interpretation. In response, the counties contend the trial court properly determined in part that lack of coronavirus immunity is a physical condition that satisfies the disability definition.

11-0732 In re Stephanie Lee from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For relator: Scott Rothenberg, Houston For real party in interest: Clinton F. Lawson, San Antonio The principal issue is whether a mediated settlement must be enforced that provides, in the absence of family violence, a divorced mother periodic possession of her 7-year-old daughter when the mother is married to a registered sex offender. The trial court, considering the father's testimony that the child slept between her mother and her new husband when he was naked, found the settlement not in the child's best interest and refused to enforce it. Lee, the mother, argues that the only statutory exception to enforcing a mediated settlement is when family violence can be shown. The court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0961 Maria del Carmen Guilbot Serros de Gonzalez, et al. v. Miguel Angel Gonzalez Guilbot, et al. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Thomas R. Phillips, Austin For cross-petitioners/respondents: Andy Taylor, Houston Principal issues arising from a family-business fight alleging theft and trademark infringement are (1) whether a third ("tertiary") recusal motion defined by statute applies only when filed against the same judge; (2) whether a facially defective recusal motion allows the judge to take no action on the defective motion; and (3) whether, for a case remanded to state court after removal, the state court reacquires jurisdiction only if the federal clerk mails the remand order to the state court. In this case two siblings were accused of stealing the family herbal-tea companies' assets and infringing on company trademarks. They moved to recuse a Harris County probate judge scheduled to hear the suit, then moved to remove the judge assigned to hear the recusal motion and the presiding judge who made the assignment. The presiding judge dismissed the recusal motions against him and the second judge for defects. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that the state court acquired jurisdiction but the presiding judge could not rule on the recusal motion against him. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this parental-rights termination case the issues are (1) whether for Texas Family Code section 263.401 dismissal purposes the appeals court wrongly concluded a hearing to establish parentage does not count as commencing a trial on the merits; (2) whether a trial court's docket entry granting an extension constitutes an extension under Texas Family Code section 263.401; and (3) whether section 263.401 is unconstitutional.

The issue in this case is whether evidence of a causal connection between a parent's drug use and any alleged endangerment of the child is required to terminate a parent's rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Texas Family Code.

The principal issues are (1) whether Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 95 - establishing a property owner's liability for an independent contractor's employees' injuries - applies to negligent-activity or negligent-undertaking claims and (2) whether the injured worker's claim in this case arose from his construction, repair, renovation or modification of a real-property improvement when he was burned by gases leaking from a unit separate from the one was repairing (95.002(2)). Elmgren sued for burns he suffered while working for an independent contractor doing maintenance on pipes that carry gas to one of several furnaces in a chemical plant. Gas ignited from a leak at another furnace about 100 feet from where Elmgren worked, causing a flash fire. The trial court granted summary judgment for the work-site owner, ruling that chapter 95 applied. The court of appeals reversed on Elmgren's negligent-activity and negligent-undertaking theories.

The issues in this challenge to Houston's policy providing spousal benefits to same-sex couples married outside Texas before state bans on same-sex marriages were declared unconstitutional are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal; (2) whether the plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers to bring the challenge; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred by reversing the temporary injunction without addressing questions of retroactive effect of the same sex-marriage decision on state law.

In this contract-breach suit, among principal issues are (1) whether substantial-compliance doctrine applies to contract-notice provisions outside of the insurance context; (2) whether the language "no claim shall be made" by either party against the other for consequential damages creates a covenant not to sue; (3) whether the appeals court erred by relying on the jury's agency finding in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence and (4) whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001 bars a limited-liability company from responsibility for attorney fees.

A principal issue is whether the insurer is liable for demolition and rebuilding costs prompted by Galveston's mandate that an apartment complex be razed because of hurricane damage. Owners of The Pointe sued for contract breach, deceptive-trade practices and insurance-code violations after Lexington, the primary insurer, determined that the complex was substantially damaged by flooding or by a combination of wind and flooding damage, both of which the policy excluded. Reviewing jury findings that Lexington acted in bad faith by denying the claim, the appeals court reversed, concluding in part that the apartment-complex owners failed to show that substantial damage to the complex - 50 percent or more - was caused by wind alone, a covered cause. Under the policy Lexington agreed to pay for costs imposed by ordinance or law, but the court of appeals held that Galveston's requirement that the complex be demolished must have been based on substantial damage from wind alone.

This declaratory judgment suit addressed whether a property's deed

This is a suit challenging the CA's ruling that two municipal taxpayers lacked taxpayer standing to challenge Houston City Officials alleged illegal misallocation of their property tax proceeds.

The principal issues in this legal-malpractice case are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by striking as mere conclusion portions of an attorney's affidavit estimating damages and (2) whether plaintiffs nonetheless presented sufficient evidence to defeat a no-evidence summary-judgment motion. Elizondo and his wife sued lawyers who represented him in negotiations with BP Chemical Co. for his injuries in the Texas City refinery explosion in 2005. Jose Elizondo settled for $50,000, BP's only counter to his $2-million settlement offer. But years later he brought this malpractice claim when he discovered one of the lawyers negotiating for plaintiffs went to work for BP. In his claim Elizondo argued that his lawyers failed to obtain a larger settlement and never discussed a possible loss-of-consortium claim by his wife. The trial court struck the Elizondos' expert's affidavit as conclusion without support and ordered a take-nothing judgment against them. The court of appeals affirmed, with one dissent.

08-0669 Dan Kelly and Laura Hofstatter v. General Interior Construction Inc. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: David C. Holmes, Houston For respondent: Ross A. Sears II, Houston In this jurisdictional challenge the principal issues are (1) whether Texas contacts to establish personal jurisdiction should be limited to pleadings that did not allege a disputed contract was a contact for a fraud claim or for Texas Trust Fund Act violations by the officers individually and (2) whether asserting jurisdiction over the corporate officers complies with federal due process and the Texas long-arm statute. In this case General Interior Construction, a Texas company, sued Kelly and Hofstatter over alleged payments due from Kelly and Hofstatter's general-contracting business incorporated in Arizona. Their company agreed with another Arizona firm for improvements to a Texas hotel the other firm owned. GIC alleged breach of contract, fraud and misappropriation of trust money Kelly and Hofstatter's firm held for paying subcontractors. The trial court found specific jurisdiction existed to require Kelly and Hofstatter to defend in Texas against all claims, but the court of appeals reversed on the contract-breach claim, based on Kelly and Hofstatter's signing the contract as corporate officers. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-1003 Kirby Lake Development Ltd., et al. v. Clear Lake Water Authority from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Lawrence J. Fossi, Houston For respondent: Ramon J. Viada III, The Woodlands The principal issues are (1) whether governmental immunity bars developers' contract claims alleging the water authority failed to seek bond approval for reimbursing the developers' water- and sewer-installation costs and, if not, (2) whether the water authority's failure to place the reimbursement issue on one bond ballot breached the reimbursement agreement. Kirby Lane and other developers sued the water authority for failing to seek voter approval for a bond proposal to pay developers for the water and sewer work under an agreement. After two bond issues for reimbursing developers failed, the water authority won voter approval for bonds that did not specifically call for purchasing the water and sewer facilities. The trial court granted summary judgment for developers, denying the jurisdictional plea. The appeals court reversed in part and rendered judgment against the developers, holding that the water authority did not have immunity but that the contract was not breached. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this case in which Gaytan alleges an acne treatment at a spa discolored her the issues are (1) whether her claim is for health-care liability claim; (2) whether a court may view an amended petition filed after the 120-day expert report deadline to determine whether a claim is subject to the medical-liability act; and (3) whether, if dismissed, defendants are entitled to legal fees.

In this defamation case based on litigation publicity the principal issues are (1) whether the judicial-proceedings privilege or attorney-immunity doctrine protected out-of-court press releases and social media posts and, if not, (2) whether the appeals court erred by affirming more than a nominal sanctions award under the Texas Citizens Participation Act.

The principal issues are (1) whether the law-of-the-case doctrine bars Lennar's complaint that the court of appeals wrongly defined property damage because Lennar, as the successful party in a previous appeal, did not challenge the point in the earlier appeal; (2) whether the costs submitted to the jury were covered costs under the excess-insurance policy--that is, whether Lennar's incurred costs to determine water damage in homes was "because of" property damage and whether Lennar properly segregated covered from uncovered costs; and (3) whether Lennar was legally liable to homeowners for repairs attributed to a faulty stucco simulant to avoid a settlement-without-consent clause in the policy that barred coverage. In this case Lennar sued Markel and other insurers for refusing to pay repair costs Lennar incurred to remedy problems, actual and prospective, to homes it sold with the defective imitation stucco. Markel's policy with Lennar covered damages because of "property damage." In the earlier appeal the appeals court established damages categories that excluded costs to remove the imitation stucco to inspect homes for water damage attributed to the defective product. From a jury verdict on remand for Lennar, the court of appeals reversed in part because it held the defined damages were broader than it allowed in the initial appeal. The appeals court also determined Markel should not pay because Lennar did not prove its liability to homeowners or seek Markel's permission to make the repairs it did.

The issue in this case is whether an arbitration agreement in a recorded deed runs with the land and therefore binds the home's successive purchasers.

The issue is whether a hospital visitor's lawsuit for injuries from a fall on a wet lobby floor constitutes a health care-liability claim requiring a threshold expert report to proceed. After her fall, Ross sued the hospital for premises liability but did not file an expert report. As her claim was pending, the Court decided Texas West Oaks Hospital LP v. Williams, holding that a suit by a hospital employee injured by a patient constituted a health care-liability claim. The trial court dismissed Ross's claim, determining that hers also was a health-care claim that required an expert evaluation. The appeals court affirmed.

The issue is whether a default is imputed to a probate applicant presenting a will that had been filed before but outside the requisite time restriction.

In this interlocutory appeal from a denial of a special appearance, the issues are (1) whether specific personal jurisdiction exists over defendants who were in Texas twice to discuss asbestos liability, executed agreements in Texas to divest themselves of liability and transferred an affiliate company to a trust to a Texas management company to do so; (2) whether the trial court's implied special-appearance findings should be reviewed de novo in the absence of live testimony; and (3) whether pleading defendant companies' jurisdictional contacts as a group satisfies the initial burden to plead contacts for each.

The issue is whether a purchaser who bought a yacht "as is" from a seller, the yacht's second owner, may claim breach of an implied merchantability warranty that allegedly occurred when the boat's engines were shipped by the manufacturer. In this case the appeals court reversed the trial court's judgment for Man Engines, relying on Nobility Homes of Texas v. Shivers. That case, in 1977, held that a buyer who purchases used goods may sue a manufacturer for breaching an implied warranty that the product will work as intended based on the initial sale, without the need for contract privity between the later buyer and the manufacturer.

10-0513 ?Matthew W. Wasserman, M.D. v. Christina Bergeron Gugel? from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston? For petitioner: Holly H. Williamson, Houston ?For respondent: Reginald E. McKamie, Houston? For Amicus Curiae: Christopher Kaiser, Austin The issue is a whether a sexual assault alleged during a medical examination constitutes a health-care liability claim that would require an expert report. Gugel sued Wasserman for inappropriately touching her genitalia during an examination to determine the cause of pain and numbness in her lower back and legs and claimed he sexually harassed her in later calls. Wasserman moved to dismiss Gugel's complaint because she did not file a health-care expert report. The trial court denied the doctor's motion and the court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this challenge to a redemption order are (1) whether substantial compliance satisfies Tax Code section 32.21 redemption requirements, in this case payment tendered within 180 days of the property sale, and (2) whether the estate substantially complied despite failing to tender property taxes and insurance.

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Patricia Limmer, et al. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Mike A. Hatchell, Austin For cross-petitioners/respondents: Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas, and David Gunn, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether state negligence claim is preempted if federal money improved a railroad crossing. In this case involving a fatal car-train collision, the principal issues are (1) whether federal law preempts a state negligence claim alleging inadequate warning at an "extra-hazardous" railroad crossing if remedial provisions were provided under federal programs and (2) whether a party objecting to a jury instruction allegedly presenting an erroneous negligence theory must also object to the form of an apportionment question including the erroneous theory. Missouri Pacific argues that federal law preempts the negligence claim, but Limmer counters that the railroad did not establish federal money was used for a warning device at the accident crossing. Limmer also contends that Missouri Pacific failed to object properly to the apportionment-of-damages jury question. The trial court set damages based on a jury finding the railroad was 85 percent negligent in part because the warning sign was obscured by rock piles and overgrown vegetation. The court of appeals reversed.

In this appeal from summary judgment on indemnity under an exchange agreement, the issues are (1) whether a pre-bankruptcy exchange agreement was executory under the Bankruptcy Code and (2) whether the appeals court misconstrued the asset-purchase agreement and bankruptcy plan under Texas contract law.

In this tax dispute the issues are (1) whether public open-enrollment charter schools that use state money to lease campus property are exempt from ad-valorem taxes under Texas law and (2) whether the appeals court improperly interpreted Texas Education Code section 12.128 - providing such leased property to be public property "for all purposes" under state law - to apply only when a charter school's charter is revoked.

08-0890 Offshore Specialty Fabricators Inc., et al. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies Ltd., et al. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner Houston Exploration Co., S. Shawn Stephens, Houston For petitioner Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Harry L. Scarborough, Houston For respondents: Glenn R. Legge, Houston A principal issue in this insurance appeal is whether lined-through policy language should be considered as evidence that parties did not intend coverage. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, under contract to build an offshore oil platform, sued the underwriters when they refused to pay under an "all-risks" policy for keeping repair ships on standby during storms in the Gulf of Mexico. In contracting for coverage, the parties crossed through language providing "standby charges." The trial court granted the offshore-rig builder summary judgment, ruling that the crossed-through language showed intent for a policy that otherwise was not ambiguous. In reversing that, the appeals court held that the stricken language showed unambiguous intent not to cover standby changes. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

This case concerns the interpretation of an excess insurance policy that follows an underlying policy, except where the terms, conditions, definitions, and exclusions of the policies conflict.

At issue in this case is whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that a doctor's negligence caused a young girl's suicide.

The primary issues in this case are whether (1) a release in the parties' settlement agreement bars claims that arose during the negotiation of the agreement; (2) a disclaimer of reliance in the same agreement is enforceable and bars omission-based fraud claims; and (3) the settlement agreement revoked a previous agreement's arbitration provision, despite the previous agreement's delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitration tribunal.

This and the related 12-0199 action involve a royalty-owners class suing for underpayment the issues are (1) whether interlocutory review or relief by mandamus or prohibition are proper to force the trial court to reconsider class certification by res judicata issues the Court arguably ordered be reconsidered on remand in the previous appeal, Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co.; (2) whether the Supreme Court has interlocutory jurisdiction to review the trial court's addition of implied-covenant-to-market claims on remand by the certified class and (3) whether the implied-covenant-to-market claims should be struck as matter of law. As to the first issue, Phillips and ConocoPhillips argue that Bowden required reconsideration of the class certification based on the res judicata issues. Yarbrough counters that Bowden confirmed class certification of the subclass in this appeal and ordered res judicata be considered only if the trial court certified a new class.

06-0867 Pine Oak Builders Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Insurance Co. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Joseph H. Pedigo, Houston, and Joe S. Yardas, Conroe For respondent: Jennifer Bruch Hogan, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the principal issue of when duty to defend is triggered and whether evidence extrinsic to pleadings may be admitted to invoke a policy's duty to defend. The principal issues are (1) whether evidence outside the pleadings and policy provisions may be introduced to determine a duty to defend and (2) whether the "exposure rule" or "manifestation rule" should determine when the duty to defend is triggered under an insurance policy. In this case Pine Oak sued two insurers with which it had commercial general liability policies (each insurer for a different policy period) after the insurers refused to defend the homebuilder from lawsuits filed by home buyers. Both insurers argued Pine Oak's policies did not cover the home buyers' claims. Great American contends its policy with Pine Oak did not cover Pine Oak's own work - but would cover subcontractors' work - and one home buyer's suit only cited Pine Oak's work in its allegations. In that case, Pine Oak argues that it should be allowed to prove by evidence beyond the lawsuit pleadings that a subcontractor's work was at issue. Great American argues that its duty to defend Pine Oak also should depend on when the construction defects were manifest rather than when the exposure to harmful conditions began. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurers. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to show coverage, but reversed on when coverage was triggered.

The issues are (1) whether minority shareholders' claims fall within the scope of the forum-selection clause in the shareholders' agreement; (2) whether a forum-selection clause in an amended shareholders' agreement can be enforced against a minority shareholder who did not sign the amended version; and (3) whether defendant officers who did not sign the shareholders' agreement can enforce the forum-selection clause.

04-0431 PR Investments and Specialty Retailers Inc. v. State of Texas from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston The principal issue is whether a road-design change deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to review condemnation damages when those damages were based on a different design. In this case PR Investments and Specialty Retailers argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the appeal because the Transportation Department eliminated the design to which they agreed for access from a street to their property. The department notified them of the change just before a trial de novo on a condemnation award. Instead of dismissing the proceeding, the trial court initially gave the department three options, including the one the department took that allowed it to proceed on the new design but likely face an inverse-condemnation lawsuit. Later the court granted PR Investments and Specialty Retailers' dismissal motion, based on their jurisdiction argument, and ordered the department to pay sanctions. The court of appeals affirmed. On rehearing before the entire court, it split 5-4, holding that the condemnation statute does not prohibit the department from changing its design plans even if that change prejudices landowners. The court also held that the statute does not require that issues in a condemnation appeal be the same as what special commissioners considered in awarding damages.

The issue is whether child-support payments should be credited when made directly to a day care facility and private school instead of, as the divorce decree specifies, to the court registry. Victoria Ochsner sued for child support owed because for years he paid tuition and daycare expenses directly to providers. The original decree provided that he pay $563 a month for their daughter to attend a certain day care center, in addition to $250 a month to Victoria Ochsner as child support. Once their child quit going to the specific day-care center, the decree stipulated that he was to pay $800 a month child support through the Harris County Child Support Center and, if he did not pay into the court registry, he might not get credit for payments. When their daughter quit going to the day care center, Preston Ochsner continued to pay for day care to another place and private-school tuition - by agreement with his ex-wife, he argues - rather than pay the $800 a month in child support. The Ochsners stipulated that he paid $22,000 more than he would have if he had paid $800 a month into the court registry. The trial court ruled that he was not in arrears on child support, but the court of appeals in a split decision held the parents' oral agreement was unenforceable and was not an approved modification of the decree. The appeals court determined he owed $55,000 in unpaid child support.

The principal issues in this appeal from client sanctions for alleged litigation abuse are (1) whether Dr. Nath waived his challenge to the sanctions in the Supreme Court; (2) whether the sanctions - more than $1.3 million for attorney fees for two defendants - were unbridled; and (3) whether the sanctions violate constitutional protections established in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell. The trial court imposed sanctions against Dr. Nath after finding his suit, amended as many as six times, lacked legal or factual bases. The appeals court affirmed.

The principal issues in this fraud and contract-interference case are (1) whether Texas courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Parex, a Canadian company; if so, (2) whether Parex's separate Bermuda subsidiary ratified Parex Canada's pre-incorporation jurisdictional conduct as its promoter; and (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supports specific personal jurisdiction over Ramshorn International, a Colombia company, based in part on a subsidiary's employee's conduct as agent.

08-0148 Regal Finance Co. Ltd. and Regal Finance Co. II Ltd. v. Tex Star Motors Inc. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Russell S. Post, Houston For respondent: Eugene B. Wilshire, Houston A principal issue is whether the Uniform Commercial Code's provision governing a secured creditor's sale of collateral requires compliance with industry practice as proof that the sale is commercially reasonable. In this case Regal sued Tex Star, a used-car dealer, to collect the deficiency between the amount it got from selling repossessed cars and the outstanding amount owed on the car-loan notes Regal bought from Tex Star. Regal's agreement to buy notes from Tex Star obligated Tex Star to pay the unpaid balance on a defaulted note. This lawsuit arose from a dispute over which company was responsible for assuring a reserve account a bank required. The trial court awarded damages to Regal, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Regal presented insufficient evidence that it sold the repossessed cars in a commercially reasonable way. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 09-0396 Reid Road Municipal Utility District No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores Inc. Ltd. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: C. Charles Dippel, Houston For respondent: Bill Russell, Victoria The principal issue is whether a corporate agent under the property-owner rule - allowing a property owner to testify to its value even if unqualified to assess property belonging to someone else - is competent to testify to corporate property's value. Speedy Stop challenged a $9,300 condemnation award for a water easement, putting on as a valuation expert the general partner's vice president charged with property acquisitions. He testified to a $62,000 property-value loss. The trial court granted a no-evidence summary judgment for the utility district, ruling that the vice president, who was not a broker or licensed appraiser, could not testify because the property-owner rule did not apply to a corporate entity. The court of appeals reversed.This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue, based on denial of a dismissal motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act, is whether an off-duty police officer using deadly force outside his jurisdiction during an arrest is acting outside the scope of his employment.

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0658 Carroll Robinson, et al. v. Bill White, City of Houston and Houston City Council, et al. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Andy Taylor, Houston For respondents: Scott J. Atlas, Houston The principal issues are (1) whether proponents who drafted and campaigned for a proposition and voted for it have standing to sue to declare it effective and, if so, (2) whether a "poison pill" provision associated with a competing proposition violates state law. In this case Robinson drafted and promoted Proposition 2, for a city revenue cap, which Houston voters approved in 2004 but by a smaller margin than a proposition for a property-tax revenue cap on the same ballot. The City Council refused to adopt Proposition 2 because of a provision associated with Prop 1, that among inconsistent propositions the proposition approved by most voters would prevail, and because of a similar City Charter provision. The trial court granted summary judgment to Robinson and the other Prop 2 organizers, but the court of appeals reversed and dismissed their claims, holding the organizers did not have standing. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

06-0714 Barbara Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas For respondents: Thomas R. Phillips, Austin, and Kimberly R. Stuart, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether House Bill 4's "innocent successor" limits on asbestos liability violate the constitutional prohibition by retroactive application. The issue is whether the "innocent successor" limits on asbestos-related liability that House Bill 4 imposes (Civil Remedies and Practices Code Chapter 149) are unconstitutional either (1) as applied retroactively to an accrued cause of action or (2) as a special law. In this case Robinson appealed from a partial summary judgment in Crown Cork's favor. Crown Cork moved for the summary judgment based on House Bill 4 provision that became effective after Robinson sued over her husband's death from asbestos-related cancer. That provision, made applicable to pending cases, limited liability for asbestos claims involving companies that had acquired asbestos manufacturers before May 1968. In its summary-judgment motion, Crown Cork argued that it met the statutory limit on liability because it had paid more in asbestos claims than the market value of the asbestos manufacturer it acquired in 1966.

In this appeal, from a jurisdictional plea denied in a breach-of-contract case against an development-development corporation, the issue is whether the economic-development agency is protected by governmental immunity.

The issues are (1) whether the trial court has authority to award attorney fees as "necessities" for child support when the nature of the action is modification and not enforcement and, if so, (2) whether awarding 6 percent compound interest on those fees abused the trial court's discretion. Tucker sued his ex-wife, Thomas, to modify final orders to give him exclusive right to designate his children's primary residence. In her counterclaim Thomas sought sole managing conservatorship and increased child support from Tucker. The trial court denied Tucker's relief and Thomas's request to be appointed joint managing conservator, but increased Tucker's child support. The court awarded Thomas attorney fees as child support, finding the fees necessities benefiting the children. The appeals court affirmed in a split decision by the whole court.

The principal issues are (1) whether a city zoning ordinance more restrictive on locating a concrete-crushing plant than the Texas Clean Air Act allows is preempted by either the statute or the state constitution and (2) whether the zoning ordinance violates the Local Government Code's uniformity-of-requirements provision by imposing its restriction years after the company's state-permit process was begun. In this case the company sued to declare the zoning ordinance impermissibly in conflict with the state's permit. The city denied Southern Crushed Concrete's application after the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality issued its permit. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's ruling for the city.

The issue is whether the Harris County Flood Control District's plan to demolish a bridge to widen a bayou triggered the district's statutory obligation to pay for relocating the telephone company's equipment across the bridge (by making the relocation necessary). The district contends the bridge demolition was not necessary, but Houston ordered it as part of a city public-works project that, by ordinance, obligated AT&T Texas (Southwestern Bell's business moniker) to pay its own relocation costs. AT&T argues that the district's flood-control plan had been in the works since 1998, calling for bridge demolition, and that Houston belatedly claimed the project as its own. The trial court granted the district's jurisdictional plea. Interpreting the Water Code's provision that would shift relocation costs to the flood-control district, the court of appeals affirmed, holding Houston, not the district, made AT&T's equipment relocation necessary.

The issue is whether the Harris County clerk's plans to send mail-in ballot applications to all county voters should be halted as illegal, beyond the clerk's specified powers under the Texas Election Code, that will cause irreparable harm if not stopped. In this case the trial court denied the state's request for a temporary injunction because it determined the Harris County clerk had authority to send unsolicited mail-in ballot applications because no statute forbids him. The appeals court denied the state's interlocutory appeal, holding the state could not demonstrate irreparable harm.

The question presented in this case is whether attorney immunity applies to an alleged violation of both the Texas Wiretap Act, Texas Penal Code § 16.02(b), and the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).

A principal issue is whether the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss department employees from a wrongful-death lawsuit under the Texas Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision when the plaintiff added federal Section 1983 claims while the department's dismissal motion was pending. Cannon sued the department and employees, alleging tort claims, after her son, a patient at the Brenham State School, died after employees restrained him. In a jurisdictional plea, the department asserted sovereign immunity, then moved to dismiss claims against the employees, arguing that Cannon could not sue both the department and the employees. Before the trial court acted on that dismissal motion, Cannon dropped her tort claims and amended the suit to allege only federal civil-rights violations under Section 1983. But the department contends claims against the employees effectively were dismissed when it moved to dismiss because the statute makes dismissal mandatory. In its review, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to drop the claims against the employees.

10-0603 Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Frederick Williams from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Ryan L. Clement, Houston For respondent: Charles M. Hessel, Houston The issue is whether a hospital employee's negligence claim against his employer based on a fight with a paranoid-schizophrenic patient is a health care-liability claim and, if so, whether the employee is a "claimant" under the statute who must file an expert report. Williams, injured in the fight that resulted in the patient's death, sued the hospital after the patient's estate named him as well as the hospital in a health care-liability claim. In his cross claims, Williams alleged the hospital did not train him adequately to handle dangerous patients or adequately warn or supervise him with the patient. The hospital moved to dismiss Williams' suit because he did not submit a health care-liability expert report. The trial court denied the dismissal motion and the court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0770 City of Houston v. Steve Williams, et al. from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Reagan D. Pratt, Houston For cross-petitioners/respondents: Vincent L. Marable III, Wharton The issues in this case by firefighters claiming the city miscalculated vacation and sick-leave benefits upon retirement are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal; (2) whether city ordinances are written contracts that would waive governmental immunity; and (3) whether the firefighters have standing to sue, based on or despite "meet-and-confer" or collective-bargaining agreements. A principal factor is whether the city ordinances governing these retirement benefits amount to a contract as defined by Local Government Code section 271.151(a)(2) - "a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services" - that would waive governmental immunity. The court of appeals held that the ordinances constituted a unilateral contract accepted by the firefighters when they began work. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

This case challenging the city's retirement-pay calculations for firefighters raises two principal issues: (1) whether the Local Government Code (section 142.0017) requires the city to pay overtime for approved absences and (2) whether a state statute preempts the city's ordinance governing retirement pay by explicitly defining "salary" and making that definition mandatory. Bates and other firefighters sued the city for failing to calculate overtime pay in their lump sum "termination pay" that normally included leftover vacation and sick days. The city claims they had been paid overtime by mistake when they were working and deducted it from their termination pay. They also allege the city miscalculated their regular salaries, reducing their termination payments. The trial court found for the firefighters on both claims. The appeals court affirmed.

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0551 State of Texas v. Charles Lynn Brownlow and Marlene H. Brownlow from Brazoria County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Lisa Marie McClain, Austin For respondents: Bud Arnot, Houston The issue is whether the Department of Transportation's permanent easement for a water-detention pond adjacent to a widened highway allows the state to excavate soil from the easement for highway work miles away. Claiming inverse condemnation, the Brownlows sued the state for unconstitutionally taking their property, arguing they owned the dirt. Their permanent easement resulted from an earlier challenge to the state's effort to take a fee-simple interest in their land. The trial court dismissed the Brownlows' suit on the state's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals reversed, holding the state did not have sovereign immunity because the easement did not transfer the soil's ownership from the Brownlows to the state. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 09-0005 Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Joyce Crump from Fort Bend County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: David Brenner, Austin For respondent: Peter M. Kelly, Houston A principal issue is whether "producing cause" in a workers compensation death-benefits determination must meet the definition for producing cause established in Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma (a 2007 products-liability case) - a cause that, in a natural sequence, produces a result (in this case, death) and without which the result would not have occurred. Another issues is whether a treating physician's expert testimony based on "differential diagnosis" was reliable. In this case Crump won death benefits under workers compensation for her husband's death after Transcontinental contested her claim. Transcontinental argued that the work-related injury, a knee contusion, was not the producing cause of several complications that led to Mr. Crump's death because those complications related to Crump's being prone to infection following a kidney transplant 15 years before. A jury determined the knee injury was the producing cause of death. The court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues are (1) whether under Timberwalk and elaborating cases a court must conduct an independent analysis of a crime risk's unreasonableness and (2) whether the crime was foreseeable in this case under Timberwalk and its progeny.

The issues are (1) whether M.D. Anderson used tangible personal property during surgery, defeating Anderson's immunity defense, and, if so, (2) whether that use proximately caused the surgery patient's death.

The issues in this equal-and-uniform-taxation challenge are (1) whether the trial court has jurisdiction if the property owner only challenges certain component parts of the property, each with a separately assigned tax account, but not all; (2) whether the owner must prove the component parts can be separately valued apart from those parts that have not been challenged; (3) whether the owner must show evidence (and by what sufficiency standard) explaining the exclusion of unchallenged component parts; and (4) whether evidence of other refineries' valuations may be - and how so - legally sufficient to support an equal-and-uniform challenge.

The issues are (1) whether the implied revocation doctrine applies outside the real-estate context; (2) whether a debtor's notice of a creditor's future effective contract to assign debt impliedly revokes an offer to settle the debt with the creditor; and, if the offer was not revoked, (3) whether emails between Tauch and the bank that was originally the creditor form a valid contract.

Among principal issues in this oil-platform-injury case, involving for liability purposes the contention that the injured worker was a "borrowed" employee, are (1) whether such an employee's status is always a legal determination for the court; (2) whether disputed facts preclude the trial court from rendering judgment despite the evidence; and, if the borrowed-servant question is not one of law and if fact questions prohibited judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (3) whether enough evidence supports the jury's finding that the worker was not a borrowed employee.

In this case alleging a county commissioner improperly caused a county engineer to delay a plat application, a principal issue is whether the commissioner acted without authority - thus without government-immunity protection - when he instructed the engineer to hold up the plat application to get the developer to build a wider road.

In this personal-injury case involving a temporary garbage-truck worker, the issue is whether a contract specifying temporary workers as independent contractors defeats summary judgment when evidence shows Waste Management's actual control over the worker when he was injured.

The principal issues are (1) whether Texas' constitutional home equity-lending provisions preclude as personal liability attorney fees awarded against the homeowners in a declaratory action on a home-loan default and (2) whether the appeals court erred by reframing declaratory-judgment pleadings to be pleadings instead for injunctive relief (by the homeowners) and contract breach (by the bank). In this case the Murphys sued Wells Fargo, seeking a declaration that the bank was not entitled to foreclose on the home-equity debt. Wells Fargo counterclaimed that the Murphys were obligated to make payments on the loan, failed to do so and were in default. The trial court ruled for the bank and awarded attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed all but the fees award, holding that neither the Murphys nor the bank sought declaratory relief and, because of that, Wells Fargo could recover attorney fees against the property but not against the Murphys personally.

This car-crash case involves arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, charge error, and damages.

In this case alleging breach of a construction contract, the principal issues are (1) whether Texas law recognizes common-law exceptions to contractual no-damages-for-delay clauses for actions constituting arbitrary and capricious conduct, active interference, bad faith or fraud and (2) whether Zachry's partial lien release unambiguously released its claims that the Port of Houston Authority improperly withheld payments as liquidated damages. Zachry sued over its contract to build the port authority a wharf on the Baytown Ship Channel, alleging the port authority penalized Zachry for missing deadlines that Zachry contended resulted from changes the port authority ordered in how Zachry was building the wharf. In its judgment, the trial court awarded Zachry almost $20 million in damages. The appeals court reversed, ordering Zachry to take nothing on its claims.