The issue is whether an action to recover on a dishonored check should be considered essentially a contract suit that allows awarding . In this case 1/2 Price Checks Cashed sued after United refused to pay on a check its bank would not honor. The trial court awarded attorneys fees, but the court of appeals reversed, citing its decision in Time Out Grocery v. The Vanguard Group. United argues that a contract, for attorneys fees recoverable by statute, must be a bilateral agreement. Half-Price contends Civil Practices and Remedies Code 38.001 extends to statutory obligations, citing Medical City Dallas v. Carlisle Corp. (allowing attorneys fees for warranty-breach action).

The issue in this case is whether a title dispute permits a payor of oil-and-gas proceeds to withhold payments without interest under the safe-harbor provision of the Texas Natural Resources Code. The safe-harbor statute permits payors of oil-and-gas proceeds to withhold payments without interest if there is a payee title dispute that would affect distribution of payments or reasonable doubt as to the payee's clear title.

The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether 'safe harbor' element was shown in dram shop action. The principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by holding that a bar and pool hall owner failed to establish a "safe harbor" under Texas' statutory dram shop law by proving that it did not encourage employees to serve alcohol to an intoxicated customer. Parker sued 20801, the owner of Slick Willie's, alleging that its employees provided him perhaps 15 free drinks at the bar's grand opening before he was assaulted in the parking lot by another bar patron. Parker claimed the drinks were a proximate cause of the head injuries he suffered in the fight. The trial court granted summary judgment to 20801 Inc., but the court of appeals reversed on the safe harbor provision.

A main issue is whether a creditor's bona fide protections pass to a subsequent purchaser if the property is purchased through a receivership sale rather than through foreclosure.

The issues are (1) whether a property owner may be liable to an independent contractor's employee for negligent entrustment of equipment; (2) whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 95 applies to negligent entrustment; (3) whether a reference to the defendant as a "slave master" in closing argument was reversible error, even in the absence of black jurors; and (4) whether the jury was improperly charged by broad form submitting comparative responsibility for negligent entrustment together with premises liability.

In this case alleging a financial institution lost documentation creating a survivorship right in a joint account, the principal issues are (1) whether Texas Probate Code section 439(a) bars extrinsic evidence of intent in a contract-breach claim over creation of the joint-tenancy account and (2) whether the "intertwining" exception to the duty to segregate attorney's fees should include fees recovery in a related federal court proceeding. Beyer sued A.G. Edwards & Sons for conversion and breach of contract, among other claims, after the company allegedly lost an agreement that would have made Beyer joint owner of her father's investment account and sole owner when he died. Four days before her father lapsed into a coma, A.G. Edwards told her the agreement was missing, then froze the $1.19 million account after he died. When Beyer initially sued for negligence, the company submitted the proceeds to federal court to determine ownership. In this case Beyer sought as damages the money from the account split among her siblings to settle the interpleader action in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed a breach-of-contract verdict, admitting evidence that showed the father's intent to create the joint account, and affirmed attorneys fees that were not segregated because the court held the fees were inextricably intertwined.

In this health care-liability claim, a principal issue is whether a chiropractor's expert testimony was improper to establish the duty to inform. Felton sued after he suffered a stroke as Dr. Lovett manipulated Felton's neck to relieve pain. Doctors determined the stroke resulted from a tear in a spinal artery. A jury found for Lovett on Felton's negligence claim, but for Felton on his second claim, that Lovett failed to inform him of the risk posed by the neck manipulation. The court of appeals reversed, noting Felton's expert, a chiropractor, testified that neck manipulations were risky only if a problem exists with the spinal artery or if the adjustment were performed improperly. In this appeal Felton argues that the appeals court relied on the chiropractor's opinion as it addressed causation, which he was not qualified by statute to give.

The primary issue in these cases is whether an executive order barring local mask mandates falls within the scope of authority granted to the Governor under the Texas Disaster Act.

The primary issue in these cases is whether an executive order barring local mask mandates falls within the scope of authority granted to the Governor under the Texas Disaster Act.

The primary issue in these cases is whether an executive order barring local mask mandates falls within the scope of authority granted to the Governor under the Texas Disaster Act.

This direct appeal arises from two suits challenging the constitutionality of the Legislature's recent reapportionment of the State's senatorial and representative districts based on the 2020 census. The suits were transferred to and consolidated before a special three-judge district court under Chapter 22A of the Government Code. In the direct appeal, the State parties

The principal issue is whether the trial court properly dismissed a suit under procedural Rule 91a against the commission, on notice that the suit was filed, because the plaintiff failed to effect service within 90 days.

The principal issues in this personal-injury case are (1) whether AEP Texas Central, by contract, retained control over an independent subcontractor charged with filling in power-pole holes after their removal and, if a duty exists, (2) whether Arredondo's negligence allegation is actually a premises-liability claim founded on a land condition.

The principal issue in this discrimination and retaliation action is whether the trial court erred by refusing to compel arbitration, given a dispute over how, and if, the arbitration clause was electronically signed.

The principal issues are (1) whether for a civil-conspiracy claim limitations are established by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.003(a) - two years - or four years under a vicarious-liability theory or as an independent claim, or both, and (2) whether limitations begins with the conspiracy's last act or at the time of the underlying tort.

10-0683 and 10-0714 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0683 and 10-0714 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0818 Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. National Development and Research Corp. and Robert E. Tang from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner Akin, Gump: Jeffrey S. Levinger, Dallas For cross-petitioners/respondents National Development: Michael L. Jones, Dallas Among principal issues in this legal malpractice case are (1) whether the damage award should be reduced by what the plaintiff would have owed for a contingency fee in the underlying suit; (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supported damages based on stock value in the plaintiff's joint venture; and (3) whether legal fees and expenses for an appeal allegedly taken because of the malpractice were recoverable as economic damages. National Development and Research sued Akin, Gump over the trial court's determination that lawyers failed to submit proper jury questions. A jury in the malpractice action found for NDR. The trial court refused to reduce damages by the 10 percent contingency fee NDR would have paid Akin, Gump for the underlying litigation. The court of appeals reduced the award by other attorneys fees calculations, but otherwise affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this interlocutory challenge to the trial court's order denying the district's jurisdictional plea, in a retaliation suit based on a same-sex sexual harassment claim, are (1) whether but-for causation is a jurisdictional element in Texas Commission on Human Rights Act allegation and (2) whether the same-sex hostile-work environment allegation constitutes gender discrimination under the statute.

The principal issue is whether Government Code section 82.065(c) permits attorneys to recover fees in quantum meruit when their oral contingency fee is unenforceable or, if not, whether common-law quantum meruit allows the fees to be recovered....

The principal issue is whether the Court should adopt the "sham-affidavit" doctrine, that an affidavit contradicting previous testimony to raise a fact question to avoid summary judgment must explain the contradiction.

In this challenge to void a home-equity loan for constitutional defects, and to recover principal and interest, the issue is whether the borrowers' notice eight years later that the loan did not comply with constitutional requirements voids the loan or makes it voidable and subject to a four-year limitations. The Woods sued the bank and Ocwen, alleging fraud and contract breach based on alleged constitutional defects. The trial court denied the Woods' summary-judgment motion and granted the bank's and Ocwen's. The appeals court affirmed, holding a home-equity loan that does not comply with constitutional requirements is voidable, that as voidable a suit on it is subject to a four-year limitations and the Woods' suit was filed too late.

The issues in this defamation case are (1) whether the common-interest privilege bars a defamation recovery in this case for allegedly libelous statements made in letters to third parties; (2) whether sufficient evidence of reputational harm supports compensatory and exemplary damages; and (3) whether a permanent injunction barring future communications is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. Kirk Burbage sued his brother, Chad, over allegations Chad posted on a website and included in letters to a couple who bought a mausoleum site in the family cemetery the brothers jointly owned. Chad Burbage argues in part that his statements to the couple were privileged, based on their common interest in his dispute with Kirk, and challenges the reputational damages a jury awarded to Kirk. The court of appeals affirmed the reputational-damages award, modified an exemplary-damages award and threw out an injunction against Chad on certain future communications.

Two principal issues arise from this election ballot-language challenge: (1) whether the city established no material-fact issue exists that a municipal charter amendment's ballot description was legally sufficient and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a new-trial motion based on the mayor's public statements after the election. Dacus and others sued to invalidate voters' 2010 approval of a proposition that would create a dedicated fund to pay for drainage-system improvements by charging property owners fees in addition to property taxes. They argue that those fees, a chief feature of the improvements' financing, were omitted from the ballot description and that how the ballot described it - a dedicated "pay as you go" fund - was misleading. They also cite Mayor Parker's statements after the election as new evidence that should have established their right to a new trial after the trial court granted the city summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the city, holding in part that the ballot language needed only to refer to the proposition's character and purpose, its chief features.

09-0955 Allen Keller Co. v. Barbara Jean Foreman, et al. from Gillespie County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio granted on rehearing For petitioner: Wade Crosnoe, Austin For respondents: Randy Howry, Austin The issue is whether a contractor working for a county owes a duty to protect the public from a danger created pursuant to a contract requiring absolute compliance. In this case a car in which Foreman's daughter was a passenger drove through a gap between a guardrail and an embankment Keller widened according to the county's mandatory specifications. Foreman's daughter drowned when the car plunged into the river. The trial court granted summary judgment for Keller, but the court of appeals reversed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this effort to recover underinsured-motorist payments are (1) whether a declaratory-judgment action is appropriate for such a recovery and (2) whether a declaratory judgment for recovering underinsured-motorist benefits may be used also to recover attorney fees.

The primary issues in this summary-judgment case are (1) whether Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires a trial court's ruling sustaining an objection to summary-judgment evidence to be reduced to a written order and (2) whether the court of appeals erred by ordering a new trial in the interest of justice without addressing the appellee's rendition points.

The issues presented in this case are (1) whether absent class members lack standing to seek civil penalties for 176 alleged violations of the Texas Property Code and (2) whether the court of appeals was required to determine and evaluate the specific elements for the causes of action raised by the class.

The main issues on appeal are whether Honda defectively designed the seatbelt that caused Sarah Milburn's injuries and whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 82.008's rebuttable presumption of nonliability shields Honda from liability.

This case involves contract interpretation and repudiation, lost-profits damages, and the election-of-remedies doctrine.

The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award all community property to the wife when the husband was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of the wife's daughter.

A principal issue is whether the common-law mirror-image rule applies to civil procedure Rule 167 settlement agreements. Amedisys sued Kingwood in a dispute over Kingwood's hiring an ex-Amedisys employee. Kingwood offered $90,000 to settle "all claims asserted or which could have been asserted" against it. Amedysis wrote back to accept Kingwood's offer by the offer deadline, but the acceptance terms omitted reference to claims that could have been asserted. Kingwood refused to pay. The trial court granted Amedysis summary judgment for breach of the settlement contract. The appeals court reversed.

08-0110 American General Finance Inc. v. Kyle Allen from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Richard C. Danysh, San Antonio For respondent: Thomas H. Crofts Jr., San Antonio A principal issue is whether a borrower qualifies as a consumer under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act when the lender promised escrow services in addition to the loan. In this case Allen sued American General Finance on a counterclaim after foreclosure of a house he owned on which the company made a home-equity loan and promised to pay outstanding taxes. Before this suit, Allen won excess proceeds from the house sale, which American General Finance then tried to get by imposing a constructive trust. Allen counterclaimed in that the company violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. On that claim the trial court granted summary judgment against Allen. The court of appeals reversed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this dog-bite case, by a military-contractor employee against another contractor that supplied bomb-sniffing dogs and its animal supplier, principal issues are (1) whether the trial court erred by designating the Army as a responsible third party (and, if not, whether the injury claims fall under the political-question doctrine); (2) whether the Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant-activities exception preempts the injury claims; (3) whether American K-9 has official immunity by delegation of a government function; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the plaintiff Freeman her request to replead her claims; and (5) whether the appeals court erred by reversing dismissal of claims against Hill Country Dog Center, which supplied the dogs to American K-9.

The issue is whether limitations to recover from general partners a partnership's judgment debt begin when the debt judgment was entered or when the underlying contract-breach action accrued. In 1993 American Star sued S&J Investments, the partnership, for breach of an operating agreement. American Star won a judgment in 2007 for almost $230,000, which was final in 2009. When partnership assets failed to satisfy the judgment, American Star sued Stowers and other general partners in 2010 to confirm their liability. The trial court granted summary judgment for the partners, ruling that the suit against the partners on the debt was brought too late because that suit accrued at the same time as the breach-of-contract claim against the partnership. In a split decision, the appeals court affirmed.

10-0554 American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Daniel Samudio from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Robert D. Stokes, Austin For respondent: Byron C. Keeling, Houston The principal issues in this workers-compensation impairment-rating dispute are (1) whether a trial court has jurisdiction over an impairment-rating dispute when only one rating was before the workers-comp division and (2) whether the trial court or appeals court has jurisdiction to assign a new impairment rating if the one presented to the workers-comp division was invalid. In this case Zurich contested Samudio's 20-percent impairment rating a doctor calculated for his spinal injury that resulted from a fall at work, arguing that the impairment rating was not properly calculated according to mandated American Medical Association guidelines. The court of appeals determined that the rating methodology the doctor used to establish Samudio's impairment rating might not have been proper, but the rating was valid in the absence of any other presented in the administrative hearing. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this arbitration case the principal issues are (1) whether an arbitration panel was improper because the American Arbitration Association removed Americo's selected arbitrator and, if the arbitration panel was improper, (2) whether arbitration award should be vacated. In this suit over Myer's sale to Americo of insurance companies, Americo contends its selected arbitrator met an arbitration provision's independence requirement. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to vacate the $26 million arbitration award, holding in part that American Arbitration Association rules required arbitrator impartiality and that arbitrator independence, the term used in the arbitration agreement, encompassed impartiality.

At issue in this case is whether one oil-and-gas company's forced-pooling offer to another, which included a 10% risk penalty, was unreasonably low under the Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act.

In this challenge to a summary judgment's reversal, that Anadarko's entitled to defense expenses under its insurance policy for Deepwater Horizon damages, the issues are (1) whether the policy's joint-venture provision applies to defense costs and, if so, (2) whether either of two exceptions to that provision applies.

The principal issue is whether a jury's fraud-in-the-inducement finding was proper if the jury also finds insufficient evidence of the plaintiff's only alleged specific agreement.

In this dispute involving agreements between West, the chief executive for several of Quintanilla's businesses, the issues are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under expanded authority giving the Court broad power to determine questions important to the state's jurisprudence, enacted in 2017 after the dispute arose, and (2) whether the parol-evidence rule bars West's evidence of an alleged separate agreement to discharge West's debts to Quintanilla.

Among principal issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by rendering judgment on an issue not raised in the appeal below; (2) whether the appeals court erred by reversing a decision on adverse possession because it concluded the Brumleys pleaded their cause as one to quiet title and not on trespass to try title and (3) whether adverse possession was tried by consent.

In this challenge by Dallas teachers over the effects of a new district evaluation process the issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by determining the commissioner had jurisdiction over the teachers' appeal because their grievance was filed on time; (2) whether the appeals court erred by holding that the teachers' appraisal grievances and grievances based on the district's new evaluation components were filed on time; and (3) whether the appeals courts erred by finding the teachers' exceptions to the administrative-law judge's proposal for decision inadequate to preserve error on allegations that the teachers' pay was reduced by higher insurance costs at a time when they could not resign without penalty.

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0833 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International Inc. v. Greenberg Peden P.C. and Gerard J. Swonke from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Gregory S. Coleman, Austin For amicus curiae, Abrams Scott & Bickley: Christopher S. Johns, Austin For respondents: Robert M. (Randy) Roach Jr., Houston In this dispute over an allegedly ambiguous contingency-fee agreement involving work by an attorney acting of counsel, the principal issues are (1) whether potential ambiguity should be construed against the attorney who drafted it for an existing client and (2) whether the trial court should have instructed jurors on the lawyer's fiduciary duty to the client. In this case Swonke, of counsel to Greenberg Peden, worked for Anglo-Dutch on a lawsuit it eventually won with a $70.5-million verdict. Anglo-Dutch refused to pay Swonke the percentage he claimed he was owed because it contended Greenberg Peden, not Swonke individually, represented the company. The trial court ruled for Swonke. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the ambiguous agreement should not be construed against the attorney who drafted it. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in this special-appearance case, involving two agreements that involved some but not all participants, is whether the transactional-participant doctrine binds non-signatories to an agreement, in this case, establishing Tarrant County as the forum for disputes.

This oil-and-gas lease dispute involves what respondents Apollo Exploration, Cogent Exploration, and Sellmoco's rights are under purchase and sale agreements entered into with petitioner Apache Corporation.

In this employment retaliation case the principal issues are (1) whether the employee alleging age- and gender-discrimination engaged in protected activity when she complained by email and (2) whether legally sufficient evidence established a causal link between the email and her discharge.

The issue is whether proceeds from bundled minerals leases must be proportionately reduced if one or more of the leases expire because production ceased. This case calls for interpreting a 1953 assignment of a production payment - an oil payment, as it's also called - from four minerals leases. McDaniel, the successor to the production payment, sued for contract breach and conversion after Apache Deepwater reduced the payment because two leases expired when production ceased. Apache argues that the production payment, like an overriding royalty interest, should be diminished when a lease ends and that Texas law does not require a proportionate-reduction clause. McDaniel contends the assignment specifies one fractional interest applied to all production from the designated surveys and, in the absence of a reduction clause, expresses the parties' intent to allocate risk. The trial court ruled for Apache, but the court of appeals reversed.

The primary issue in this case is whether an insurer's ability to rescind a life insurance policy based on an applicant's material misrepresentation requires proof of the applicant's intent to deceive.

The principal issue in this case in which a real-estate scam is alleged is whether an amended petition without new material factual allegations amounts to a new "legal action" under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, triggering anew the 60-day deadline for a defendant to move to dismiss.

The issues in this case involving oral and written severance agreements are (1) whether employees' contract-breach claims are preempted by federal law (ERISA) and, if not, (2) whether the agreements are valid unilateral contracts and (3) whether the company that bought the manufacturing plant at issue is a "successor" covered defined by the severance agreements.

10-0615 Ashford Partners Ltd. v. ECO Resources Inc. from Fort Bend County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Charles Watson, Austin For respondent: Michael P. Cash, Houston Principal issues in this lease dispute over a construction defect are (1) whether Ashford, which took over ECO's building lease when it bought the building, had a duty to complete the construction "punch list" according to ECO's plans even though ECO had signed an estoppel agreement with the previous owner "accepting the premises without exception" and (2) whether the damages measure for the construction defect should be diminished lease value instead of repair costs. After the building's foundation cracked and tilted, Ashford sued the contractor and sued to declare it had not breached the lease with ECO. ECO countersued for breach, arguing that Ashford, as the landlord by assignment, assumed the original landlord's obligation to complete the building according to plans. The trial court awarded ECO damages for diminished lease value and attorneys fees. On review, the appeals court affirmed, holding in part that Ashford exclusively failed to complete a necessary punch-list item linked to the foundation problem after it assumed the lease but before the deadline for completing the punch list. The court of appeals also held diminution of the lease value was the proper damages measure because ECO leased the building and did not own it. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues are (1) whether this challenge under the Texas Constitution's due-course-of-law provision should be analyzed under a "real and substantial connection" test and not, as federal due-process-of-law claims, by a rational basis; (2) whether the state has immunity from declaratory-judgment claims raising constitutional challenges to statutes; and (3) whether the suit is justiciable because all plaintiffs may not have standing to challenge the licensing requirement, or the suit may not be ripe because only two of the plaintiffs face penalties for not being licensed or it may be barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine. In this case several "eyebrow threaders" and salon owners who offer threading sued the department, the commission over it and officers of both over regulations that require eyebrow threaders to be licensed facialists or cosmetologists. To be licensed, the threaders complain, involves either 750 or 1,500 hours' training that has little to do with their work. Patel and another eyebrow threader who worked at a mall kiosk, as Patel did, were cited by state inspectors for working without licenses. Together with other eyebrow-threading practitioners and the salon owners, they sued to declare the license requirement unconstitutional as it applied to them. The state responded by arguing that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, being essentially a claim that department officers exceeded their authority. The trial court ruled that the department and the commission did not have immunity but granted summary judgment for the state on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the eyebrow threaders had standing and their claims were ripe, but the regulation was constitutional as applied to Patel and the others.

07-0572 Gail Ashley v. Doris D. Hawkins from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas, and Kimberley M. Spurlock, Humble For respondent: James B. Manley, Cleveland For amicus curiae State of Texas: Rance L. Craft, Austin The issue is whether the statute of limitations is tolled during a person's absence from the state but amenable to service. In this case Hawkins sued Ashley, claiming injuries from an automobile accident. Hawkins filed a petition 60 days before the limitations period ended. The trial court dismissed the claim for failure to prosecute it, then reinstated it, then dismissed it again, then reinstated it a second time. A year after filing suit Hawkins served Ashley, who moved to California after the accident. Ashley moved to dismiss for summary judgment, based on limitations and failure to diligently pursue the claim, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 16.063 suspended limitations regardless of Hawkins' diligence in serving process. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Principal issues in this nuisance and trespass case against three operators of gas-compressor stations and one pipeline company are (1) whether limitations bars the plaintiffs' claims; (2) whether state and federal clean-air laws preempt the claims; (3) whether the town of DISH (yes, all caps - named after the satellite-television provider) has statutory authority to sue; and (4) whether plaintiffs may recover for prospective injury or mental anguish, abatement of an ongoing nuisance or $1,000-a-day fines against the energy companies.

10-0375 Atmos Energy Corp., et al. v. Cities of Allen, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners/cross-respondents companies: Ann M. Coffin and David Duggins, Austin For petitioners/cross-respondents cities: Jose E. de la Fuente, Austin For respondent Railroad Commission: Priscilla Hubenak, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the Texas Railroad Commission has appellate jurisdiction over the cities' denials of a utility's interim rate-increase filing and, if so, (2) whether the cities get a contested hearing for an interim-rate adjustment. In this case Allen and other cities sued for a declaratory judgment to void an administrative rule permitting interim rates for gas utilities' infrastructure improvements because the rule did not provide for a contested hearing. Allen and the other cities rejected the rate adjustments, but the Railroad Commission granted them without an evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied the cities' request that it declare the rule void, finding the cities could conduct a ministerial review of an interim rate increase but not otherwise deny it. The court of appeals affirmed that cities were not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing on an interim rate adjustment and held the Railroad Commission did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the cities' denial. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in this laundry-service breach-of-contract case is whether a cancellation clause providing damages at 40 percent of remaining weekly payments based on the last invoice constitutes an unenforceable penalty.

The issues in this public-information case are (1) whether the attorney-client privilege may be asserted under Public Information Act sections 552.101 or 552.107(1), or both; (2) whether attorney-client privilege constitutes a compelling reason to withhold requested public documents under section 552.302; and (3) whether avoiding harm to the city's bargaining position in a multimillion-dollar long-term transaction to without requested information.

There are three primary issues in this case. The first is whether the executor of an estate owed a fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries. The second issue is whether a decedent's estate was required to, and did, disclose all material facts in connection with a release executed by beneficiaries to the decedent's marital trust. The third issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding certain financial documents from the summary judgment evidence.

The issue is whether the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act preempts a common-law sexual-assault claim against an employer for a vice-principal's conduct that would be actionable as sexual harassment under the anti-discrimination statute.

05-0801 S. Murthy Badiga, M.D. v. Maricruz Lopez from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Diana L. Faust, Dallas For respondent: E. A. Villareal Jr., Edinburg The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether in a medical-malpractice case a trial court's refusal to dismiss for failure to file a timely expert report can be subject to an interlocutory appeal. In this case the expert report was served three and a half months after the 120-day deadline, after the trial court granted two motions to extend time. A principal issue in this medical-malpractice case is whether an interlocutory appeal can be taken from a trial court's refusal to dismiss the lawsuit because an expert report was not filed on time. In this case the expert report was served three and a half months after the 120-day deadline, after the trial court granted two extensions. To support the second motion, Lopez contended the report was late because of a clerical error, not indifference. The case poses a statutory conflict between a provision that prohibits interlocutory appeals from orders denying dismissal when an extension is granted to cure a deficient expert report and a provision allowing such appeals when a dismissal motion is denied when an expert report is not filed on time. In this case the court of appeals dismissed the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in this case is whether a trial court's oral rendition of divorce is effective when one spouse dies prior to the entry of a written final decree.

In this case, involving an insurance-financing agreement by which the financing company terminated the insured's policy for chronic late payments, the issues are (1) whether BankDirect's statutory obligation to give 10 days' notice before canceling the policy was substantially completed when the notice was sent nine days before its effective date and (2) whether the power-of-attorney agreement BankDirect used to cancel the policy should be strictly construed.

The issues in this appeal from a dismissal in a medical-malpractice case, based on adequacy of the plaintiff's expert report, are (1) whether the good-faith effort standard requires a trial court's conclusions to be reviewed anew as legal matters and (2) whether the trial court's dismissal without a chance to amend was error.

A principal issue is whether the discovery rule delays limitations on a suit to reform a deed based on mutual mistake. In this case the Cades sued four months after limitations ended, after attempting to get Cosgrove to fix the mistake. In conveying their home and the two acres surrounding it, the Cades specified in the real-estate contract that they, as sellers, would retain the mineral interests. But the deed did not reserve the mineral interests. The Cades argue that the discovery rule should extend limitations on their suit, that is, that they could not have known until they did that the deed was contrary to the real-estate contract. The Cades chose the title company to prepare the deed and closing documents, which includes an agreement that Cosgrove, as buyer for a trust, would adjust or correct any errors or omissions necessary to comply with the sales contract. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cosgrove. The court of appeals reversed, holding that neither the Cades nor Cosgrove were entitled to summary judgment.

The issue is whether State Farm violated the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act by delaying payment on a claim until, after being sued by its policyholder, it invoked the policy's appraisal clause.

The issues in this case, which is governed by Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, are: (1) whether a fact issue exists about whether a landowner retained "some control" over an independent contractor's employee's work; (2) whether the common-law open-and-obvious defense applies to Chapter 95 and eliminates the landowner's duty to warn the independent contractor's employee of a danger, and if so, whether the independent contractor's employee raised a fact issue on the necessary-use exception to this defense; and (3) if the independent contractor's employee's knowledge of the dangerous condition did not obviate the landowner's obligation to issue an adequate warning, whether a fact issue exists about whether the landowner issued an adequate warning.

In this challenge to the appeals court's take-nothing reversal from a contract-breach and fraud verdict, the issues are (1) whether the court erred by considering a deleted provision from negotiations to interpret the contract and (2) whether the court erred by rejecting a fraud claim on reliance grounds based on an oral promise to act when the written contract omitted that.

The issues challenging the trial court's order to withhold wages and split retirement benefits to enforce contractual alimony are (1) whether wages may be withheld under the Texas Family Code chapter 8 to satisfy the alimony agreement and (2) whether Texas Property Code section 42.0021 exempts retirement money from seizure in this case nor whether federal retirement law (ERISA) preempts Texas law.

08-0244 Basic Capital Management Inc., et al. v. Dynex Commercial Inc. and Dynex Capital Inc. from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioners: William Dorsaneo, Dallas For respondents: Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas In this breach-of-contract case involving real-estate loans the principal issues question (1) whether Basic Capital Management's affiliate entities were third-party beneficiaries of a loan commitment under which they may recover; (2) whether, if so, they have capacity to recover for Single Asset Bankruptcy Remote Borrowing Entities authorized as borrowers if acceptable by the lender (or whether Dynex, the lender, waived its challenge by failing to file a verified denial); and (3) whether consequential damages for lost opportunity or, alternatively, damages for increased costs may be recovered. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The primary issue in this case is whether the defendant is entitled to a settlement credit under the one-satisfaction rule.

The issue is whether a fraudulent-misdiagnosis claim falls under the health-care liability statute and requires a threshold expert-report requirement.

Principal issues are (1) whether Houston's air-quality ordinance intended to regulate emissions more stringently than state law is preempted by state law and (2) whether the ordinance unconstitutionally delegates law-making authority by incorporating state regulations and allowing changes the Texas Department of Environmental Quality may make. BCCA, a group of industrial owners in the Houston area, sued Houston over its ordinance establishing the city's own comprehensive air-quality program. Before the city passed the ordinance in 2007, it contracted with state air-quality regulators to monitor pollution standards the city imposed on businesses not regulated by the state. But Houston's newer ordinance and regulatory scheme resulted from the city's perception that the state's pollution enforcement was too lax. The trial court granted summary judgment to BCCA and enjoined the Houston ordinance's enforcement. The appeals court reversed.

The issue in this case is whether a contract is ambiguous.

In this deed-interpretation case the issue is whether a floating non-participating royalty interest should burden remaining royalty interests proportionately.

08-0074 Thomas O. Bennett Jr. and James B. Bonham Corp. v. Randy Reynolds from San Saba County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Susan S. Vance, Austin For respondent: David Keltner, Fort Worth The principal issues in this dispute over cattle belonging to one rancher allegedly sold by another are (1) whether $1.25 million in punitive damages violates due process when actual damages were $5,300; (2) whether agency principles support punitive damages against a corporation for its president's acts; and (3) whether punitive damages against the corporation may be based on "reverse veil-piercing." In this case Reynolds sued Bennett and the Bonham corporation for conversion, alleging Bennett sold Reynolds' cattle on the corporation's land. Bennett's daughters own the corporation. Bennett, the president but not a shareholder, lives on the corporate property and runs his own cattle on it without charge. The court of appeals affirmed the punitive damages. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0522 Benny P. Phillips, M.D. v. Dale Bramlett from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Jim Hund, Lubbock For respondents: John Smithee, Amarillo The Supreme Court will hear arguments of whether Stowers doctrine applies to avoid statutory damages cap in med-mal award. The principal issue is whether medical-malpractice damages are capped under the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act when the doctor's liability insurer may be liable on a bad-faith claim. In this case the trial court ruled that the insurance company's refusal to settle the case brought it under an exception to the statutory damages limit. Phillips also contends that the plaintiff's jury argument - that they should send a message and "buck the liberal treatment" of doctors by previous med-mal juries - was incurable. In his lawsuit Bramlett claimed his wife died after a hysterectomy because her surgeon did not check on her before leaving the hospital and did not check his voice mail to learn early enough that she suffered from internal bleeding after her operation. Phillips argues that the jury's multi-million verdict should have been capped by the medical-malpractice statute because the exception to those limits for an insurer that imprudently rejects a settlement offer - the basis of the Stowers doctrine - would not apply because the judgment was against the doctor, not the insurance company. Even if it does apply to the insurer, he contends, Bramlett did not prove the insurer refused an offer an "ordinary prudent insurer" should have accepted. The trial court refused to cap the damages and the court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issue is whether judicial error breaks causation for a legal-negligence claim when the appeals court reversed the trial loss based on trial-court error. In this case the Neubaums claim as damages their costs for an appeal to remedy their lawyers' trial error. In the underlying lawsuit, alleging the Neubaums charged usurious interest for a loan to a customer through an agent, the jury found March, the agent, loaned the money on the Neubaums' behalf. But on review the court of appeals reversed, holding no evidence proved the agent acted for the Neubaums. In this malpractice case the Neubaums allege their lawyers in the original case were negligent in part because one lawyer's illness left the trial in the hands of a firm lawyer, Stanfield, who never tried a case before. The Neubaums contend their lawyers failed to conduct discovery early enough to find the company that sued for usury was working a Ponzi scheme; that a usury "cure" letter was never admitted as evidence (and the jury never considered it as an issue); and that their lawyers did not hire an expert to review the company's bank records until after the trial. But in the malpractice case the Neubaums did not allege Stanfield, the trial lawyer, acted negligently on the issue whether March acted as the Neubaums' agent. At trial of the usury case Stanfield objected that evidence did not prove March was the Neubaums' agent and raised that argument in moving for a new trial, both of which the trial court rejected. In this malpractice case the law firm argued that it could not be liable for the trial court's error in the underlying usury case and that error caused the Neubaums' appellate costs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. A divided court of appeals reversed in part, holding the law firm failed as a legal matter to establish that its alleged negligence did not proximately cause the Neubaums' damages. By holding that the law firm should have established by expert testimony that causation was broken, the appeals court seems to reject the rule that judicial error creates a new and independent cause.

A principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by remanding, in the interest of justice, the question whether the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's intentional-tort exception applies. The court of appeals at first reversed and rendered judgment against Lee, whose leg was crushed and later amputated when a crane fell under maneuvering stress. Then the court remanded, reasoning that its elaboration on the intentional-tort exception (before the Court's June 12 Mo-Vac Service Co. v. Escobedo decision) justified a remand. For the intentional-tort exception to apply in worker-comp cases, the Court held in Mo-Vac, the employer must believe that its actions are substantially certain to result in a particular injury to a particular employee, not merely highly likely to increase overall risks to employees in the workplace. The appeals court determined its outline of the substantial-certainty test's requirements required remand to allow Lee to support his argument that he was in a "danger" zone - a localized area - that Berkel's supervisor knew would result in injury.

This case, a dispute regarding the lease of a family ranch, raises four primary issues. First, does a person named in a trust agreement as a contingent beneficiary have standing under the Trust Code to bring claims against trustees? Second, does a co-trustee of a trust have standing to bring claims against non-co-trustee third parties? Third, does a co-trustee of a trust that owns a limited partnership share of a partnership have derivative standing to bring claims on behalf of the partnership? And fourth, is a co-trustee with arguable notice of other co-trustees' likely breach of fiduciary duty required to search public records for evidence of that breach?

These cross-petitions raise issues of briefing waiver and whether fiduciary duties are owed among business partners.

The principal issues in this dispute over calculating health care-liability damages are (1) whether the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its mandate on remand; (2) whether post-judgment interest accrues from the first trial-court judgment or from the judgment on remand; and (3) whether the trial court properly vacated its first judgment when the Supreme Court remanded without instructions to vacate. In a first appeal in this case, in which Dr. Phillips contended the trial court erred by not capping, the Supreme Court remanded, holding that damages awarded against Dr. Phillips should have been capped consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand the trial court entered a second judgment, capping damages and awarding post-judgment interest beginning with the second judgment's date. When Bramlett appealed, the appeals court rejected Phillips' dismissal motion - based on his contention that the Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction - and reversed to calculate interest from the first judgment.

The issue is whether each spouse of a married couple may claim a separate "residence homestead" for tax-exemption purposes.

(Justice Green not sitting) 09-0039 BIC Pen Corp. v. Janace M. Carter from Matagorda County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Reagan W. Simpson, Austin For cross-petitioner/respondent: Lisa Powell, McAllen Principal issues in this case involving injuries resulting from a child playing with a lighter are (1) whether federal law preempts the manufacturing-defect claim and the causation theory based on it; (20 whether legally sufficient evidence supported causation and a manufacturing defect; and (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's malice finding for exemplary damages. The Court earlier held that federal law by implication preempted a lighter design-defect claim in reversing a judgment for Carter. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the jury's manufacturing-defect verdict for Carter, but reversed the punitive-damages award. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this fraud suit against an attorney, the issues are (1) whether Youngkin proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hines's claims are subject to the Texas Citizens Participation Act; (2) whether Hines demonstrated by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case on all essential elements of his claims; and (3) whether Youngkin established by clear and specific evidence his litigation-privilege defense.

The issues in this interlocutory appeal, based on the trial court's refusal to dismiss for failure to file an expert medical report, are (1) whether a laser hair-removal company owned by a physician is a health-care provider or physician as defined by the Texas Medical Liability Act and (2) whether the negligence claim for laser burns from a hair-removal process resulted from treatment directly related to health care. Bioderm Skin Care moved to dismiss Sok's claim because, as required by the medical-liability act, she did not submit a health care-expert report. The trial court refused to dismiss the suit. The court of appeals affirmed.

06-1084 Bison Building Materials Ltd. v. Lloyd K. Aldridge from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Tom Van Arsdel, Houston For respondent: Kurt Arbuckle, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the principal issue of whether an appeal can be taken from a trial court's order vacating in part an arbitration award without a rehearing. The principal issue is whether an appeal can be taken from a trial court's order vacating in part an arbitration award without ordering a rehearing. In this case Aldridge, a Bison employee, moved for arbitration of a damages claim for a work injury under an agreement stipulating all work-related injury claims would be arbitrated but providing that an objection to an arbitration decision could be reviewed by a court. Bison moved to dismiss his claim, arguing that he had waived his right to arbitrate his damages because, after his injury, Aldridge signed a subsequent workplace-injury benefits waiver and release forgoing "the right to file a legal action ... for any and all damages sustained by me because of my injury" for benefits he got from Bison's plan. Aldridge sued to set aside the arbitration decision. Noting "unanswered questions regarding fair notice and ambiguity of the post-injury waiver agreement, the trial court vacated that part of the award precluding arbitration of the damages claim. In a split decision, the court of appeals dismissed what it called an interlocutory appeal because it had no jurisdiction.

In this royalties dispute the issues are (1) whether an addendum to an oil-and-gas lease with a "gross value received" royalty provision conflicts with one pegged to "market value at the well" in the printed lease and (2) whether a free-use clause limiting the producer to "operations hereunder" permits the producer without paying royalties to send gas to be processed by a third party, away from the lease, that the producer in part uses to power its production operations.

The principal issues involving a home fire-loss claim are (1) whether a statutory provision bars the insurer's defense that coverage was suspended when the homeowner left the house vacant for more than 60 days (the vacancy did not contribute to the loss: fire spread from an adjacent house) and, if not, (2) whether Farmers is required to show prejudice to deny the claim. Greene sued after Farmers Insurance denied the claim he brought as the homeowner's best friend. Four months before the fire, the owner notified Farmers that she was leaving her house, putting it up for sale and moving into a retirement community. She continued paying her premiums. The trial court ruled for Greene, but the court of appeals reversed, finding the statute applied to personal-property loss but not real-property damage.

The principal issues in this contest to get the price Boeing paid for maintenance facilities at the former Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio are (1) whether lease information is exempt from public disclosure under Texas Public Information Act section 552.104 (protecting information that would give advantage to a competitor) and (2) whether the information falls under section 552.110's trade-secrets exemption. A former Boeing employee requested the lease information from the Kelly development entity. Boeing sued the attorney general after the attorney general, in an opinion Boeing requested, determined that Boeing's leasing costs for the Kelly space was subject to disclosure under the open-records law. The trial court agreed and the appeals court affirmed its decision. Boeing argues that its military aircraft-maintenance business, the reason it leased former maintenance hangars at Kelly, is highly competitive, so by knowing what it paid for the Kelly lease its competitors could bid for cheaper facilities elsewhere and underbid Boeing for military contracts. The attorney general contends that section 552.104's exemption for information benefitting a competitor protects the government's interests, not a private company's, and that Boeing did not prove the information it was seeking to protect was a trade secret exempted by section 552.110.

In this fraud breach-of-contract and implied-warranty case involving a private-jet purchase, alleging the aircraft was bought new but had a faulty engine taken from another plane, the issues are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supports damages to all plaintiff owners; (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supports actual damages awarded; (3) whether liability limits in the purchase agreement bar a punitive-damages award; and, if not, (4) whether punitive damages are unconstitutionally excessive.

A threshold issue is whether the appeals court lacked authority to consider an order denying arbitration when the order was not contested on interlocutory appeal. In this case the losing party, Hart of Texas Cattle Feeders, challenged the arbitration denial by mandamus two months after the trial court's order, lost that, then brought its challenge after a trial on the merits.

The main issue is whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that allocates a pool of paid leave to further a union's interests violates any "Gift Clause" in the Texas Constitution (Article III, Sections 50, 51, 52(a) and Article XVI, Section 6(a)).

The issue is whether taxing underground wastewater disposal wells separately from the surface constitutes unconstitutional double taxation.

The issues are (1) whether Laddex lacks standing because its "top lease" is void for violating the state constitutional Rule Against Perpetuities and (2) whether evidence supports the trial court's judgment terminating BP's lease for production below paying quantities.

(Justice Guzman not sitting) 09-0399 BP America Production Co., et al. v. Stanley G. Marshall, et al. from Zapata County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner BP America: Thomas R. Phillips, Austin For petitioner Wagner Oil: Pamela Stanton Baron, Austin For respondents Stanley G. Marshall Jr., et al.: Tim Patton, San Antonio For respondents Vaquillas Ranch Co., et al.: David M. Gunn, Houston In this case by mineral interest-holders alleging BP fraudulently continued a lease it had ceased working, the issues are (1) whether the discovery rule tolled limitations; (2) whether BP's communications with a mineral interest-holder amounted to legal opinion or created a false impression that required full disclosure; (3) whether BP, which leased its production interest, can be required to account for future net profits even though it no longer possesses producing wells; (4) whether a successor lessee to BP's interest, as co-tenant, can claim title to the mineral interests by adverse possession against the other tenant; and (5) whether BP's successor to its lease interest can be a bona fide purchaser, if it took title without knowledge of the alleged fraud. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this contest over the commercial viability of a producer's lease are (1) whether Red Deer, the top-lease holder, secured a necessary finding that a well was incapable of producing in paying quantities when BP, the producer, stopped its production and invoked a shut-in royalty clause; (2) whether the trial court's judgment that the lease lapsed was based on inconsistent jury findings, one that production in paying quantities had not failed before the well was shut in and the other that on the shut-in date the well was incapable of commercial production; (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the verdict; and (4) whether the trial court erred by rejecting BP's proposed instructions.

In this wrongful pooling case, the issues are (1) whether the owner impliedly ratified the pooling by depositing royalty checks and (2) whether estoppel prevents the owner from denying ratification.

The issue is whether the environmental-quality commission has authority under the Tax Code to determine pollution-control tax breaks for businesses that use heat-recovery steam generators.

The issue in this legal-malpractice case is whether limitations are tolled under Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins for assets-transfer advice that led to a judgment against Renda by the federal government for violating the federal Priority Act. Renda sued seven months after the government's judgment and 11 years after the advice on the assets transfer.

In this dispute over a fee-simple conveyance to a trust beneficiary, later corrected to be a life estate, the issues are (1) whether the original deed is void; (2) whether Property Code section 5.029, allowing for non-judicial corrections for material mistakes, requires that Yates and its assignees, current owners of the property interest but not parties to the original instrument, sign the 2013 correction deed to validate the change; and (3) whether limitations bars the suit even if the Property Code section applies.

The principal issues in this premises-liability case are (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting spoliation evidence based on the grocer's retaining a security-video clip showing the plaintiff's fall and the moments before and after it but not longer, which might have borne on constructive notice of a grease spill; (2) whether the trial court generally erred by instructing the jury on spoliation (and specifically by placing the burden of disproving prejudice on Brookshire); and (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's negligence finding. In this case Aldridge, a former professional football player, asked the see the video of his fall a few days after he slipped at the store. The store refused. After he sued, the store produced eight minutes of what store cameras caught on tape, starting a minute before Aldridge entered the store and ending a minute after he fell. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the spoliation evidence and its spoliation instruction.

The issue in this wrongful-death action is whether an engineering firm working for a toll-road authority has derivative immunity involving a triple-fatality accident. Oliveres sued for negligence and premises defects after her son died in a collision with a wrong-way drunken driver who entered a tollway by way of an exit ramp. Oliveres alleged Brown & Gay failed to design proper signs to avoid the accident. Brown & Gay argues that it falls within the scope of the toll-road authority's immunity because the toll-road authority had the right to control its work. The trial court granted Brown & Gay's jurisdictional plea, but the appeals court reversed, holding that Brown & Gay was an independent contractor and not the Fort Bend County Toll Road Authority's employee.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court had specific jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer for claims based on an allegedly defective product.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in signing a judgment that disregarded the jury's award of exemplary damages due to language in the charge and a post-verdict jury poll indicating that the verdict was not unanimous.

The issues are (1) whether in a sale agreement an arbitration provision between Apache and Wagner Oil Co. extended to Wagner's assignees; (2) whether the arbitration clause covers Apache's claims; and (3) whether the declaratory-judgment action filed in Tarrant County violated Texas's mandatory-venue provisions and the contract's terms.

The issues are (1) whether in a sale agreement an arbitration provision between Apache and Wagner Oil Co. extended to Wagner's assignees; (2) whether the arbitration clause covers Apache's claims; and (3) whether the declaratory-judgment action filed in Tarrant County violated Texas's mandatory-venue provisions and the contract's terms.

The issues in this case are (1) whether Texas Health and Safety Code 363.111 empowers a Type A general-law municipality to impose licensing requirements on commercial solid waste operators and impose a percentage of revenue fee; (2) whether a municipal ordinance adopted by Westlake is preempted by Texas Health and Safety Code 361.0961; (3) whether the license fee imposed by Westlake's ordinance is an unconstitutional occupation tax, and whether this issue was mooted when Westlake lowered the fee from 15% to 3%; and (4) whether the court of appeals erred by remanding the issue of attorney's fees to the trial court.

The issues in this royalties-calculation dispute are (1) whether the producer's distribution of overriding royalties based on "amount realized" prohibits the producer from deducting post-production costs after delivery and (2) whether the merger-by-deed doctrine applies to govern the producer's obligation to an affiliate assigned overriding royalties by the original royalty-interest holder by superseding that assigning interest-holder's earlier agreements with the producer.

The issue in this case is the sufficiency of an expert report supporting a health care liability claim against a hospital directly under Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

The issue is whether Byrdson, doing business as Excello Construction in working for the regional-planning commission, provided a service defined by the Local Government Contract Claims Act that would waive the commission's immunity for breach-of-contract claims.

A principal issue in this libel case based on a television report that the Texas Medical Board ordered a physician disciplined is whether Texas recognizes the third party-allegation rule that would shield a publisher or broadcaster from defamation liability if the report is substantially true. Dr. Neely, an Austin neurologist, sued Wilson and her then-employer, KEYE-TV in Austin, after a report that included interviews with two malpractice claimants against Neely and a rendition of the medical board's agreed order with Neely. The order addressed the doctor's writing his own refill prescriptions for drugs in lieu of returning to the doctors who prescribed them. The order suspended him for three years, but allowed him to practice on probation with conditions and cited his violation of a rule prohibiting inappropriate prescriptions of "dangerous drugs" and his inability to practice medicine "with reasonable skill and safety to patients, due to mental or physical condition." The trial court granted summary judgment for Wilson and the station. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that McIlvain v. Jacobs created a third party-allegation rule in Texas and that Neely's allegations that the broadcast reported false defamatory statements were either substantially true or not defamatory.

The issue is whether Texas's bar against a retail alcohol-sales permit-holder having ownership in an alcohol-beverage manufacturer operates to keep Mexican convenience-store operator Cardena from selling beer and wine in Texas stores it plans. Cardena is owned by a Mexican holding company that in turn owns through subsidiaries a 20 percent stake in a European brewer and its holding company.

The issues are (1) whether a common-law affirmative defense of an offset based on a theory of breach of contract conflicts with the Uniform Commercial Code's provisions that allow a bank to chargeback provisional funds to a depositor whose check was dishonored and (2) whether Elizondo is entitled to an offset under these facts.

The main issues in this case are whether Texas should recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice and whether a trial court must grant a Rule 91a motion to dismiss any time a novel claim is asserted.

In this condemnation-valuation case a principal issue is whether harmful error resulted from trial court's excluding evidence, based on the project-influence doctrine, that the state interfered with pollution remediation and depressed the property's value. In this case Caffe Ribs challenged a condemnation award of $7.3 million for property it argues was worth $9.9 million when the state condemned it. The trial court excluded Caffe Ribs' evidence that its land was subject to a pollution-cleanup plan and that the state interfered with the remediation plan. Based on the jury's fair-market valuation, the trial court awarded $4.9 million. The court of appeals affirmed. Caffe Ribs argues that the trial court misapplied the project-influence doctrine, which bars enhancing the value of land because of a new higher use based on the plans for it after condemnation.

The issue is whether the City of San Antonio Water System is entitled to governmental immunity from Campbellton's breach-of-contract suit.

In this fraud suit by Byrd against the law firm that represented his ex-wife in a divorce, the issues are (1) whether attorney immunity protects lawyers who allegedly forged a bill of sale for property awarded to the ex-wife in the decree (with tax consequences to the ex-husband) and (2) whether the burden to show the attorney-immunity doctrine's fraud exception should be borne by the ex-husband as plaintiff. Byrd's suit against Cantey Hanger alleged that the firm prepared paperwork to transfer ownership of an airplane his ex-wife got in the divorce but arranged for its sale from Byrd's leasing company to a third party, falsely listing the ex-wife as the leasing company's manager. As a result, the leasing company incurred tax liability that the divorce decree specified the ex-wife would bear. The trial court granted summary judgment to the law firm on the immunity question. The appeals court affirmed.

Canyon Regional Water Authority v. Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority from Guadalupe County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Gregory S. Coleman, Austin For respondent: David P. Blanke, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether 'paramount use' question in water authority's condemnation in public lake. The issue is whether the river authority, the owner of a lake, offered sufficient evidence challenging the water authority's condemnation of part of the lake to require the water authority to show its water need was paramount to the lake's prior public use. In this case, the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority sued after negotiations broke down on the water authority's plan to build a second water intake on Lake Dunlap near New Braunfels. The river authority argues that the intake interferes with the lake's recreational use. The trial court held that Canyon Regional Water Authority had rights to construct the intake under an existing easement, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the easement allowed only one intake and that water authority offered no evidence of a paramount public use.

In this specific-performance case, seeking to enforce a recorded first-refusal right to purchase mineral interests, the issues are (1) whether the Archer trust suffered an injury when the minerals interest was sold or when, long after, the trust learned its right had been breached and (2) whether the discovery rule applies if the right accrued when the sale was completed.

In this specific-performance case, seeking to enforce a recorded first-refusal right to purchase mineral interests, the issues are (1) whether the Archer trust suffered an injury when the minerals interest was sold or when, long after, the trust learned its right had been breached and (2) whether the discovery rule applies if the right accrued when the sale was completed.

The issue in this negligence case seeking sentimental-value damages for a pet dog mistakenly euthanized is whether intrinsic or sentimental value can be recovered.

In this case involving burn injuries from a fire at a church fundraiser, the issues are (1) whether volunteers for a vendor on the church property are invitees under premises-liability law; (2) whether the trial court's failure to instruct jurors to disregard a "nobody's responsible" argument should be reversed when unavoidable accident was not pleaded; (3) whether families of the four injured teenagers the waived any challenge to the evidence by not contesting the jury's zero-damages finding; and (4) whether the appeals court applied the correct factual-sufficiency standard in reviewing the no-liability verdict.

05-0940 Central Ready Mix Concrete Co. Inc. v. Luciano Islas from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg A principal issue is whether a contractor owes any duty for the safety of an independent subcontractor's employees performing dangerous work. In this case Islas sued Central Ready Mix for injuries he suffered as he cleaned the rotating mixer on one of Central's cement trucks. Islas, employed by a subcontractor hired by Central to clean the trucks' mixing drums, was caught as he was climbing out of the mixing drum when a co-worker started the truck and the mixer began turning. A jury determined that Central was 20 percent responsible, but the trial court granted the company's motion to disregard the verdict. The court of appeals reversed.

The issue is whether an apartment-building contractor should be entitled to indemnity as a "seller" from a component manufacturer. In the underlying case a subcontractor's employee, injured as he worked on an apartment complex, settled a products-liability case with Centerpoint, the general contractor building the complex, and Trussway, manufacturer of a failed truss that led to his fall. Centerpoint then sued Trussway to be indemnified, claiming it was a seller of the Trussway truss by incorporating the truss in the apartment complex Centerpoint constructed and sold to the owners. By doing so, Centerpoint argues, it put the truss into commerce for purposes of products-liability law. Trussway contends Centerpoint sold a service - building an apartment complex - so it could not be a seller and could not qualify for indemnity. The trial court ruled that Centerpoint was a seller. The court of appeals held it was not.

In this gas-explosion case that injured a homeowner's father as he checked on an appliance the issues are (1) whether CenterPoint had a duty to inspect a residence's interior before gas service was begun; (2) whether liability limitations under CenterPoint's tariff were implicated if the plaintiffs were not customers, consumers or applicants under the tariff; (3) whether a tariff's liability limitations can apply to a non-customer as a legal matter; and (4) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the verdict under a negligence or negligent-undertaking theory.

10-0223 Centocor Inc. v. Patricia Hamilton and Thomas Hamilton, et al. from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Robert M. (Randy) Roach Jr., Houston For respondents/cross-petitioners: Craig T. Enoch, Austin For cross-respondent Michael G. Bullen, M.D.: Thomas F. Nye, Corpus Christi For amici curiae Texas Medical Association, et al.: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas Principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by discounting the learned-intermediary doctrine when fraud allegations were based on a drug-marketing video shown to patients; (2) whether expert testimony should have been required to assist in establishing that the existing warning was unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the product's side-effects warning can prove causation of one of those effects. In his case the Hamiltons sued after Patricia Hamilton developed lupus-like symptoms from a drug she used to treat her Crohn's disease. They alleged Centocor, the drug manufacturer, used direct-to-patient advertising that did not include side-effects warnings about symptoms she developed. A jury found Centocor committed fraud and awarded damages, including punitive damages. On review, the appeals court rejected Centocor's argument that the learned-intermediary doctrine shielded it from liability because Mrs. Hamilton's prescribing doctor was responsible for warning her about adverse effects. It held the doctrine was defeated when the manufacturer was misleading in a promotional video by omitting potential adverse effects. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue is whether in a health-care liability case the required preliminary expert assessment must address both direct and vicarious liability theories. In this case the patient sued a temporary staffing agency over a male nurse's alleged inappropriate touching and questioning, claiming Certified EMS, the employer, was vicariously liable for the nurse's conduct and negligent itself in its employee's training and supervision. On an adequacy challenge to expert reports, the court of appeals rejected Certified EMS's objections, reasoning that at least one report was adequate for vicarious liability even though it was inadequate for direct liability.

In this dispute over an alleged contract breach to sell oil-and-gas working interests the issues are (1) whether a fact issue exists on the parties' intent to be bound by terms expressed in emails; (2) whether a fact issue exists that those emails showed the sellers waived a "definitive agreement"; and (3) whether the sellers established defenses under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.

17-0404

Two principal issues are (1) whether a mineral-rights owner exercised reasonable diligence, to avoid limitations, by relying on a fraudulent plat the drilling operator filed with the Texas Railroad Commission instead of a third-party survey in the commission's records would have shown the operator's fraud and (2) whether the mineral-rights owner ratified an unauthorized pooling agreement by knowingly accepting royalties from the unit. Hooks sued for underpaid royalties from Samson, the operator, alleging the operator did not pay royalties on minerals it took in slant-drilling from a "bottom hole" that was within the scope of Hooks' lease. Hooks also claimed unpaid royalties from a pooled unit that Samson created by unilaterally terminating an existing producing unit without authority to do so. Samson contends Hooks sued too late on the fraud claim because Hooks could have discovered the misleading information locating the bottom hole before the limitations deadline. Samson also argues that Hooks accepted royalties from the unauthorized unit, negating the breach-of-contract claim. The trial court ruled for Hooks and awarded damages on the fraud and contract claims, but the court of appeals reversed on both.

The principal issue in this case is whether immunity protects the county from a lawsuit alleging it breached settlement of a claim for which it did not have immunity involving litigation not between the parties in this case.

A principal issue is whether dismissal by nonsuit of a health care-liability claim delays the statutory expert-report deadline. In this case the Lidjis, suing on their son's behalf, nonsuited their claim 116 days after its filing (four days before the expert-report deadline). When they refilled the suit more than two years later, the Lidjis served an expert report on the same day. The Lidjis argue that their nonsuit tolls the deadline for the expert report. The hospital moved to dismiss, contending the deadline for the report passed. The trial court denied the hospital's dismissal motion and the court of appeals affirmed.

The issue in this case is whether an employee's report of sexual harassment by a coworker and comments about the matter to another coworker fall within the employee's scope of employment for purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act.

The issues in this case alleging lawyers destroyed evidence in a wrongful-death claim are (1) whether civil procedure Rule 91a allows a plaintiff's claims to be dismissed for an affirmative defense like attorney immunity; (2) whether Bethel alleges conduct for which Texas law provides an attorney immunity; and (3) whether Bethel preserved her argument that affirmative defenses cannot be a proper basis for a Rule 91a dismissal.

In this case over a "cost-free" overriding royalty on gross minerals production, from wells on Hyder's property that produced from an adjoining leasehold, a principal issue is whether post-production costs may be deducted from Hyder's overriding royalties. Hyder sued Chesapeake for underpaying royalties from Chesapeake's slant-drilling production from wells on Hyder's land. The central dispute is whether Hyder's lease with Chesapeake for oil-and-gas production from her minerals estate, allowing for post-production costs, should inform a provision that provides a cost-free 5 percent royalty for directional production from adjacent estates. The trial court ruled that Hyder was entitled to an overriding royalty free of post-production costs. The court of appeals affirmed.

The issues are (1) whether the implied covenant of seisen attaches automatically to a special-warranty deed and (2) whether the merger doctrine applies to bar Chicago Title's contract-breach claim.

The issue is whether Linegar has standing to sue for legal malpractice and related claims if his only injury was losing his retirement money held by a corporate trustee. This case involves a temporary loan that Linegar, as chair, director and sole shareholder of the corporate trustee holding his retirement fund, authorized from the retirement fund to a company in which he was the largest shareholder. That company, IdentiPHI Inc., resulted from a merger between a company Linegar controlled and a Seattle company. Linegar alleges DLA Piper, which represented the Seattle company in the merger and became the new company's counsel, later represented him in the details of the temporary financing for the new company. Linegar claims, however, that DLA Piper failed to secure the loan properly and, when the new company declared bankruptcy, his retirement fund was his direct loss, not the corporate trustee's, and his alleged malpractice claim arose from DLA Piper's advice to him. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded Linegar the retirement fund's value and other damages. The appeals court reversed, holding that Linegar did not have standing to sue as a shareholder because the loan was from the corporate trustee.

The issue in this case is whether modifying an engineering plan without an engineer's statutorily required seal is a discretionary act for which the Texas Department of Transportation retains immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.

The issues are (1) whether a party who failed to admit negligence during discovery but admitted negligence during trial should be sanctioned for discovery abuse and (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supports the jury's gross-negligence finding.

A principal issue is whether a fraud claim, alleging misrepresentations to get a widow's consent for an autopsy, constitutes a health care-liability case requiring a threshold expert report. Carswell sued St. Catherine, the Katy hospital where her husband died in 2004 after his admission following emergency treatment for severe pain. The hospital treated him with narcotic pain-killers. In her complaint Carswell alleged medical malpractice, claiming in part that St. Catherine's staff did not monitor her husband after different narcotics were given to him the morning he died. He was scheduled for release later that day. A hospital worker found him crossways in his bed, unresponsive. A year and a half after filing her malpractice suit Carswell amended her case to add the fraud claim, alleging she consented to a complete and independent autopsy but the autopsy actually was done by a hospital affiliated with St. Catherine and by a pathologist who was not trained to determine a cause of death. Conflicting evidence addressed whether the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office, which has jurisdiction to conduct autopsies for unexplained or mysterious deaths, was contacted about an autopsy or what the medical examiner was told. In response to the suit, CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast, St. Catherine's owner at the time, moved to dismiss Carswell's case, arguing that autopsies fall under the state's medical-liability law's definitions of health care-liability claims that include "professional or administrative services directly related to health care." But Carswell never filed an expert report to substantiate her fraud allegations, which the law requires before a health care-liability case can go to trial. The trial court ruled the fraud claim was not one for health-care liability and rendered judgment in her favor. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the fraud claim.

A principal issue in this dispute over a third-party administrator's payments to hospitals for services to HMO patients is whether the Texas Prompt Pay Statute requires privity between the hospitals and the health-maintenance organization. Several hospital groups sued Aetna for payment delays after Aetna refused to pay claims by two third-party administrators that went insolvent. In this case the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Aetna, holding that the prompt-pay law required that the hospitals must have contracted directly with Aetna and not with its delegated claims-processors.

In this mandamus action the issue is whether a medical peer-review committee's report recommending no discipline must be disclosed to a physician it investigated. The physician, sued for malpractice, sought the report's disclosure after the hospital, which he named as a responsible third party, contended he was responsible for a surgery error. Franklin, the physician, argues that the Texas Occupations Code, which makes medical peer-review proceedings and records confidential, requires in section 160.007(a) disclosure to a physician the committee is investigating if the committee "takes action that could result in" discipline against the physician. By meeting to review the surgery mistake, the doctor contends, the committee took action and that could have resulted in discipline. The trial court ordered the hospital to produce the report. The court of appeals denied the hospital its requested mandamus relief.

06-0127 William Chu v. Chong Hui Hong from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Murry B. Cohen, Houston For respondent: G. Stanley Cramb, Bedford The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether third party can be liable in tort under Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. A principal issue arising from this divorce proceeding is whether an independent tort claim exists against a third party under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act when the alleged misconduct was fraud on the marital community. This case challenges a husband's sale of a doughnut store without his wife's consent as part-owner, allegedly with Chu's help in his capacity as attorney for the buyers. After the sale, the husband transferred the proceeds to Korean relatives before he then filed for divorce. Hong, the ex-wife, sued her ex-husband for divorce and Chu as a third party for fraud on the community estate. Jurors awarded damages for lost value and lost profits for the shop and $1.5 million in punitive damages against Chu. The court of appeals affirmed.

Among principal issues arising from the San Jacinto River Authority's request for expedited declaration that its water rates to secure bonds are valid: (1) whether the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act allows the river authority to seek the declarations it seeks in this case; (2) whether the act's procedures violate due process; (3) whether the declarations concern public or private rights; (4) whether the cities may contest the act's constitutionality; and (5) whether the cities are immune from this declaratory action.

At issue in this case is whether a police officer in a high-speed chase acted with reckless disregard such that the emergency exception under the Texas Tort Claims Act does not apply and immunity is waived.

This case concerns the City of Austin's immunity from premises-defect claims arising from an accident that occurred on a City-owned sidewalk.

10-0316 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues are (1) whether the evidence raises a material fact issue on each element of a regulatory taking claim and (2) whether the evidence raises a material fact issue under the Mayhew/Penn Central balancing test.

07-0284 City of Dallas v. Kenneth E. Albert, et al. from Collin County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas consolidated with 07-0288, City of Dallas v. David S. Martin, et al. For petitioner: Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas For respondents: Charles W. McGarry, Dallas, and E. Lee Parsley, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether governmental immunity protects the city from a declaratory judgment that could impose a billion-dollar liability for back pay, benefits and interest to Dallas police, firefighters and emergency workers; (2) whether a suit like this, seeking to enforce an ordinance passed by referendum, is exempt from governmental immunity; and (3) whether by withdrawing a counterclaim the city may restore its immunity. Employees sued to declare the effect of a 1979 referendum imposing by ordinance, they argue, minimum salary increases across the board and for breach of contract for the city's alleged failure to provide those raises. The trial court denied the city's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals held that a declaratory-judgment action waives governmental immunity for prospective relief, affirming the trial court in part, but the court reversed the trial court on the city's immunity on the contract-breach claims. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this case are (1) whether requiring the board of a pension fund to approve amendments to the city code is an improper delegation of authority; and (2) whether an ordinance that changes one part of the city code constitutes an amendment to another part of the code.

07-0931 City of Dallas v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas from Travis County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: James B. Pinson, Dallas For respondent: James C. Ho, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether delay for records clarification postpones 10-day deadline for city to seek public-information ruling by attorney general. The issues are (1) whether the Public Information Act's 10-day deadline for a government entity to seek an attorney general's opinion on records disclosure is postponed while the city awaits clarification on the records request and (2) whether the city can be compelled to disclose privileged attorney-client information if the request for the attorney general's opinion was not submitted by the statutory deadline. In this case the city got two requests for records, one that it sought to clarify and the other resulting from that clarification request. Nine days after the second request, the city asked the attorney general for an opinion on whether certain requested information was covered by the attorney-client privilege and not subject to disclosure. When the attorney general answered that the request included privileged information that had to be disclosed because the city missed the deadline, the city sued the attorney general. The trial court ruled for the attorney general and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning in part that city did not show a compelling reason for withholding the records. The Court will hear three arguments beginning at 9 a.m. in the Hillcrest Classroom in the Underwood Law Library at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law in Dallas. Each side in each case will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0284 City of Dallas v. Kenneth E. Albert, et al. from Collin County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas consolidated with 07-0288, City of Dallas v. David S. Martin, et al. For petitioner: Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas For respondents: Charles W. McGarry, Dallas, and E. Lee Parsley, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether governmental immunity protects the city from a declaratory judgment that could impose a billion-dollar liability for back pay, benefits and interest to Dallas police, firefighters and emergency workers; (2) whether a suit like this, seeking to enforce an ordinance passed by referendum, is exempt from governmental immunity; and (3) whether by withdrawing a counterclaim the city may restore its immunity. Employees sued to declare the effect of a 1979 referendum imposing by ordinance, they argue, minimum salary increases across the board and for breach of contract for the city's alleged failure to provide those raises. The trial court denied the city's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals held that a declaratory-judgment action waives governmental immunity for prospective relief, affirming the trial court in part, but the court reversed the trial court on the city's immunity on the contract-breach claims. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0257 City of Dallas v. Heather Stewart from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: Barbara Rosenberg, Dallas For respondent: Julius S. Staev, Dallas The issue in this takings claim over a house the city demolished as a nuisance is whether res judicata or collateral estoppel attaches to a final determination by a legislatively created, quasi-judicial board. In this case the Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board declared Stewart's house a nuisance after years of standing vacant and in disrepair. As Stewart appealed the standards board's nuisance determination to the trial court, the city demolished the house under authority granted by Local Government Code chapters 54 and 214. Stewart then pressed an unconstitutional-takings claim, arguing the city took her property without fair compensation. In response the city pleaded that the takings claim depended on relitigating the standards board's nuisance finding, but Stewart failed to appeal that specifically to the trial court. After a trial, a jury found the city had unconstitutionally taken Stewart's property and awarded damages. The trial court rejected the city's res judicata defense. The court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0265 City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: Charles Estee, Dallas For respondent: James C. Mosser and Alexis F. Steinberg, Dallas For amicus curiae: Bill Davis, Austin Principal issues are (1) whether the vehicle-storage company has a vested property interest in stolen cars police seized from the company's tow lot and (2) whether the cars' seizure is a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. VSC, which operates a storage facility for vehicles towed without owners' consent, sued over as many as 277 vehicles seized by city police with search warrants for vehicles reported stolen, involved in felonies or with altered identification numbers. VSN claims it lost as much as $250,000 in fees it would have charged the owners for storage and towing. The trial court denied the city's jurisdictional plea, seeking dismissal, and the court of appeals affirmed for the most part. The appeals court held that the city's exercise of its police power in this case could be an unconstitutional taking.The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue in this dispute over back pay the issue is whether the Texas Local Government Code's immunity-waiver provision is triggered when the back-pay claim is based on an provision for on-call pay in an employment manual that disclaims any provision in it can be considered contractual.

The issues in this case are whether two employees' report of misconduct by an unpaid city councilmember qualifies for protection under the Texas Whistleblower Act and whether there is sufficient evidence that the report caused the employees' termination.

07-1031 City of DeSoto v. Justin White from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: Amber L. Slayton, Dallas For respondent: Randy Doubrava, Austin The principal issue is whether a hearing examiner had jurisdiction over an appeal from a police officer's indefinite suspension because the city failed to inform the suspended officer, as required by the Civil Service Act, that choosing a hearing examiner to review his disciplinary action limited his appeal of the examiner's decision. White sued for reinstatement when the city, in its formal suspension notification, failed to follow the requirement that it inform him of restrictions on appellate issues from a hearing examiner's decision. He had assistance of counsel when he chose the hearing examination route. The trial court granted him summary judgment and ordered his reinstatement, holding that the notification requirement on the hearing examination procedure deprived the examiner of jurisdiction over the case. The court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

City of El Paso, et al. v. Lilli M. Heinrich from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioners: Eric G. Calhoun, Dallas, and Hadley A. Huchton, El Paso Respondent: Stewart W. Forbes, El Paso The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether immunity protects pension board sued over recalculated pension. The principal issues in this lawsuit to determine a widow's pension benefits are (1) whether the city and pension-benefits board retain immunity if the suit essentially is for money damages and (2) whether officials sued as individuals had governmental or official immunity. Heinrich sued after the pension board reduced by a third the pension she received after her police officer husband's death. That reflected the board's calculation for benefits that, it contended, should have been for her son under bylaws in effect when her husband died. The board initially approved 100 percent of the benefits to Heinrich, then determined in the later recalculation that the full-benefits provision to a spouse became effective after Heinrich's husband died. At first she sued for an amount she alleged was owed, but later pleaded the suit as one to declare her rights to the pension as originally calculated. The trial court denied the board's immunity defense. The court of appeals affirmed.

The issues in this challenge to a city ordinance restricting "eight-liner" gaming locations are (1) whether the statutory "fuzzy-animal exception" for games of chance preempts the ordinance and (2) whether the exception violates the state constitution's lottery prohibition

This whistleblower dispute asks (1) what constitutes a covered report for purposes of the Texas Whistleblower Act, (2) whether the alleged report was based on an objectively reasonable belief that criminal activity had occurred, and (3) whether there was legally sufficient evidence that the report caused an adverse employment action.

In this next stage of dueling between the city and the city's pension system over onetime municipal employees employed by spinoff city corporations - and whether and how much the city owes for their pension contributions - the principal issues are (1) whether under the first stage decision by this Court, Klumb v. Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, the employees are covered by the pension system; (2) whether the pension system's ultra vires suit appropriate to enforce a meet-and-confer agreement with the city; (3) whether the pension system's public-information suit is barred because it was against the city and not a public-information officer; and (4) whether the pension system instead of its board has standing under the pension-requirements statute.

The principal issue is whether a city order forcing homeowners to vacate their condominium units later reversed for violating their due-process rights precludes their inverse-condemnation suit for the time they were barred from their homes. After city investigations that found the building was not covered by an occupancy permit and the condominium units unsafe, Houston city officials ordered the residents to vacate their homes. In ensuing litigation, the vacate order was reversed on due-process grounds. The homeowners then sued for inverse condemnation. On that claim, the trial court granted the city's jurisdictional plea, which argued in part that the homeowners had no right to occupy the property without the required occupancy permit and that the city did not take the property for public use. A divided appeals court reversed.

At issue in this case is whether a police officer acted with reckless disregard such that the Texas Tort Claims Act's emergency exception does not apply, and whether the officer acted in good faith such that he is entitled to official immunity.

The issue in this case is whether the Tort Claims Act waives the City of Houston's immunity in a negligence suit for damages caused by a Houston Police Department officer.

Principal issues in this employment-discrimination appeal are (1) whether a fire captain's reassignment from "fire suppression" work to training duties - allegedly because he avoided firefighting - constituted unlawful discrimination without a medical evaluation and (2) whether the trial court properly gave injunctive relief without a damages award and the city, in response to an arbitration order, had returned him to firefighting duty before he filed his lawsuit. Proler also argues that the city's petition for review was not filed in time, so the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. In this case the city challenges a trial court's decision affirming a hearing officer's order reinstating Proler, the fire captain, to duty in a fire station. Proler complained that his assignment to the training academy for a second time was discrimination based on a perceived but undiagnosed disability. In a split decision the appeals court upheld the trial court's employment-discrimination ruling.

The issue in this case challenging Laredo's plastic-bag-ban ordinance is whether state solid-waste law preempts the city's ban with "unmistakable clarity."

At issue in this breach-of-contract case is whether League City's entering into an agreement with Jimmy Changas, Inc., for the construction of a restaurant was a governmental action such that the City is immune from suit or a proprietary action.

The issue is whether a city's moratorium on sewer connections should apply to unsold lots in a platted development the city approved before the moratorium. In this case BMTP Holdings, the developer, sued to prevent the city from halting sewer connections to seven lots in two approved subdivisions. BMTP argues that Local Government Code section 212.131, defining property development for a city's moratorium such as this one, applies only when all development plans have not been completed. The trial court denied BMTP's summary-judgment motion. The court of appeals reversed the city's summary judgment, holding that section 212.131 excluded from the moratorium a subdivision that had been platted and approved.

11-0367 City of North Richland Hills v. Laura Friend and Luther Friend from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Fredrick Wayne "Fritz" Quast, Fort Worth For respondents: Darrell L. Keith, Fort Worth For amicus curiae State of Texas: Rance L. Craft, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the city waived its immunity when city water-park staff responded to a 12-year-old girl's heart attack with resuscitation equipment that did not include heart defibrillators available in the park and (2) whether, as in this case, the city and its employees are sued at the same time, the Texas Tort Claims Act bars suit against either or whether the city consented to suit by waiving its immunity under the act. The Friends sued the city after their daughter died. When she collapsed, employees at the city-owned park did not use available defibrillators on her. The Friends argue the city waived its immunity under the theory that the city employees misused tangible personal property because the resuscitation equipment did not contain an integral safety component. The trial court denied the city's jurisdictional plea. The appeals court affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

06-0948 City of Pasadena v. Richard Smith from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston On rehearing For petitioner: Kevin D. Jewell, Houston For respondent: Heidi L. Widell, San Antonio For amicus curiae, State of Texas: James C. Ho, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether a city has a right to appeal a hearing officer's decision dismissing a disciplinary proceeding when the basis for the examiner's decision was mistaken law. The principal issue is whether a city has a right to appeal a hearing officer's decision dismissing a disciplinary proceeding when the basis for the decision was mistaken law. In this case Smith, a Pasadena police officer, appealed an indefinite suspension to a hearing examiner. State law provides for an appeal from a civil service commission decision, but not from a hearing examiner's decision. The trial court dismissed the appeal on Smith's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals affirmed. In this Court, the city argues that the hearing examiner's decision can be appealed under a provision allowing for an appeal when the examiner has exceeded her jurisdiction - and that a mistake of law is exceeding jurisdiction. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue is whether Oncor's pro-forma provision in its revised tariff abrogated its contractual obligation and the common law to shift relocation costs from the company to the city.

The issues, involving a motorcyclist injured when he tried to avoid traffic slowing as a patrol officer used his car's emergency lights, the issues are (1) whether enough evidence established a nexus between the patrol car's use and the motorcyclist's injuries; (2) whether bystanders' statements that the accident was the police officer's fault were speculative; (3) whether the police officer's use of his patrol car's lights was too attenuated from the accident; and (4) whether needs-risk balancing the correct standard for determining good faith in non-pursuit officer immunity cases.

The issues in this case, involving one vehicle under police pursuit colliding with a third car when the pursued car traveled the wrong way on a highway access road, are (1) whether a nexus exists between injuries and operation of the patrol car enough to waive the city' immunity; (2) whether the Masperos showed enough evidence of recklessness by the police officer to be an exception to the immunity waiver; and (3) whether negligent policy implementation constitutes an independent ground for immunity waiver.

08-0121 City of Waco v. Debra Kirwan from McLennan County and the 10th District Court of Appeals, Waco For petitioner: Charles D. Olson, Waco For respondent: Michael Singley, Austin For amicus curiae State of Texas: David S. Morales, Austin The principal issues in this case involving a death in a fall at a city park are (1) whether the Recreational Use Statute allows a premises-defect claim based on a natural condition and (2) whether the plaintiff presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the city's gross negligence. Kirwan's son died when he fell 60 feet as a rock precipice gave way under him. To get to the cliff, Kirwan's son had to pass a stone wall across a path and a warning sign. Under the Recreational Use Statute, the landowner - in this case, Waco - does not owe a duty of care greater than that owed a trespasser for inherent natural dangers. Kirwan argues the statute's exception for gross negligence applies to a premises defect for a naturally occurring condition and points to a graduate student's report offered to the city that warned of falling rock dangers to walkers on paths below limestone cliffs at the park as evidence of the city's knowledge of the danger and its gross negligence in failing to fix the dangers. Waco, however, argues that gross negligence may only be established by showing a landowner created a condition that a recreational user would not reasonably expect on the property. The trial court granted to city's jurisdictional plea, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute did not prohibit a premise defect based on natural conditions. The appeals court also held that Kirwan raised a material fact issue to support her gross-negligence claim. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

06-0089 City of Waco v. Robert Lopez from Limestone County and the 10th District Court of Appeals, Waco For petitioner: Enid Wade, Waco For respondent: R. John Cullar, Waco The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether Commission on Human Rights Act is exclusive remedy for retaliation claim. In this employment-discrimination case, the principal issues are (1) whether the Commission on Human Rights Act offers the exclusive remedy for a retaliation claim; (2) whether the city's equal employment-opportunity policy is a "law" under the state Whistleblower Act; (3) whether the act only applies to reporting law violations detrimental to the public good; and (4) whether an alleged equal-employment policy violation was reported in good faith to an appropriate law-enforcement agency. Lopez was fired after alleged misuse of a city vehicle and claims the firing was in response to his age- and race-discrimination complaint filed months earlier with the city's equal-employment opportunity officer. The city answered Lopez's Whistleblower Act suit with a jurisdictional plea and summary-judgment motion, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed.

07-0485 City of Waco v. Larry Kelley from McLennan County and the 10th District Court of Appeals, Waco For petitioner: David W. Holman, Houston For respondent: LaNelle L. McNamara, Waco, and Richard W. Carter, Fort Worth The Supreme Court will hear arguments of whether hearing examiner exceeded his authority by ordering a fired police officer to be reinstated at reduced rank. A principal issue is whether state law allows a hearing examiner to order temporary suspension and reduction in rank of an assistant police chief indefinitely suspended after a drunken-driving arrest. In this case Kelley had been indefinitely suspended after his arrest in 2001. Waco argues that the hearing examiner reviewing the assistant police chief's discipline violated Texas Local Government Code section 143.053(e) because the examiner was limited, after finding the allegation to be true, to upholding Kelley's firing. Section 143.053(e) gives hearing examiners three options in reviewing a police officer's suspension: dismissal, temporary suspension or restoring the officer to previous rank. The trial court upheld the examiner's decision to suspend Kelley temporarily and to reinstate him as a sergeant. In a split decision, the appeals court reinstated Kelley as a commander, a higher rank than the examiner decided, but a rank lower than assistant chief.

The issue is whether an intentional tort under the Texas Tort Claims Act is defined only by a government employee's intent to act or by both the intent to act and the resulting harm. In this case Gordon sued for injuries to his wrists after officers arresting him for drunken-driving handcuffed him (too tightly, he complained). The city moved to dismiss on a jurisdictional plea, arguing that Gordon's claim was barred by the intentional-tort exception to the immunity waiver for tangible personal-property use under the tort claims act because the handcuffing itself was intentional. The trial court denied the city's plea. On interlocutory review, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Gordon pleaded facts to establish negligence and the handcuffing, in any event, followed the officers' affidavit testimony that it was according to training standards and not to intentionally injure him.

A principal issue in this school-financing challenge to the district's alleged unequal support for certain schools is whether the parents were required to exhaust administrative remedies before suing the district on a constitutional claim. In this case parents claimed the district's disparate support among its schools violated the state Constitution's equal-rights provision. Clint school district moved to dismiss on a jurisdictional plea because the parents did not raise their challenge in an administrative proceeding before suing. The trial court granted the district's plea, but the court of appeals reversed, holding the challenge raised constitutional claims exempt from the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement.

Among issues in this convoluted limited-partnership breakup are (1) whether two partners breached their partnership agreement by allowing the partnership to default on financing and selling its assets in foreclosure; (2) whether tort claims - trade-secret misappropriation and contract interference - can support conspiracy claims; and (3) whether the appeals court erred by permanently enjoining defendants based on a presumption of imminent harm.

10-0688 CMH Homes Inc., et al. v. Adam Perez from Duval County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Mr. Scott A. Brister, Austin For respondent: Mr. Brendan McBride, San Antonio The principal issue is whether a trial court order appointing an arbitrator in lieu of the parties' impasse is subject to interlocutory review under Civil Practices and Remedies Code . If not, counsel for CMH Homes argues that the interlocutory appeal should be considered a mandamus petition, inviting the Court to adopt the concurrence in In re D. Wilson Construction Co. (at 784, suggesting an improper appeal should be treated as a mandamus petition). This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues in this case brought against a tenant operating a coin-operated laundry in an apartment complex are (1) whether the tenant is entitled to limited possession until evicted and whether it's liable in tort for wrongful possession and, if so, (2) whether the continuing-tort doctrine tolls the statutory limitations for alleged torts. In this case Aspenwood bought an apartment complex in foreclosure and tried to evict Coinmach's laundry facilities, but Coinmach ultimately won on appeal. After several years during which Coinmach paid rent (Aspenwood never cashed the checks) Aspenwood sued in district court for tort damages for trespass and for interfering with a contract Aspenwood had with another laundry-machine company and claimed damages to when Coinmach's lease ended with the foreclosure sale under the continuing-tort doctrine. The trial court ruled Coinmach was a tenant at sufferance and had a right to possession until judicially evicted and granted summary judgment for the laundry operator. The court of appeals agreed that Coinmach was a tenant at sufferance, but held that Coinmach did not have a possessory interest in the leasehold and that Aspenwood could sue for trespass back to when the lease ended and for tortious interference with a contract.

The issue in this case is whether claims against an assisted living facility arising out of a resident's fall on the facility's sidewalk, pleaded as premises liability claims, are health care liability claims under the Texas Medical Liability Act and therefore require an expert report.

In this challenge to a deputy sheriff's firing, a principal issue is whether the Texas Government Code's requirement that a misconduct complaint against a law-enforcement officer be in writing and signed by the complainant applies to an "internal" complaint - that is, in this case, when a county prosecutor brought evidentiary concerns to the sheriff in a case involving the deputy.

06-0372 Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare L.P. v. Alice H. Hawley and James A. Hawley from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Charles Watson, Austin For respondents: Darrin Mitchell Walker, Kingwood The Supreme Court will hear arguments on among principal issues in this medical-malpractice and wrongful death case against a hospital are (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing an instruction on new and independent cause when a pathology report diagnosed cancer that the patient did not receive for almost a year; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing a "lost chance" instruction when conflicting evidence assessed the patient's survival chances; and (3) whether by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the independent pathologist's negligence the trial court commingled valid and invalid liability theories. The Hawleys sued the hospital, claiming the hospital was at fault for the pathology report's delay and that when she learned of the cancer after it became untreatable. She died while the case was on appeal. The trial court refused instructions on new and independent cause - that the doctors' delay in reading the pathology report caused any delay in the prospect of treatment; on "lost chance" - that the delay did not harm her because her chances of survival might have been less than 50 percent; and on not taking account of the pathologist's possible negligence as negligence by the hospital, because the pathologist worked for an independent contractor, not the hospital. The court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issue in this case is whether the district court is required to submit questions on life expectancy and annual healthcare expenses to the jury under the Periodic Payment Statute. Ana Ramirez (Ramirez) went to Valley Regional Medical Center (Valley Regional) for premature labor with her son. Ramirez was primarily under the care of her nurses. Her obstetrician was on call. During her stay, the baby's heartbeat repeatedly dropped. Ramirez's obstetrician performed an emergency c-section. The umbilical cord was tightly wrapped around the baby's neck, cutting off oxygen. The baby was ultimately diagnosed with cerebral palsy.

In this health care-liability case, alleging nurses should have prevented transfer of a patient who died on an acute pregnancy complication in an ambulance en route from a Harlingen hospital to one in Corpus Christi, the issues are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal; (2) whether the court of appeals applied the proper causation standard for expert medical reports; and (3) whether a nurse expert was properly qualified as an expert.

09-0481 Susan Combs and Greg Abbott v. Texas Entertainment Association Inc. and Karpod Inc. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: James C. Ho, Austin For respondent: Craig T. Enoch, Austin The issue is whether the First Amendment free-speech clause prohibits the state from collecting the so-called pole tax on each patron at clubs, restaurants or bars serving alcohol with live nude entertainment. In this lawsuit, the trial court declared the $5 tax unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the state comptroller from collecting it. The court of appeals affirmed in a split decision, holding that the tax was a content-based limitation on protected speech. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

This case addresses whether the Texas Citizens Participation Act applies to claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, and breach-of-contract stemming from the sale of a major sports network.

The issues in this case by an Ohio wedding shop shuttered by an Ebola-virus-contamination scare are (1) whether a corporation asserting only economic damages can be a "claimant" under the state's health-care-liability law and (2) whether the case itself is a health-care-liability claim.

The principal issues are (1) whether a cardiovascular surgeon's firing, under a contract provision allowing termination without cause after a set employment period, requires the employer to prove it fired the surgeon on without-cause grounds to disprove a contract-breach claim; (2) whether the employment contract's stipulation for "annual practice losses" is ambiguous and, if not, whether the hospital the employer established the condition to terminate without cause; (3) whether a tortious interference-with-contract claim is precluded if the contract was not breached; and (4) whether the Second Torts Restatement's truthful-information defense (section 772) should be adopted in this case and, if so, whether it would cover a consultant's performance assessment to preclude the tortious-interference claim.

In this appeal challenging summary judgment for the bank's affirmative Uniform Commercial Code defenses, in a case in which an account was emptied by fraud, the issues are (1) which of two deposit agreements govern; (2) whether the bank customer was negligent as a legal matter for failing to monitor the account when the account was depleted; and (3) whether the bank sent or made "available" bank statements to the customer when it mailed them to an imposter.

In this dispute over ownership and minerals proceeds, among the issues are (1) whether a boundary stipulation is enforceable; (2) whether, if not enforceable, the stipulation was ratified; (3) whether Concho is a bad-faith trespasser if Ellison has superior title; and (4) whether more than one party can be a "payor" for oil-and-gas proceeds under Natural Resources Code sections 91.401(2) and 91.404.

A principal issue is whether the rule against perpetuities voids a non-participating royalty interest.

The issues in this royalties dispute are (1) whether a grandmother's bequest of all "right, title and interest" in her ranch includes minerals after the surface estate was severed; (2) whether grandchildren who took remainder mineral interests from their father as life tenant can recover royalties Conoco paid on leases it executed without their signatures; (3) whether the appeals court erred by awarding prejudgment interest to the grandchildren, under the Natural Resources Code, for pressing a title dispute; and (4) whether the court erred by awarding the grandchildren $1.1 million in attorneys fees.

At issue in this case is the proper calculation of Kenneth Hahn’s royalty interest in a tract of land in DeWitt County, Texas.

The issues are (1) whether an employee is a "participant" under Farm Animals Activities Act; (2) whether Zuniga was such a participant under the act; and (3) whether the ranch owners are subject to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.

The issues in this dispute over pricing an expanded easement is whether multiple emails establish an agreement satisfying the statute of frauds (1) if the emails are to different recipients containing futuristic language, (2) if the landowners identified as one lawyer's "clients" are enough to satisfy essential terms to identify the parties and (3) if the easement-location description properly identifies the property interest conveyed.

The issues in this case, alleging Cornerstone executives wrongfully steered an opportunity for the company - purchase of a Texas-based hospital chain - to an unrelated out-of-state investment fund, are (1) whether Texas has specific personal jurisdiction over the nonresident private-equity funds' general partner for its alleged in-state due diligence for the Texas acquisition and, by deciding on the purchase, ostensibly benefited from tortious activity in Texas and (2) whether the Texas contacts of that general partner or its knowledge was shared by the limited-partner investment funds. In this case Cornerstone claimed Nautic Management, through its managing director, Scott Hilinski, furthered Cornerstone executives' wrongdoing: Charged with finding Cornerstone investment opportunities, they identified the hospital chain as an acquisition target but instead proposed to Hilinski that his private-equity funds purchase the hospital chain. Cornerstone claims Hilinski, through Nautic Management, investigated the investment prospect on trips to Texas in which he also met with the Cornerstone executives, then recommended the Texas hospital chain be acquired out-of-state subsidiaries Hilinski controlled. Cornerstone's executives, including its chief executive, resigned after the acquisition to run the chain. Cornerstone argues that Nautic Management's knowledge can be imputed to each of the subsidiary funds and that Nautic's contacts are contacts of the others because of Hilinski's central role. Nautic and the Reliant limited partnerships counter that personal jurisdiction cannot be established over nonresident entities that indirectly invested in the Texas hospital chain. The trial court granted the funds' special appearances to contest jurisdiction but denied Nautic Management's. In the intermediate appeal, the court held that the funds lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas, affirming the trial court, and reversed the ruling denying Nautic Management's special appearance.

The issues in this case, alleging Cornerstone executives wrongfully steered an opportunity for the company - purchase of a Texas-based hospital chain - to an unrelated out-of-state investment fund, are (1) whether Texas has specific personal jurisdiction over the nonresident private-equity funds' general partner for its alleged in-state due diligence for the Texas acquisition and, by deciding on the purchase, ostensibly benefited from tortious activity in Texas and (2) whether the Texas contacts of that general partner or its knowledge was shared by the limited-partner investment funds. In this case Cornerstone claimed Nautic Management, through its managing director, Scott Hilinski, furthered Cornerstone executives' wrongdoing: Charged with finding Cornerstone investment opportunities, they identified the hospital chain as an acquisition target but instead proposed to Hilinski that his private-equity funds purchase the hospital chain. Cornerstone claims Hilinski, through Nautic Management, investigated the investment prospect on trips to Texas in which he also met with the Cornerstone executives, then recommended the Texas hospital chain be acquired out-of-state subsidiaries Hilinski controlled. Cornerstone's executives, including its chief executive, resigned after the acquisition to run the chain. Cornerstone argues that Nautic Management's knowledge can be imputed to each of the subsidiary funds and that Nautic's contacts are contacts of the others because of Hilinski's central role. Nautic and the Reliant limited partnerships counter that personal jurisdiction cannot be established over nonresident entities that indirectly invested in the Texas hospital chain. The trial court granted the funds' special appearances to contest jurisdiction but denied Nautic Management's. In the intermediate appeal, the court held that the funds lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas, affirming the trial court, and reversed the ruling denying Nautic Management's special appearance.

The issues in this challenge to the Health and Human Services commissioner and inspector general's refusal to provide a contested-case hearing on an audit under the vendor drug program are (1) whether the challenger's request for findings and conclusions extended the deadline to appeal and thus preserved appellate jurisdiction and (2) whether McNeill was entitled to a contested-case hearing.

The issues in this dispute raising application of the accommodation doctrine to groundwater rights are (1) whether jurisdiction exists over this interlocutory appeal; (2) whether the accommodation doctrine applies to a severed groundwater estate; and (3) whether the groundwater-rights grant, providing access to the land to get the water, precludes the accommodation doctrine. Coyote Lake Ranch, a cattle-raising operation, sued Lubbock for property damage the city caused by mowing grass and building roads to drill wells to pump water it owns under the ranch. The trial court temporarily enjoined Lubbock from its work by applying the accommodation doctrine - a principle of oil-and-gas law that requires the mineral-rights owner to give "due regard" to the surface owner's rights. The appeals court overturned the temporary injunction, holding that the accommodate doctrine does not apply to groundwater rights held by an owner different from the surface owner.

The primary issues in these cases are whether the Electric Reliability Council of Texas is a "governmental unit" entitled to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and whether ERCOT has governmental immunity from suit.

The issue in this dispute over a mineral lease targeted for alleged failure to produce is whether Lona Hills Ranch, which sued to terminate the lease, may dismiss breach-of-contract counterclaims under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, arguing that by telling third-party buyers the lease lapsed it exercised free-speech rights involving a matter of public concern.

The issues are (1) whether contract disclaimers bar Credit Suisse's liability for an alleged fraudulent real property appraisal; (2) whether contract-reliance disclaimers bar the ruling that Credit Suisse fraudulently induced Claymore Holdings; and (3) whether the trial court and the appeals court erred by awarding more than $211 million in rescission damages.