In this permissive appeal regarding insurance, the primary issues are: (1) whether an insurer's duty of "good faith and fair dealing" included the insured's accidental death that occurred during the investigation of covered accident, (2) whether the insurer created a new duty by "instructing" the insured after the accident, and (3) whether the court recognized a new direct-liability, extra-contractual cause of action against the insurer for the insured's death.

In this franchise tax dispute involving the transmission of satellite radio to Texas customers, the primary issue is whether the test to determine if a service has been performed in Texas should be based on where the "receipt-producing, end-product act is done."

The primary issues in this summary-judgment case are (1) whether Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires a trial court's ruling sustaining an objection to summary-judgment evidence to be reduced to a written order and (2) whether the court of appeals erred by ordering a new trial in the interest of justice without addressing the appellee's rendition points.

The issue in this permissive interlocutory appeal is whether sections 9.201 and 9.203 of the Texas Family Code vest exclusive jurisdiction over a post-divorce partition action in the trial court that rendered the final divorce decree or whether section 23.001 of the Property Code permits a partition action over undivided community property to be filed in another court.

In this mandamus proceeding involving the Texas Medical Liability Act's limits on discovery in a health care liability claim before the claimant has served an expert report, the issues are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to produce its operating policies and procedures before the claimant served the expert report; and (2) whether the court of appeals had authority to stay the expert-report deadline pending the claimant's receipt of the documents.

The primary issue in this case is whether a corporate officer simultaneously owes a formal fiduciary duty to the corporation and an informal fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of an individual shareholder.

The question in this case is whether a party to a trust-modification proceeding entitled to a jury trial.

The issues in this case, which is governed by Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, are: (1) whether a fact issue exists about whether a landowner retained "some control" over an independent contractor's employee's work; (2) whether the common-law open-and-obvious defense applies to Chapter 95 and eliminates the landowner's duty to warn the independent contractor's employee of a danger, and if so, whether the independent contractor's employee raised a fact issue on the necessary-use exception to this defense; and (3) if the independent contractor's employee's knowledge of the dangerous condition did not obviate the landowner's obligation to issue an adequate warning, whether a fact issue exists about whether the landowner issued an adequate warning.

At issue in this case is whether Texas Central qualifies as a "railroad company" or "interurban electric railway," and whether an entity must show reasonable probability of project completion to invoke eminent domain authority under Texas Rice Land Partners, LTD. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 198, 202 (Tex. 2012). Texas Central intends to build, maintain, and operate a highspeed passenger railway between Houston and Dallas. Miles challenged Texas Central's eminent domain authority after the company attempted to survey Miles' property along the proposed route of the railway. Texas Central counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the company was "railroad company" and "interurban electric railway" under the Texas Transportation Code. The trial court granted summary judgment for Miles. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Texas Central was "operating a railroad" and thus, a "railroad company" under the statute. Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that, because Texas Central was chartered for the purpose required under the Transportation Code, the company also qualified as an "interurban electric railway."

The issue in this case is whether a formerly incarcerated individual is entitled to compensation for wrongful imprisonment under the Tim Cole Act.

The principal issue in this case is whether the rescission of a Railroad Commission (RRC) no-harm letter before Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) granted an injection-well permit rendered the application deficient or void at its issuance.

The primary issues in this case are whether (1) a release in the parties' settlement agreement bars claims that arose during the negotiation of the agreement; (2) a disclaimer of reliance in the same agreement is enforceable and bars omission-based fraud claims; and (3) the settlement agreement revoked a previous agreement's arbitration provision, despite the previous agreement's delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitration tribunal.

The issue is: When a legal malpractice plaintiff does not seek discretionary review himself, does the statute of limitations on his legal malpractice claim toll under Hughes-legal-malpractice tolling while his co-party in the underlying litigation seeks discretionary review?

The sole issue in this petition is whether a defendant is entitled to expunction of his arrest records after acquittal when he has one prior conviction for an offense that is the same as or similar to the one for which he has been acquitted. The facts in these consolidated cases are virtually identical: The defendants, K.T. and Ferris, were each convicted of DWI; each fully discharged the resulting sentence. Four years after their respective convictions, each defendant was arrested and charged with a second DWI offense. Each was acquitted, resulting in one DWI conviction and one DWI acquittal for each defendant. Both K.T. and Ferris filed petitions for expunction of the arrest records pertaining to their acquittals, and each trial court granted the petitions. In both cases, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) filed motions for new trials, contending that neither K.T. nor Ferris qualified for expunction due to an exception for acquittal expunctions. Both trial courts denied the motions for new trial; DPS appealed in both cases.

The sole issue in this petition is whether a defendant is entitled to expunction of his arrest records after acquittal when he has one prior conviction for an offense that is the same as or similar to the one for which he has been acquitted. The facts in these consolidated cases are virtually identical: The defendants, K.T. and Ferris, were each convicted of DWI; each fully discharged the resulting sentence. Four years after their respective convictions, each defendant was arrested and charged with a second DWI offense. Each was acquitted, resulting in one DWI conviction and one DWI acquittal for each defendant. Both K.T. and Ferris filed petitions for expunction of the arrest records pertaining to their acquittals, and each trial court granted the petitions. In both cases, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) filed motions for new trials, contending that neither K.T. nor Ferris qualified for expunction due to an exception for acquittal expunctions. Both trial courts denied the motions for new trial; DPS appealed in both cases.

The issues in this case are (1) whether Whataburger has an adequate remedy available on appeal when it can no longer take an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration because it had no notice of the order denying the motion until after the deadline for an appeal expired, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Whataburger’s motion to reconsider its motion to compel arbitration.