Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Paula Ledbetter, et al. from Jones County and the 11th District Court of Appeals, Eastland For petitioner: Mary A. Keeney, Austin For respondents: Lance Hall, Sweetwater The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether challenge to nonsuit leaving only an estate in case workers comp insurer claims subrogation rights. Principal issues are (1) whether a challenge to a trial court's granting a nonsuit should be reviewed for abuse of discretion or de novo; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the nonsuit to be granted; and (3) whether Texas Mutual's intervention plea was proper. In this case Texas Mutual, which had been paying Ledbetter death benefits under a workers compensation policy, petitioned to intervene in a settlement hearing in a negligence suit Ledbetter filed. The insurance company claimed it had subrogation rights against the settlement proceeds for benefits it had paid. At that hearing, Ledbetter moved to drop all plaintiffs bringing claims over her husband's death, leaving only his estate in the suit. The trial court granted the nonsuit, struck Texas Mutual's intervention, ordered that it was not entitled to reimbursement and that it must continue payments. In this Court, Texas Mutual argues that the decision to grant the nonsuit must be reviewed in its entirety and that the nonsuit was improper because it prejudiced Texas Mutual's claim for affirmative relief by an adverse party. The court of appeals held that the nonsuit did not affect Texas Mutual's subrogation rights but that the trial court erred by striking the intervention.

07-0055 In re Gulf Exploration LLC, et al. from Midland County and the 11th District Court of Appeals, Eastland For relators: James M. Chaney, Oklahoma City For real party in interest: Brad Miller, Midland The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the principal issues are whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review a trial court order compelling arbitration and, if so, whether the appeals court erred by vacating the order on grounds that claims were outside the scope of the arbitration clause. In this case working interest partners in an oil- and gas-development agreement moved to arbitrate their claim that the operating partner, Great Western, used an acquired lease adjacent to the development tract to drill offset wells that drew from the reservoir subject to their development agreement and that, under the operating agreement, the operating partners should have been given a right to participate. The agreement included an arbitration provision covering claims over areas of "mutual interest." The trial court granted the arbitration motion, but the court of appeals in a mandamus action ordered the trial court to rescind the arbitration order because the claim was beyond the scope of the arbitration provision.

07-0760 Greg Tanner and Maribel Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. from Caldwell County and the 11th District Court of Appeals, Eastland For petitioners: Don R. Cotton, Austin For respondents: Chris Heinemeyer, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether fleeing driver's hard braking before wreck during police chase voids willful conduct used to avoid insurance coverage. The issue in this insurance-coverage dispute resulting from a high-speed police chase is whether sufficient evidence exists to conclude that the fleeing driver engaged in willful and intentional conduct when he collided with the Tanners' car. When he hit the Tanners' car, the pursued driver was braking hard. The Tanners and their two children were injured and sued the driver, but Nationwide, which insured him, sued to declare the policy did not cover the accident because it resulted from willful and intentional conduct. Jurors found in favor of the Tanners, but the trial court held Nationwide had no duty to defend the driver or to indemnify him. The court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0520 Ed Vanegas, et al. v. American Energy Services, et al. from Midland County and the 11th District Court of Appeals, Eastland For petitioners: Allen R. Stroder, Odessa For respondents: Harper Estes, Midland The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether promise is illusory to share future merger proceeds for at-will worker's staying with company. The issue is whether an alleged oral promise to share proceeds from a merger, conditioned on employees remaining with a young company, was illusory because the employees worked at-will and were subject to firing at any time. Vanegas and other employees sued AES for breaching a contract under which they claim AES promised them 5 percent of proceeds from selling the company if they would continue working for it until it was sold or merged. The trial court granted AES's summary-judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the contract, being illusory, could not be support the promised bonus because the company could fire the workers at any time. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0989 Italian Cowboy Partners Ltd., et al. v. The Prudential Insurance Co. of America, et al. from Dallas County and the 11th District Court of Appeals, Eastland For petitioners: Thomas F. Allen Jr., Dallas For respondents: G. Luke Ashley, Dallas Among issues in this restaurant lease dispute over recurring sewer odors are (1) whether a lease provision disclaiming any representations not set out in the lease negates reliance to sustain fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims and (2) whether the implied warranty that leased premises will be suitable for the intended occupation was not implicated because the lease obligated the restaurant owners to make certain repairs. In its suit, Italian Cowboy Partnership claimed the property manager knew of the building's odor problems when another restaurant occupied it, but said the previous tenant did not have problems and continued to maintain the sewer odors had not existed before when the partnership encountered them. Prudential, the building owner, argues that the lease clearly establishes no other representations were made about the property except those written in the lease and that the lease by its terms represented the entire agreement. The trial court rescinded the lease and awarded the partnership damages. On review, the court of appeals reversed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Chief Justice Jefferson not sitting) 09-0306 Betty Yvon Lesley, et al. v. Texas Veterans Land Board, et al. from Erath County and the 11th District Court of Appeals, Eastland For petitioners: Chris Aycock and Charles Tighe, Midland For respondent: Bluegreen Southwest One, Laura H. Burney, San Antonio For respondents lot owners: Stephen E. Haynes, Brownwood The issue is whether a residential developer holding executive mineral rights breached its duty to other mineral interest-holders by failing to lease oil and gas rights or by using restrictive covenants to prevent the mineral interests' development. In this action, arising after the Barnett Shale exploration and development west of Fort Worth, lesser mineral interest-holders sued the developer and lot owners (including the Veterans Land Board) to declare as unenforceable covenants prohibiting oil-and-gas drilling in a ranchette community. Non-executive interest-holders also contend the developer's refusal to lease the mineral rights breached a duty to lease owed to lesser mineral interest-holders. The trial court found for the non-executive interest-holders. But the appeals court held the executive mineral interest-holder only owed lesser interest-holders a duty against self-dealing if it decided to lease mineral rights. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's ruling that the Veterans Land Board did not have sovereign immunity because the interest-holders sought damages. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this case are (1) whether an arbitration provision may be found unconscionable absent evidence that the party asserting that would be prejudiced and (2) whether an allegedly unconscionable arbitration provision may be severed if a party does not invoke a severance clause. In an agreement with Venture to buy and market their cotton, Freeman and other farmers agreed to arbitrate under a clause that provided the farmers would be liable for attorney and arbitration fees if they breached the contract. Venture did not face similar liability if it breached. Freeman and the other farmers sued for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and deceptive-trade practices. On a motion to compel arbitration, the trial court ruled the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable. The appeals court affirmed, reasoning the farmers were forced to forgo substantive rights and remedies if they prevailed on their claims.

In this case contesting the royalty value of minerals recovered by carbon-dioxide-injection, the principal issues are (1) whether the gas should be valued in its "native" state, before extraction, or at the wellhead commingled with CO2; (2) whether removing, compressing and transporting CO2 should be classified as production operations; and (3) whether CO2 removed at an off-site processing plant for reuse is a production or post-production operation. French and other royalty owners sued Occidental, the field producer, for paying royalties on 70 percent of gas production, not 100 percent they allege they're owed under their leases. The trial court found for the royalty owners. But the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Occidental, holding that production and post-production processing occurred at the CO2-extraction plant and the royalty owners' failure to apportion these costs made their evidence legally insufficient to prove Occidental underpaid royalties due.

The issue is whether Linegar has standing to sue for legal malpractice and related claims if his only injury was losing his retirement money held by a corporate trustee. This case involves a temporary loan that Linegar, as chair, director and sole shareholder of the corporate trustee holding his retirement fund, authorized from the retirement fund to a company in which he was the largest shareholder. That company, IdentiPHI Inc., resulted from a merger between a company Linegar controlled and a Seattle company. Linegar alleges DLA Piper, which represented the Seattle company in the merger and became the new company's counsel, later represented him in the details of the temporary financing for the new company. Linegar claims, however, that DLA Piper failed to secure the loan properly and, when the new company declared bankruptcy, his retirement fund was his direct loss, not the corporate trustee's, and his alleged malpractice claim arose from DLA Piper's advice to him. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded Linegar the retirement fund's value and other damages. The appeals court reversed, holding that Linegar did not have standing to sue as a shareholder because the loan was from the corporate trustee.

The issue is whether mental-anguish damages may be recovered in a negligence action by a son alleging a funeral home illegally cremated his mother's body when he did not have a contract with the funeral home.

The issue is whether Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 95 applies to a negligent-hiring claim against a well operator for a contract employee's death at the drill site.

In this contract-breach case a principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by requiring a jury question on readiness, willingness and ability to perform when the parties stipulated before trial that relief would be specific performance if an enforceable contract were found.

The issues in this dispute over a secondary lease term with a continuous-drilling provision are (1) whether the appeals court properly construed the retained-acreage clause to limit carryover days extending the lease's 150-day drilling requirement from one term only to the next and, if so, (2) whether the language is so "clear, precise and unequivocal" to enforce it as a special limitation on the grant. Under the continuous-drilling clause, mineral interests on undeveloped acreage would revert to the landowner in this case unless the lease operator undertook continuous development operations. Under the lease the operator "shall have the right to accumulate unused days in any 150-day term during the continuous development program in order to extend the next allowed 150-day term between the completion of one well and the drilling of a subsequent well."

In this tax-appraisal case the issues are (1) whether the county employed a "tax ferret" illegally, prompting dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and (2) whether Kinder Morgan lost its opportunity to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act because it acted under a second amended petition that it argues implicated its rights under the Citizens Participation Act and was a new "legal action" that restarted the statutory clock.

This case concerns a dispute between two families, the Mulkeys and the Whites over whether the 1924 deed conveying the estate from the Mulkeys to the Whites, which reserved "one-half of one-eighth" of the mineral rights in the Mulkeys, left the Mulkeys with 1/2 or 1/16 of the mineral estate.

The issues in this case are (1) whether Mike Morath, commissioner of the Texas Education Agency, acted ultra vires by appointing a board of managers to exercise authority over Houston ISD, and by assigning a conservator to oversee Houston ISD's governance; (2) whether Dr. Doris Delaney, the conservator appointed by Commissioner Morath, had the authority to suspend Houston ISD's superintendent search; and (3) whether the trial court must reconsider its temporary injunction under the Texas Education Code as amended by Senate Bill 1365.

The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff-farmers presented sufficient reliable evidence to survive a no evidence motion for summary judgment that herbicide from the defendant's aerial application caused their alleged injuries.

This oil-and-gas lease dispute involves what respondents Apollo Exploration, Cogent Exploration, and Sellmoco's rights are under purchase and sale agreements entered into with petitioner Apache Corporation.